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No one is in favour of barbarism. Not even barbarians. Everyone is on the side of civilization. Hitler, Mao, and Stalin 
are recent cases in point. All three were very much 
‘pro civilization’. At least for what they took to be 
civilization. Socrates said that no one willingly strives 
for what is bad. Everyone aims for what he believes 
is good. The question is, of course:  What is truly 
good? Analogously, we should ask ourselves:  What 
is true civilization?
In searching for an answer to this important 
question, most of us tend to focus on politics and 
political ideas. We are inclined to think of states 
and ideologies as the stuff of civilization and 
barbarism. From this perspective, the Third Reich 
and Nazism, the USSR and communism qualify as 
barbaric; Western society and liberalism as civilized. 
Conservatives, of course, have grave doubts about 
liberalism, and where it is leading Western society.
I agree that politics and political ideas are vital. 
After all, as Aristotle said, the good life is a life within 
the polis. The polis needs to be a good polis, and hence 
deserves careful attention.
But politics and political ideas is not everything. 
When it comes to civilization and barbarism, the 
distinction between them is also of great use at the 
level of personal life.
There, civilization refers to, among other things, 
civility, as opposed not to martiality but to rudeness, 
impoliteness, offensiveness, which are all expressions 
of a barbaric nature on a personal level. 
Civility in this sense is very much underrated in 
our day. It is even more important than civilization 
on a political level. One can be happy and content, 
even under a tyranny, but not when surrounded 
merely by ill-mannered, loutish, boorish people. 
Civility came to full fruition in the ideal of 
the gentleman, which is, contrary to what some 
Englishmen believe, a truly European ideal. 
Historians of the ideal of the gentleman relish in 
finding differences in the way it has been understood 
in various ages and countries. They tell their reader 
that the gentleman of the Renaissance is not the 
gentleman of the Victorian Age, and that the Spanish 
gentilhombre does not equal the French gentilhomme, 
and that both differ from the Italian gentiluomo, etc. 
Andreas Kinneging All very true. But also very untrue. Because behind 
all the various manifestations, one finds the general 
idea of the gentleman transcending the boundaries 
of time and place. All it takes is a somewhat Platonic 
way of looking at things—of which historians are 
professionally incapable, of course.
Civility is not the only characteristic of the 
gentleman. He also exhibits courage in danger and 
perseverance in difficulties. He is neither a coward 
nor someone who gives up easily. Moreover, the 
gentleman is a man of sense. He is judicious and 
reasonable. Finally, he always tries to be fair, as far as 
humanly possible. One can count on his word. He is 
generous and kind.
In real life, one often feels surrounded by 
barbarians. Even in the company of self-proclaimed 
conservatives. Why is that? Obviously because most 
people, including conservatives, have forgotten the 
importance of being a gentleman. The ideal is almost 
dead.
That is terrible. It seems to me that conservatism 
should also—and perhaps in the first place—be a 
defence of the ideal of the gentleman. And let us not 
forget the ideal of the lady, its feminine counterpart, 
which is equally in need of restauration.
Where to look for inspiration? A good place to 
start, if I may be so free to make a few suggestions, are 
two witty books from 16th century Italy:  Giovanni 
Della Casa’s Il Galateo, overo de’ costume (Galateo:  The 
Rules of Polite Behaviour), published in 1558, and 
Baldassare Castiglione’s Il Cortegiano (The Book of the 
Courtier), published in 1528. The latter book especially 
was extraordinarily influential in establishing the ideal 
of the gentleman and woman in Europe. “It is hard, 
indeed, to think of any work, more opposed to the 
spirit of the modern age”, writes one of Castiglione’s 
20th century translators. And so it is.
But behind these two books lie three other books 
that are the true source of the gentlemanly ideal. 
They are all from Antiquity. They are Plato’s Republic, 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and Cicero’s On Duties. 
Of these, the first is indubitably the greatest. Every 
conservative should know them by heart.  
Andreas Kinneging is a Professor at the Law School of the 
University of Leiden in The Netherlands. He is a founder of 
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The Myopia of Cultural Relativism
Filip Mazurczak
When asked by an English reporter what he 
thought of Western civilization, Mahatma Gandhi 
reportedly quipped:  “It would be a good idea.” 
Scholars doubt that this exchange took place. However, 
the popularity of the anecdote shows how widespread 
hatred of our civilization has become, including among 
our own culturally relativistic elites.  Their self-loathing 
is frequently coupled with a glorification of the Far 
East and apologetics for Islam. 
In actuality, the West created the greatest 
civilization in world history, and it was only until after 
the Enlightenment that its decline began. A comparison 
with Oriental and Muslim societies reveals that it was 
only in the West where freedom, beauty, and the search 
for truth could flourish.
For cultural relativists, 1789 serves as the 
demarcation line between barbarism and progress. 
In their misguided view, the West before the French 
Revolution was a dim, ignorant, superstitious place. 
True enlightenment only existed in India. The 
Romans and Greeks were cruel, the Church Fathers 
were misogynists, and the Middle Ages—the ‘Dark’ 
Ages—were an unredeemable embarrassment. The 
Renaissance was temporarily treated somewhat 
better, as it was incorrectly viewed as a turn towards 
secularization, but now it is more frequently presented 
as the age of corrupt Borgia popes and the time of the 
first encounter of Europeans with the rest of the world, 
a prelude to the latter’s oppression. It was only thanks 
to the Enlightenment and French Revolution that 
the West ‘discovered’ ideals such as liberty, equality, 
and brotherhood, which finally led to ‘progress’, the 
abolition of monarchy, secularization, and notions 
of equality that have recently led to the apex of 
human achievement:  the legalization of abortion and 
homosexual ‘marriages’.
Of course, the above description of the anti-
Western historical narrative is somewhat of a caricature. 
However, this construct is more or less what most 
students in the West are taught about their civilization. 
They are indoctrinated to hate tradition, religion, and 
order, instead idealizing progress and emancipation 
and turning towards the East for guidance.
These self-hating Westerners are right about 
one thing:  1789 indeed was a watershed moment in 
Western history, insofar as the French Revolution 
created the world’s first totalitarian regime. Russian 
philosopher Vladimir Solovyov wrote that the 
difference between Christ and Marx is that the former 
asked his disciples to give their own goods to the poor, 
while the latter asked his followers to take others’ by 
force and redistribute them equally. The same applied 
to the French Revolution, which attempted to enforce 
liberty, equality, and brotherhood by the guillotine.
It was the period before the French 
Enlightenment that allowed the West to flourish. The 
interaction of Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem created a 
civilization based on the quest for truth, beauty, actual 
equality, freedom, and rationality. The ancient Greek 
philosophers taught us how to search for truth, while 
the Romans gave us the basis for modern law and, 
applying reason, constructed cities, roads, and works 
of architecture. The greatest philosophical revolution 
in the West, however, occurred after the Edict of Milan 
in 313. It was Christians who built the first hospitals 
and poorhouses, founded the oldest universities, and 
created masterpieces of art. Above all, Judeo-Christian 
values made Western man see his neighbour as an 
equal—because, to quote St. Paul, “there is neither 
Greek nor Jew”.
The French Revolution, and the French 
Enlightenment that preceded it, represents a 
hermeneutic rupture with the past, a point when 
Western thinkers detached themselves from Roman 
law, the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage, tradition, 
and the search for truth. In the 19th century, Comte 
replaced God with the cult of reason; Marx created the 
blueprint for what was to be a society without inequality 
(violently imposed, of course); Nietzsche convinced us 
that some are weak and therefore a burden to society; 
and Bentham rejected the notion that all men are 
endowed with equal dignity as “nonsense on stilts”. 
What followed was a series of true disasters:  genocides, 
wars, concentration camps, and the Gulag.
The main intellectual influencers of today’s West 
are the ideological descendants of Comte, Nietzsche, 
Bentham, and Marx—people such as Michel Foucault, 
Slavoj Žižek (who has written a panegyric about mass 
murderer Lenin), and Judith Butler. They postulate a 
world in which everything is relative, simultaneously 
elevating the homosexual agenda and abortion to 
religious dogma. Today’s post-modernists strictly reject 
the search for objective truth, especially if it does not 
fit their ideological agenda. 
For example, despite the fact that all scientific 
evidence shows that unborn children are, indeed, 
humans capable of feeling pain, that differences 
between the sexes are real, and that a child needs strong 
male and female role models for stable development, 
today’s ideologues champion the homosexual agenda 
and permissive abortion laws. They want to interfere 
directly in the democratic right to free worship. (In 
recent months in the United States, legislation intended 
to protect religious liberty in Indiana was lambasted 
by intellectual and political elites, while presidential 
candidate Hilary Clinton has said that Christianity must 
change its teaching on abortion.) In fact, many of these 
people no longer hide that they want to destroy the 
traditional family—an outcome that Marx and Engels 
prescribed in the Communist Manifesto.
Meanwhile, the West has settled for mediocrity, 
even ugliness. It is difficult to read Petrarch or marvel 
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at the perfection of Michelangelo’s sculptures without 
feeling awe and pride to be the recipient of such a rich 
inheritance. Today’s mass culture, however, strives 
for vulgarity. When Spanish philosopher José Ortega 
y Gasset wrote The Dehumanization of Art in 1925, 
he could hardly have predicted that in 1999 New 
York’s intellectual elites would venerate, as a symbol 
of religious freedom, a painting of the Virgin Mary 
covered with photographs of female genitalia from 
pornographic magazines and elephant feces.
As mentioned before, the anti-Western 
school has instead turned to the Far East, especially 
India, for inspiration. While India is a top emerging 
economy, its culture makes huge inequalities unlikely 
to disappear no matter how robust its GDP growth. 
Whereas Christianity teaches that there is “neither 
Greek nor Jew”, Hinduism retains a caste system that 
consigns millions to destitution and neglect because 
of the families into which they were born. The abuse 
of women is commonplace in India and widows, 
considered “inauspicious”, are ostracized by their 
families and villages. 
It is traditional Western values—the very ones 
that young people are taught to hold in contempt by 
academia, the Guardian, and the New York Times—that 
represent the only hope for the millions of hapless 
Indians suffering because of such (anti-progressive) 
cultural shackles. Missionaries from Europe and the 
Americas (Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity are 
the best-known example) continue to rescue countless 
Indians from filth, neglect and starvation. The Catholic 
Church in India also is a great advocate of widows’ 
rights. These moves are not motivated by proselytism: 
The faithful serve persons of all creeds, and although the 
Catholic Church is the largest charitable organization in 
India, only about 2% of the population are Christian.
Further double standards abound—courtesy of 
the proponents of moral equivalence, no less. Western 
newspapers revel in stories of sexual misconduct by a 
tiny minority of Catholic priests, despite the Vatican’s 
adoption of a strict line against deviant clergymen. In 
contrast, the late Indian Sathya Sai Baba—a cult leader 
who claimed to be a deity and to possess miraculous 
powers (such as making Rolex watches ‘materialize’, 
a trick debunked by illusionists)—was accused of 
molesting dozens of underage boys from various 
continents. Indian courts refused to investigate, 
because as a ‘holy man’ he enjoyed impunity. Such 
license strongly contrasts with the Roman concept of 
equality before the law and the separation between 
“The Triumph of  Death” by Pieter Bruegel the Elder (c. 1525-1569), a sprawling, nightmarish oil painting from 1652.  The 
work is located in the Museo del Prado in Madrid.
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Church and state dating back to Pope Gregory VII.
Today’s cultural relativists have a similarly bizarre 
approach to the Muslim world, embracing Islam and 
rejecting Christianity. A peculiar symptom of this 
inversion is that in 2007, Columbia University invited 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to speak, while one year later 
Sapienza University of Rome cancelled a planned 
lecture by Pope Benedict XVI to appease anti-clerical 
professors. The new dogma may be summarized by 
Barack Obama’s disdainful comments (putatively 
made in regard to the threat of ISIS) at his 2015 prayer 
breakfast:  “Unless we get on our high horse and 
think this is unique to some other place, remember 
that during the Crusades and the Inquisition, people 
committed terrible deeds in the name of Christ.”
Certainly, Christians have committed crimes 
towards others. However, this fact comes with two 
important qualifiers that do not attach to all other 
religions. First, the right to kill innocents was never a 
part of Christianity, which has always preached love 
of one’s neighbour and forgiveness. Misdeeds by 
Christians resulted not out of the theology, but simply 
from the wretchedness of individuals. This is not the 
case in “the religion of peace”. 
Egyptian Jesuit Samir Khalil Samir has noted 
that Islam is based on three inequalities:  between man 
and woman, freeman and slave, and Muslim and non-
believer. When during a 2006 lecture in Regensburg 
Pope Benedict XVI quoted a Byzantine emperor who 
said that Islam is incompatible with reason, Muslims 
killed an Italian nun, a missionary in Somalia, in 
response. Conversely, when Christians are constantly 
insulted on Western late-night television, they turn the 
other cheek.
Second, Christians—with extremely rare 
exceptions that are inevitable since their numbers 
exceed two billion—no longer commit violence in 
the name of their faith. Many Muslims, however, do. 
This distinction is not because more Christians live 
in developed countries and, as prevailing opinion 
holds, economic progress makes people less savage. 
Saudi Arabia, home to the two holiest cities in Islam, 
is a wealthy country that espouses Wahhabism, a 
particularly radical form of Islam, which crucifies 
apostates and subjects women to genital mutilation. 
Yet it typically receives a pass from the Left.
It is indisputable that since 1789, and especially 
in recent decades, the West has been in a state of 
decay. If it ever wants to regain its former stature, 
it must embrace the fact that it was once great and 
acknowledge the unique source of its strength. This 
revival can only happen if a fundamental change is 
made in how history is taught in the West—and if 
an honest look—unhampered by cultural relativism 
or political correctness—is taken at the differences 
between cultures.  
Filip Mazurczak is a translator and journalist whose work has 
appeared in the National Catholic Register, First Things, 
The Catholic Thing, and other publications.
AVARIM/CC BY-SA 2.0
A view of  Regensburger Dom (also known as the Cathedral of  St. Peter) and the Clock Tower of  the Altes Rathaus (Old City 
Hall) of  the city of  Regensburg in Bavaria.
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The Politics of Separatism
Alexander Biermann
Despite the European Union’s quest toward an 
“ever closer union”, numerous separatist movements 
throughout the continent continue to challenge the 
territorial integrity and cultural cohesiveness of its 
nation-state members. Paradoxically, the expansion of 
EU competencies has coincided with the devolution of 
power to various subnational regions, some of which, 
while gaining significant autonomy, push for outright 
independence. This trend toward fragmentation is 
troubling to those who believe that the Westphalian system 
offers the best framework for balancing economic growth 
and international peace with representative government 
and traditional values. 
Spain’s Catalonia, where I worked last autumn as 
an intern at the Consulate General of  the United States 
in Barcelona, is one of the regions calling Western 
Europe’s time-honoured nation-states into question. 
Madrid remains resolutely opposed to consideration of 
Catalan independence. Yet sovereignty backers there 
have experienced a high degree of success, culminating 
in a recent victory for pro-independence candidates in 
Catalonia’s regional elections on September 27.
In the foreign press, the ‘Catalan Question’ is often 
cheated of its true depth. Certainly, Catalans are upset at 
having to pay much more in taxes than they receive from 
Madrid in welfare and investments. However, this surface-
level explanation makes the movement appear merely 
as a factional spat stemming from the 2008 financial 
crisis. The ‘Catalan Question’, like other European 
separatist conflicts, cannot be explained away by facile 
reductionism. Rather, Europe’s sovereignty campaigns 
are rooted in historic identities and the desire for local 
self-determination. Thanks to inadequate responses from 
their respective oppositions, these ideological movements 
succeed in gaining the moral high ground in many debates. 
During my internship I monitored the four major 
Spanish newspapers—El Mundo, El País, El Periódico, 
and La Vanguardia—and also watched both Spanish and 
regional television. The Catalan independence movement 
frequently dominated Spanish media. Nevertheless, with 
the key exceptions of the Barcelona-based La Vanguardia 
and the Catalan TV stations, the Spanish press frequently 
deflected the actual debate by dismissing the pro-
independence side as lawless rebels. President Mariano 
Rajoy has similarly tried to cast separatism as an issue 
that can be solved through the courts (whose political 
autonomy is dubious). Both the mass media and the 
executive have failed to challenge the weak aspects of the 
pro-sovereignty case. 
Rather than being a recent movement or a purely 
economic issue, the Catalan quest for independence runs 
deeply through local history and culture. Any visitor to 
Barcelona notices the preference given to Catalan, despite 
Castellano (i.e. Spanish) being the national language. The 
Generalitat de Catalunya, the region’s quasi-autonomous 
government, strongly encourages the use of Catalan 
through its own operations and public services, city signs, 
and public education. In Barcelona, the city’s popular 
bicycle transportation service, Bicing, offers online 
registration only in Catalan, ostensibly to prevent visitors 
from using the system, even though many residents 
originally from other parts of Spain or Latin America only 
speak Spanish. Catalans view winning these ‘language 
wars’ as critical to preserving their own national identity. 
Not surprisingly, the Generalitat, with its pro-
independence governing coalition, actively supports and 
funds more overt separatist initiatives. For example, 
Generalitat President Artur Mas i Gavarró publically 
promoted Catalonia Calling:  What the World Has to Know, an 
attractively designed publication that presents the Catalan 
narrative in a cogent, seemingly impartial way. Printed in 
multiple languages for dissemination to foreign leaders, 
the book makes an emotional appeal through storytelling. 
Catalonia Calling takes the reader on a historical journey 
from the birth of Catalonia around 1000 AD to 1714 
when Spain finally ‘suppressed’ the region, to Franco’s 
repression in the 20th century, and finally to Spain’s 
alleged current efforts to erase Catalan identity. 
Recourse to history seems to be a common thread 
among pro-independence arguments. This approach 
adeptly shifts a contemporary, tit-for-tat economic 
squabble toward an oppressor-versus-oppressed dynamic. 
From the Catalan perspective, Spain has been on a quest 
to destroy its nation for hundreds of years. The recent 
tax controversy is only the latest iteration of this historic 
struggle. In many ways, the independence movement 
is more than a political campaign—it is an ideology. 
Such narratives, revisionist or otherwise, remain largely 
unchallenged. As long as Madrid fails to counter this 
mind-set, the sovereignty camp will continue to garner 
sympathy and support. 
An associate in Barcelona pointed out to me that 
the pro-independence political bloc in the Generalitat 
A. BIERMANN
Separatists and pro-Catalan independence demonstrators 
gather for La Diada, or Catalan National Day, in September 
2014.
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never explains how local governance will rule more 
effectively than Madrid. Instead, it seems to be a foregone 
conclusion that Catalan society, unshackled from central 
authority, will rid the region of the rampant corruption 
that has plagued Spain (including Catalonia) for years. 
This perception was validated by campaign slogans such 
as Un país sin corrupción ni recortes (“a country without 
corruption or budget cuts”) and Un país on la justicia sigui 
rápida i gratuita (“a country where justice comes fast and 
free”). 
In the campaign’s historical narrative, Spain is 
nefarious at worst and irredeemably incompetent if not 
corrupt at best. In actuality, Catalonia has had its fair 
share of scandals, most notably the recent controversy 
over the region’s dominant Pujol family. Yet unless and 
until the region actually gains independence, sovereignty 
backers will be able to continue making claims of Catalan 
superiority without backing them up. 
In comparison to truly unified Western European 
states, which came about due to great efforts by singular 
leaders such as Germany’s Bismarck or Italy’s Garibaldi, 
Spain has a more tenuous national identity. Spain has 
largely succeeded in the area of political cohesion. But 
unlike France, which assiduously promoted the langue d’oïl 
over competing alternatives, Spain never really achieved 
linguistic unity due to geographic and other difficulties. 
Perhaps because of this, Spain has long been subject to 
coercive centralizing tendencies. During Franco’s reign, 
Catalan was largely confined to home use—a policy which 
bred great resentment among Catalans. The country’s 
1978 constitution acknowledges the regional languages of 
Catalan, Basque, and Galician, but specifies Castellano as 
the favoured national tongue. In May, the Spanish courts 
handed down a controversial ruling requiring Catalonian 
public schools to teach at least a quarter of classes in 
Castellano.
The question of national identity sits at the heart of 
both the Catalan and Basque independence debates. Rather 
than seeing itself as a type of federation with varied but 
equal regions, Spain’s central government has long sought 
to make Madrid the heart of the nation, similar to the role 
of Paris in France. In addition to promoting Castellano as 
the national language, the federal government has tended 
to concentrate infrastructure investments in and around 
the capital. The existence of many well-funded national 
highways leading to Madrid, in contrast with the lack of 
sufficient roads connecting Spain’s Mediterranean coastal 
cities, has not gone unnoticed by pro-secession forces. 
Supporters on both sides seem to think that Spanish 
and Catalan interests cannot be balanced—that one 
identity or the other must triumph. Indeed, as the case 
of Scotland has demonstrated, significant concessions of 
autonomy may not be enough to quell nationalist impulses. 
Nevertheless, many Catalonians favour independence not 
out of blind nationalism, but from distrust of the central 
government. Some independence backers likely would 
be content under a devolved constitutional structure that 
respected the identity of each region as distinct and equal, 
and allowed regional governments such as the Generalitat 
wider discretion to set policies. Like other European 
states facing restive regionalism, Madrid must find a way, 
in the spirit of subsidiarity, to reconcile national integrity 
with regional variances.  
Alexander Biermann recently graduated from Patrick Henry 
College in Purcellville, Virginia, where he studied international 
politics under Dr. Stephen Baskerville. He plans to intern with the 
Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., this fall. 
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Catalan sovereignty backers show their support for an 
independent Catalonia and continued EU membership.
A. BIERMANN
Independence flags and signs are ubiquitous in Catalonia, 
like on this prominent building in Girona. 
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Free Expression in Poland
Matthew Tyrmand
Everyone perennially pays lip service to the 
importance of free expression, but it is only in periods 
of extreme stress on this issue, after Charlie Hebdo, 
for example, that it comes to the front and is actively 
defended. By not having more concern for all the subtle, 
coercive, and undermining acts of censorship that 
regularly occur, I believe we allow a crony system to 
fester and become ever more pernicious in the way that it 
crowds out the free, the uncompromised, the productive, 
and the competitive in a society. 
For my father, Leopold Tyrmand, who spent much 
of his adult life in Poland battling the censors and being 
blacklisted for how he expressed himself, free speech and 
a free press were the fundamental issues from which all 
his political beliefs sprung.
It is worth recalling the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution:  “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.” 
The First Amendment, which codified the rights 
of a free citizen in the new American Republic, an 
experiment in democracy that we now can look back 
on as a resounding success, is a blanket protection for 
all forms of free expression. It goes even further than 
just protecting free speech, press, assembly and religion: 
In fact, the First Amendment encourages free citizens to 
complain by inputting, by suggestion, the right to petition 
the government for, as the framers put it, “a redress of 
grievances”. Sadly, such a protection was not codified 
into Polish law—in either the Polish May Constitution of 
1791 nor in 1989 after the Round Table talks. Because of 
this, the risk of an illegitimate power structure coercing 
the citizenry has remained high.
Let us take a moment to look at some examples in 
which free expression is being impeded in Poland—but 
would be protected in America.
The first and most pernicious example is in the 
manner in which criticism (especially that of visible 
public figures) is easily stifled by the civil justice system. 
What I find to be the most toxic to democracy is when 
the elected and appointed political class engages in this 
reprehensible practice.
In theory, an integral component of the politican’s 
role is to continually defend his or her actions to those 
he or she serves, and to openly and honestly answer 
criticism head-on. But because political criticism is not 
absolutely protected, too often one cannot publicly ‘call-
out’ someone and thus bring about a robust investigation 
of corrupt anti-competitive practices. These practices 
have become institutionally protected by laws crafted 
by the same political actors who benefit from stifling 
independent oversight.
This is where we have to make a distinction 
between the letter of the law and the spirit of the law. 
When government officials dole out overvalued contracts 
for unnecessary work to their friends, it may not be a 
violation under the law (codified by those doling out 
the contracts), but it certainly is a violation of the spirit 
of rule of law in a constitutional republic. Unrestricted 
free speech and the correlative adjunct, free press, is the 
only weapon that can neuter this cronyism by informing 
potential voters of systemic corruption.
I can relate a tangible example of this from my 
own recent experience. By social media proxy, Roman 
Giertych, a former Deputy Prime Minister and Education 
Minister, and a lawyer for many of the incumbent Polish 
government’s highest elected and appointed officials, 
stated earlier this year that on behalf of then-foreign 
minister Radoslaw Sikorski, he would be filing a lawsuit 
against Onet.pl, one of the biggest online news platforms 
in Poland, and myself.
Ostensibly this was in response to Onet having 
published a Facebook comment on their news site in 
which I had suggested that the hypothetical example I 
cited a few moments ago—of paying one’s friends from 
the public treasury no-bid contracts many times in excess 
of the market rate—is (to quote myself):  “what fraud 
VUMAG.PL 
The author describes a social and political dynamic in many 
ways reminiscent of  what his late father, Leopold Tyrmand 
(1920-1985), faced in communist Poland in the 1950s.
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looks like”. Sikorski had been doing just this. In fact, it 
had all been well documented in the preceding days in a 
major press platform (Wprost) known for its investigative 
reporting, particularly of those in power.
Given that I had written these remarks while 
in New York and under the protection of the First 
Amendment, in English, to a small group of friends and 
followers, on a personal non-commercial page, and on 
a platform operated by an American entity, this was not 
really a winnable case. Rather, it was merely an act of 
bluster from Mr. Giertych. This was the sort of action 
that he regularly deploys as a tool to silence critics of the 
political figures in the cabal that he represents.
The burdens that politically connected actors like 
this impose upon a free people who may want to express 
ideas that are unpopular with certain segments is such 
that criticism and the plurality of alternative viewpoints, 
the lifeblood of democracy, are stifled. Without an 
environment for unfettered debate, where the best 
ideas and the best people rise to the top, freedom and 
ultimately prosperity are constantly threatened and never 
maximized.
Another example of how free expression is 
undermined in Poland is the subversive work of the 
mainstream press itself—particularly its most mature 
segment, which mostly utilizes conventional distribution 
practices. This segment historically has been better 
capitalized; but in recent years, the industry has faced the 
creative destruction that new distribution technologies 
have wrought and they are now scrambling to shift their 
businesses to these alternative methods of delivery. As 
this industry has become rife with cronyism, the focus 
now is on pleasing special interests for favours and 
seeking protections like a cartel rather than embracing 
competition. The legacy players in the media industry 
cannot maintain their share in this dynamic—and more 
egalitarian—new media system where the barriers to 
entry are low. The old players remain bloated, stagnant, 
and slow to adapt.
The ‘mainstream’ media’s ideological bent has 
always slanted towards the left. This is news to no one. My 
father often wrote about how the media’s predetermined 
agenda—both in the US and Poland—impacts the way in 
which politics is consumed by the masses. Unfortunately, 
what is new to the dynamic—given that their motive is 
now just as financial as it is ideological—is that most 
Polish mainstream platforms, reliant on state orchestrated 
protection, coordinate what they communicate and ‘sell’ 
to the mass market with their political partners.
The most insidious aspect of this is that this is done 
under a veneer of independence—in an effort to convince 
the consumer/voter that what is being delivered informs 
rather than manipulates. And the easiest way these 
‘leaders’ of the press manipulate the popular narrative is 
by omission.
Last year, the newsweekly Wprost published 
transcripts of recordings of Polish politicians engaging 
in overtly corrupt back room deals over expensive 
dinners billed to taxpayers. This had the potential to 
bring down the entire government by prompting mass 
resignations and leading to numerous potential criminal 
charges. The mainstream media machine went into 
hyper-drive to defend, play down, spin, and protect the 
principals involved. However, the underlying acts of 
the scandal were not discussed by any major platform 
(omission), except by Wprost which exposed the tapes in 
the first place—despite the fact that the content of the 
conversations was positively frightening.
To illustrate how egregious these violations 
of law were:  One tape revealed the head of the 
constitutionally mandated independent central bank—
National Bank of Poland President Marek Belka—
actively coordinating monetary policy with an emissary 
of the current government—Interior Minister Bartlomiej 
Sienkiewicz—in a clearly delineated attempt to swing an 
upcoming election in favour of the incumbent party to 
which Sienkiewicz (and Belka) belong. This conspiracy 
to rapidly depreciate the currency in order to finance the 
purchase of the national election is tantamount to stealing 
from every citizen in Poland.
It was also reprehensible that the wife—Anne 
Applebaum—of one of the majorly implicated players—
Radoslaw Sikorski (yet again)—in these embarrassing 
revelations worked vociferously to defend her husband 
and his fellow incriminated officials in print and in speech, 
both domestically and internationally. (As a self-described 
‘journalist’, she has availed herself of mainstream media 
platforms in the UK, the US, and Western Europe, in 
addition to local Polish platforms.) But her contributions 
to the discourse clearly did not meet the standard 
definition of journalism since the most important facts 
of the case were never disclosed (again:  omission).
The defence offered time and again by the 
mainstream media was that the actors exposed on 
undercover tapes had their privacy rights violated and 
that that crime had superseded any other that might 
have taken place (which of course went unmentioned). 
The media attempted to sell the idea that their privacy 
rights were more important than the right of citizens 
not to be duped by their elected and appointed officials. 
Moreover, when the state sent agents from the internal 
security service to extract ‘evidence’ that the editor-
in-chief of Wprost ostensibly had on his laptop—all 
of which had been deemed pertinent to the ‘privacy 
violation’ cases that they were investigating—the images 
of physical force being used at the magazine’s offices and 
the protests that ensued again garnered no reactions and 
virtual silence from the ‘mainstream’ press. (Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the current Polish government, which has 
been widely implicated in this scandal, has drafted—and 
is currently trying to pass before current terms of office 
are up—legislation that would dismiss and render void 
any evidence gathered of illegal activity that is considered 
to have violated a politician’s privacy.)
Beyond the previously discussed methods of media 
manipulation—which include omission, spin, defence, 
coordination, and frivolous lawsuits—there exists one 
more method that only the biggest rent-seekers in the 
media can even begin to dream of:  the bailout.
As an investor, this is the one that undermines 
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my faith in an economy the most, whether in the US, 
the Euro-zone, or Poland. When a monolithic corporate 
entity cannot compete or adapt, it withers and dies. This 
is a good thing. And it paves the way for new entrants 
and innovation:  New blood brings new ideas and keeps 
societies competitive. But the breakdown in competition 
that exists in a free market when those who cannot 
compete begin to get tax-payer subsidies or infusions of 
capital from the government to stay afloat is unacceptable.
This is happening in Poland today. The reason that 
this is so dangerous to freedom in aggregate is that by 
subsidizing one crony’s right to free expression, everyone 
else—whether they are individuals or competitive 
businesses—has their rights to expression undermined 
and crowded out by state fiat.
A final example which I think demonstrates that 
free expression is under assault in Poland today is the way 
in which those tasked with the responsibility of public 
institutional administration and management abuse the 
power of their office. They take away what is not theirs 
to bestow in the first place:  access to state infrastructure, 
which belongs to the public and which is supported by 
the taxes paid by the citizenry. This is an act of forceful 
censorship and it is brazenly anti-democratic.
A personal example may be helpful. Last year, the 
Consul General blacklisted me from Polish Consular 
events at the New York consulate. As I am a Polish 
citizen—and have never acted in a violent, unsafe, or 
similarly disruptive manner—there were no formal 
channels for her to do so. But given lax oversight, and 
the state’s agents’ excessive discretionary control of “the 
trappings of their political wealth”, citizens like me have 
woefully little recourse. This is a prime reason why there 
is a need for an independent free media that can raise 
awareness of such actions. 
The rationale behind my ‘blacklisting’ (obtained 
from ‘off-the-record’ comments from staffers working 
at the Consulate) was that my political views—and the 
way in which I expressed those views—did not please 
Madame Consul. To be sure, my opinions of her and 
the government she represents were not positive—and 
I have never hidden this (as I write for many political 
outlets).
This kind of blacklisting and withholding of 
government services by discretionary fiat is another 
frontal assault on free expression. With behaviour like 
this de rigeur, one can only imagine what the calculus 
is when cultural ministries and their subsidiaries dole 
out public funding for publicly financed projects—like 
movies, festivals, and other events. These processes are 
rife with ‘spoils system’ and quid pro quo politics, which 
create costs the taxpayer/citizen unwittingly assume.
Free expression, as we have recently seen all too 
frequently, is under attack all over the globe. This issue 
affects all:  developing, transitioning, and emerging 
societies and economies. In contemporary Poland, a 
nation and economy widely credited during the last two 
decades for emerging as a beacon of post-Soviet freedom 
and free enterprise, the price for ‘free’ expression too 
often has been conformity to the government’s precepts.
A truly free and independent press needs to be 
fought for today as vociferously as it was under the 
oppressive communist regimes of yesteryear. The best 
way to fight in its defence—and for the fundamental 
right of free expression—is to never cease using this 
right assertively, in speech and in writings, and to not shy 
away from proposing ideas that may not be popular—
and which may bring added levels of personal and 
professional risk. The only thing not to put at risk is 
the moral clarity and personal integrity that comes from 
holding on firmly to one’s beliefs. One should never yield 
one’s understanding of the truth to those who would ‘re-
program’ it by coercion or by force for their own benefit.
Free expression is truly the lifeblood of democracy. 
And it is worth repeating a somewhat clichéd quotation—
often attributed to both Voltaire and Jefferson:  “I do not 
agree with what you have to say but I will defend to the 
death your right to say it.” We all need to embrace the 
sentiments behind these words. For now, it remains to be 
seen if Poland can develop a legal system to protect free 
and unfettered expression, and to function in the same 
way that the First Amendment does in the United States. 
If it can, then Poland will be better, freer, and more 
prosperous for future generations.
Matthew Tyrmand is an investor and economist based in New York 
City. He is Deputy Director of OpenTheBooks.com, an NGO 
focused on bringing transparency to government spending. This 
article has been adapted from a speech presented at the second Round 
Table Mixer (RTMx) held in March 2015 in Warsaw. The event 
was co-hosted by the author and Michal Lisiecki, President of Point 
Media Group, which owns the Wprost newsweekly.
                   Sikorski                                Applebaum                                    Giertych                                   Belka
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Magna Carta, Liberty & the Medieval Mind
André P. DeBattista
The word ‘medieval’ is often used pejoratively to 
depict something which is uncivilised or primitive. But 
as the eminent medievalist George Holmes has stated, 
“Western civilisation was created in medieval Europe”. 
Although it spanned a millennium of  upheaval and 
change, it led to a “flowering of  new ways of  life and 
attitudes” revolving around newly founded monasteries, 
cathedrals, universities, royal courts, and towns and cities. 
The axis of  ‘Church, Crown, Commerce, and Country’ 
provided the perfect mix for the establishment of  new 
social patterns which still provide continuity and stability 
today. 
Towering 13th century churches remain a symbol 
of  a transcendental continuity, while the modern nation-
state can trace its origins to the royal courts in France 
and England. The idea of  a university was also ignited 
during this period as the finest centres of  learning were 
established in Oxford, Cambridge, Bologna, and Paris. 
Given how radically different that age was from 
the present, Holmes argues that we have to “balance 
the similarities which arise from common humanity 
and a constant inheritance of  ideas against the acute 
distinctions caused by differences of  social structure 
and intellectual traditions”. The aim is not to identify the 
ideas of  the present in the past but rather to pinpoint 
those ideas of  the past which still inform the present.
I’d like to explore the Magna Carta, a document that 
was born in these very particular circumstances. Despite 
its original limited scope, the Magna Carta has continued 
to inform discourses relating to liberty, freedom, and the 
rule of  law over the centuries. It is now an entrenched 
part of  the “epic of  liberty”—a narrative which seeks 
to justify the ancient and continuing tradition of  free 
institutions and lawful limitations on power.
Juridical & legislative changes
In the Coronation Charters of  1100 and 1135, both 
King Henry I and King Stephen declared their intention 
to rule according to “custom and law”. New attitudes 
towards law and justice created the perfect climate for 
legislative and juridical progress which lasted throughout 
the 12th and 13th centuries. Charters slowly became the 
preferred method of  asserting legal rights. (In the 13th 
century alone, it is estimated that eight million charters 
were created for smallholders and peasants.)
The Crown established two permanent 
offices—the chancery and the exchequer—which were 
responsible for maintaining written records. The practice 
of  codifying agreements supplemented oral traditions. 
By the late 12th century, centres of  higher learning were 
established at Oxford and Cambridge, and Oxford in 
particular excelled at disciplines such as administration 
and legal procedure.
This King’s courts began to allow for new processes 
in the administration of  justice. Norman Vincent, the 
eminent Magna Carta scholar, argues that “England 
and England’s kings were entering a new age in which 
law and custom were increasingly to be regarded not 
as immemorial traditions committed to the memories 
of  the older and more respectable members of  the 
community, but as ‘laws’ in the modern sense, issued as 
written decrees”. Historians credit these developments 
with forming the foundation of  English Common Law.
In 1164, King Henry II issued the controversial 
Constitutions of  Clarendon which sought to restrict 
the powers and the privileges of  ecclesiastical authority. 
The Constitutions provided the pretext for a standoff  
between the Crown and the Church. (The murder of  St. 
Thomas Beckett was a consequence of  this clash.)
In the court of  Henry II a precedent was set for 
written laws which curbed, rather than licenced, the use of  
arbitrary power. At the same time, a new legal profession 
began to emerge. Eventually the administration of  justice 
became a significant source of  income for the Crown—
but this soon gave way to bribery and speculation.
Two images of  royal power soon emerged. First, 
that of  the King acting on behalf  of  God, which 
Nicholas Vincent says was based on “a sense that 
the king himself  stood in judgement above the petty 
disputes of  his subjects”. Second, in contrast, the King 
was perceived to be the ultimate sovereign, immune from 
justice or prosecution but dependent upon the law for 
his income and self-image. Vincent notes that “the more 
royal government came to depend upon the law for its 
income and self-image, the more the king’s subjects were 
likely to resent the king’s own apparent disrespect for the 
laws that he claimed to administer”.
The troubled reign of  King John
Between 1192 and 1194, Richard I was held for 
ransom in Germany. The cost of  paying this ransom 
had some long-lasting negative effects on the economy. 
During Richard’s captivity, John frequently tried to start 
revolts and claim the throne for himself. 
King Richard I died in 1199 with no legitimate 
heirs. Upon his death, different parts of  the Angevin 
Empire chose different rulers. England and Normandy 
opted for John, who inherited a situation which was, at 
best, dire.
The figure of  King John is somewhat paradoxical. 
He took an unprecedented level of  interest in daily legal 
and governmental matters but was inept at managing the 
most powerful elements in his kingdom—the Church 
and the aristocracy. As the youngest son of  Henry II 
(1133-1189), King John was an unlikely king. 
However, in terms of  policy, there was an element 
of  continuity throughout the reigns of  Henry II and his 
two sons, Richard I and John. All landlords held their 
estates at the King’s pleasure and were subject to arbitrary 
fines, particularly if  they caused offence. John, however, 
increased the pressure on the landlords by accelerating 
the terms of  repayment.
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John was widely believed to be behind the sudden 
disappearance of  his twelve-year old nephew and 
pretender to the throne, Arthur of  Brittany. His second 
marriage to Isabelle d’Angoulême set in motion various 
events which would lead to John’s loss of  territories in 
France and Normandy. He then developed plans for a 
re-conquest of  these territories and taxed his subjects 
heavily in order to finance such a venture. However, 
these military campaigns ended in defeat. And soon his 
many misdemeanours became widely known.
Vincent chronicles a number of  these misdeeds: 
taking his sons and nephews as hostages, offering a 
bounty for the murder of  Welsh outlaws, his numerous 
mistresses, his love for beer, and his perceived Christian 
impiety. Indeed, John’s relationship with the church was 
tumultuous. His reign coincided with the papacy of  
Innocent III, a formidable canon lawyer, and the author 
of  numerous treatises on liturgy and asceticism. He was 
also immovable in his belief  that he had power over all 
the crowned heads of  Europe.
The first clash came over the appointment of  
the Archbishop of  Canterbury. Innocent III favoured 
Stephen Langton, a noted scholar and lecturer at the 
University of  Paris; John favoured his counsellor, John 
de Gray, Bishop of  Norwich. Innocent proceeded 
in consecrating Langton. John, however, refused 
to recognise Langton’s new position and he exiled 
Langton. Innocent III responded by placing an interdict 
on England. Langton used his time in exile well. He 
cemented the alliance between rebel barons and the 
Church, and his exile became one of  the rallying points 
of  resistance to royal tyranny.
In the medieval mind, these setbacks cemented 
two widely held perceptions. First, the military defeats 
enhanced the perception that John was losing God’s 
favour. Second, arbitrary high taxation cemented 
discontent among landowners. The standoff  between 
throne and altar led to various rumours of  plots and 
insurgencies; and there was wild speculation about 
imminent Divine retribution and a sudden end to the 
King’s reign. 
John could ill afford such dissent. He was planning 
yet another campaign for the re-conquest of  lost 
territory in France and needed all the support he could 
muster. In 1213, a settlement between the Pope and the 
King was negotiated; England and Ireland were declared 
to be papal fiefs and Stephen Langton was installed at 
Canterbury.
However, as John planned to go into battle, he 
discovered that he had little support among the barons 
who signalled their disapproval by either rejecting the 
King’s call to arms or refusing to pay a tax to fund the 
army. The barons also had the support of  Londoners. In 
essence, the King was now dealing with an open revolt. 
TIM EVANSON/CC BY-SA 2.0
A close-up of  one of  the panels of  the Canterbury Pulpit at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. It depicts the 
Magna Carta, King John, and the Archbishop of  Canterbury Stephen Langton. The stone pulpit was given as a gift by the 
Archbishop of  Canterbury, Randall Davidson, in 1907. 
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Buoyed by this support, the rebels now threatened 
to ask King Philip Augustus of  France for help. Faced 
with this prospect, King John agreed to negotiate. 
Deliberations on what became known as the Magna 
Carta—the Great Charter—soon ensued.
The failure of  the Magna Carta
The Magna Carta is a product of  its time. It rested 
on the deeply held conventions of  the period, and on the 
intellectual and juridical milieu of  the age. 
Vincent unearths evidence suggesting that the 
rebel barons “believed that good law had once existed 
and that their duty lay in recalling and restoring it”. Thus, 
the Magna Carta “is to be viewed as a deeply conservative, 
not as a deliberately radical, measure”.
Negotiations took place over a number of  months 
and, therefore, no single author can be identified. The 
authors borrowed from different sources of  law which 
suited their particular circumstances including, but 
not limited to, the Coronation Charters of  1100 and 
1135.  There was no codification of  English laws; yet 
Magna Carta makes reference to the “law of  the land” 
and “reasonableness”. This indicates that there was an 
existing legal convention buttressed by various legal 
principles which effectively bound the King’s subjects. 
The Magna Carta was an attempt to bring the King 
within that same legal framework.
The Magna Carta was symbolically sealed on June 
15, 1215, in a field near Runnymede, approximately 
half-way between the King’s castle at Windsor and his 
baronial base in London. It remains a product of  its time 
dealing with concerns, matters, and incidents which are 
very time-specific. Out of  its original 63 clauses, only 
four remain in the statute books today. 
The charter was primarily intended to be a peace 
treaty. The Magna Carta, in its original form, never 
took effect. In this regard it was an abject failure:  It 
was repealed in nine weeks. John took advantage of  his 
new-found friendship with Innocent III and protested 
that his ‘divine right to rule’ was infringed upon by the 
barons. Innocent agreed and declared the Magna Carta 
to be “null and void forever” since the King was forced 
to accept the agreement “by violence and fear”. 
Nonetheless, the Magna Carta has been given 
place of  pride in popular lore. It is largely credited 
with debunking the myth that power was unlimited. Its 
significance wasn’t lost in Medieval England, either.
King John died a year later, in 1216. At the 
coronation of  his nine-year old son, King Henry III, the 
Charter was re-issued and re-packaged as a manifesto of  
good governance. On this occasion, the Magna Carta 
had the approval of  the King’s Chief  Minister and the 
Papal Legate, thus giving it the authority which the 1215 
version lacked. 
Magna Carta was later revised and re-issued 
on several occasions. By 1225, only 37 of  the original 
clauses remained. It was last re-issued during the reign 
of  King Edward I in 1300. By then, much of  it had been 
made redundant. All attempts to quash the Magna Carta 
on the part of  some of  the King’s courtiers had only 
served to strengthen its “totemic status as a touchstone 
of  communal liberties guaranteeing the king’s subjects 
against tyranny”. 
In time, it seemed increasingly unlikely that the 
Magna Carta would recede in the popular imagination. 
And it became part of  two grand epics:  the English 
national epic and the epic of  liberty. It served as 
a historically tangible embodiment of  an ancient 
constitution—“a brake applied by the past to present 
tendencies within the law”, according to Vincent.
Symbol for the English-speaking world
In the English-speaking world, the Magna Carta 
became a rallying symbol; the founding document of  
an epic of  liberty which is often cited and quoted to 
support specific political platforms related to freedom, 
liberty, and the language of  rights. It has become a staple 
in what Herbert Butterfield describes as the “Whig 
interpretation of  history”—which amounts to the 
tendency of  historians “to praise revolutions provided 
they have been successful, to emphasise certain principles 
of  progress in the past, and to produce a story which is 
the ratification if  not the glorification of  the present”.
Despite the dangers of  such an historical approach, 
the epic surrounding the Magna Carta has inspired 
various institutions which provide for governmental 
checks and balances, and which limit the overarching 
powers of  institutions. The so-called ‘epic of  liberty’ 
which formed around the Magna Carta has served to add 
legitimacy to such practices and institutions, providing 
both an historical framework and a reference point.
The Magna Carta was largely credited with 
asserting the concept of  “consent” and the principle 
that the business of  government was to be conducted on 
behalf  of  a “community of  the realm”. This took place 
within a feudal political order and thus it was only the 
tenants of  the king who could have exercised influence. 
From 1250 onwards, consent was to be exercised through 
a representative assembly—a parliament—where kings 
and representatives could meet.
Less than a century after the signing of  the Magna 
Carta, King Edward I faced widespread discontent over 
taxation. On two occasions during his reign he had 
to acknowledge that his power was somewhat bound 
by the Magna Carta. He set the precedent for having 
parliaments seek a re-confirmation of  the Charter and a 
clarification of  its meaning. In the 14th century, this led 
to the formation of  parliament as a permanent political 
institution acting, according to R.V. Turner, as both 
“protector and interpreter” of  the Magna Carta.
The Magna Carta would later experience a second 
popular revival during the 17th century conflicts between 
King and parliament. While the King asserted his royal 
prerogatives, parliamentarians turned towards supposed 
“ancient constitutions”. The Magna Carta was perceived 
to be a key component of  England’s ancient constitution.
One contemporary, the famed jurist and lawyer 
Sir Edward Coke—described by Friedrich Hayek 
as a “fountain of  Whig principles”—conceived his 
own interpretation of  Whig history, describing the 
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constitution as a “chain of  royal confirmations of  
English law stretching back to the age of  Edward the 
Confessor and beyond”. He perceived liberty to be on 
a continuing advance and thought the outcome of  the 
Glorious Revolution to be a re-confirmation of, in the 
words of  Turner, the “ancient compact between king 
and people, restoring fundamental law and limited 
monarchy”.
By the mid-19th century, the Magna Carta was 
displayed and admired as a great treasure in the British 
Museum. However, lawmakers and observers also 
began developing a more critical appraisal of  the Magna 
Carta. Additionally, both parliamentarians and lawyers 
championed for a reorganisation of  law. Three acts—in 
1856, 1861, and 1863—repealed a number of  old laws, 
abrogating much of  the Magna Carta. Further legislative 
reforms in the 1960s meant that only four of  the original 
clauses survived in the statute books.
The English essayist Walter Bagehot briefly 
examined the Magna Carta in his 1867 magnum opus 
titled The English Constitution. He accurately described such 
medieval charters as “treaties between different orders 
and factions, confirming ancient rights, or what claimed 
to be such”. He believed the principal controversy was 
primarily between king and nation:  “the king trying to 
see how far the nation would let him go, and the nation 
murmuring and recalcitrating, and seeing how many acts 
of  administration they could prevent, and how many of  
its claims they could resist”.
The Magna Carta still had the power to fire the 
political imagination of  individuals in the English-
speaking world and beyond. The only two extant copies 
outside of  the UK are currently housed in two English-
speaking democracies:  Australia and the US.
The Federal Parliament of  Australia purchased 
its copy of  the Magna Carta in 1952. It is revered as a 
“secular relic” and is exhibited in Canberra’s Parliament 
House. Although the state and federal parliaments are 
19th century creations, both institutions, according to 
scholar Stephanie Trigg, “appeal to their medieval origins 
in order to bolster their symbolic authority” thereby 
accumulating “symbolic capital”. 
Interestingly, the Magna Carta seems to have 
enjoyed greater appeal in the US than in the United 
Kingdom. The American Bar Association erected a neo-
classical rotunda to mark the signing of  the Charter, 
while various artefacts at the US Supreme Court depict 
images representing the history of  the Charter. In 2007, 
a copy of  the Magna Carta was acquired for a record 
US$ 21.3 million, so that it may remain on display at the 
National Archives and Records Administration.
Much of  the popularity of  the Magna Carta in the 
US is due to Sir Edward Coke’s efforts. In 1606, Coke 
was tasked with drafting the First Charter of  Virginia. 
The Charter makes reference to “Liberties, Franchises, 
and Immunities” and was largely inspired by the Magna 
Carta. The same language was used in the foundational 
charters of  the states of  Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, 
Connecticut, Carolina, and Rhode Island. The Magna 
Carta is thus believed to have provided a conceptual 
basis for American constitutional development. The 
US Constitution, widely hailed as the first modern 
constitution, establishes a constitutional order based on 
“justice … domestic tranquillity … common defence 
… general welfare” and the security of  the “Blessings 
of  Liberty” for posterity. It provides for a separation of  
institutions—three branches of  government which are 
designed to secure a system of  checks and balances. All 
these principles can undoubtedly be traced to the spirit 
fostered by the Magna Carta.
The spirit of  Magna Carta
Nicholas Vincent has argued that the significance 
of  the Magna Carta “has always been in its spirit rather 
than in its practical application”. The term “Magna 
Carta” is now utilised to denote any document which 
seeks to guarantee rights and limit power. For example, 
the Treaty of  Waitangi has often been referred to as 
the “Maori Magna Carta”, while environmental groups 
often urge governments to draft a “Green Magna Carta”. 
All this points to the enduring relevance of  the spirit 
championed by the Magna Carta and its meaning—
which is essentially that power functions best when it 
is limited. Thus, seeking to impose limits on authority is 
now a common feature of  democratic constitutions. 
One of  the most pressing issues during the reign 
of  King John was the levying of  high taxes to fund wars 
which were ultimately unsuccessful. The Magna Carta 
(and its subsequent revisions) addressed this, stipulating 
that taxes may only be levied provided consent by 
representatives of  the tenants of  the King is given. This 
principle was later echoed in the American Revolutionary 
slogan “No Taxation without Representation”. 
Consent and representation are necessary to limit 
the exercise of  arbitrary power. However, without a 
strong element of  accountability, these cornerstones of  
a healthy political life are weakened and rendered almost 
perfunctory. Accountability is fundamental—especially 
in a political culture which is increasingly swayed by the 
power and clout of  interest groups and lobby groups. 
Justice is another theme which features prominently in 
the Magna Carta. Clause 40 of  the Charter reads:  “To 
no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or 
justice”. This clause is echoed in the legal maxim “justice 
delayed is justice denied”.
The continuing relevance of  the Magna Carta—and 
its ability to speak with such immediacy to the present—
is something which will undoubtedly keep strengthening 
its position within the ‘epic of  liberty’. Such a narrative 
speaks of  the enduring tensions surrounding the nature 
of  power, accountability, and justice. And in this, the 
Magna Carta must continue to serve as a historical 
reminder of  the relevance of  these concerns—and of  
the importance of  giving them maximum priority if  we 
are truly to have a healthy political community.  
André P. DeBattista is a visiting lecturer at the Department 
of  Public Policy, University of  Malta. He is a fellow of  the 
Royal Society of  Arts and a member of  the Political Studies 
Association (UK).
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Marriage & the Family
Rabbi Lord Sacks
I want to begin by telling the story of the most 
beautiful idea in the history of civilization:  the idea of 
the love that brings new life into the world. There are of 
course many ways of telling the story, and this is just one. 
But to me it is a story of seven key moments, each of 
them surprising and unexpected. 
The first, according to a report in the press on 
October 20 of last year, took place in a lake in Scotland 
385 million years ago. It was then, according to this new 
discovery, that two fish came together to perform the 
first instance of sexual reproduction known to science. 
Until then all life had propagated itself asexually, by cell 
division, budding, fragmentation or parthenogenesis, all 
of which are far simpler and more economical than the 
division of life into male and female, each with a different 
role in creating and sustaining life.
When we consider, even in the animal kingdom, 
how much effort and energy the coming together of 
male and female takes, in terms of displays, courtship 
rituals, rivalries and violence, it is astonishing that sexual 
reproduction ever happened at all. Biologists are still not 
quite sure why it did. Some say to offer protection against 
parasites, or immunities against disease. Others say it’s 
simply that the meeting of opposites generates diversity. 
But one way or another, the fish in Scotland discovered 
something new and beautiful that’s been copied ever since 
by virtually all advanced forms of life. Life begins when 
male and female meet and embrace.
The second unexpected development was the 
unique challenge posed to Homo sapiens by two factors: 
We stood upright, which constricted the female pelvis, 
and we had bigger brains—a 300% increase—which 
meant larger heads. The result was that human babies 
had to be born more prematurely than any other species, 
and so needed parental protection for much longer. This 
made parenting more demanding among humans than 
any other species, the work of two people rather than 
one. Hence, the very rare phenomenon among mammals 
of pair bonding (unlike other species where the male 
contribution tends to end with the act of impregnation). 
Among most primates, fathers don’t even recognise their 
children let alone care for them. Elsewhere in the animal 
kingdom motherhood is almost universal but fatherhood 
is rare.
So what emerged along with the human person was 
the union of the biological mother and father to care for 
their child. Thus far nature, but then came culture, and the 
third surprise.
It seems that among hunter-gatherers, pair bonding 
was the norm. Then came agriculture, and economic 
surplus, and cities and civilisation, and for the first time 
sharp inequalities began to emerge between rich and 
poor, powerful and powerless. The great ziggurats of 
Mesopotamia and pyramids of ancient Egypt, with their 
broad base and narrow top, were monumental statements 
in stone of a hierarchical society in which the few had 
power over the many. And the most obvious expression 
of power among alpha males whether human or primate, 
is to dominate access to fertile women and thus maximise 
the handing on of your genes to the next generation. 
Hence polygamy, which exists in 95% of mammal species 
and 75% of cultures known to anthropology. Polygamy is 
the ultimate expression of inequality because it means that 
many males never get the chance to have a wife and child. 
And sexual envy has been, throughout history, among 
animals as well as humans, a prime driver of violence. 
That is what makes the first chapter of Genesis so 
revolutionary with its statement that every human being, 
regardless of class, colour, culture or creed, is in the image 
and likeness of God himself. We know that in the ancient 
world it was rulers, kings, emperors and pharaohs who 
were held to be in the image of God. So what Genesis 
was saying was that we are all royalty. We each have equal 
dignity in the kingdom of faith under the sovereignty of 
God. From this it follows that we each have an equal 
right to form a marriage and have children, which is why, 
regardless of how we read the story of Adam and Eve—
and there are differences between Jewish and Christian 
readings—the norm presupposed by that story is:  one 
woman, one man. Or as the Bible itself says:  “That is why 
a man leaves his father and mother and is united to his 
wife, and they become one flesh.”
Monogamy did not immediately become the norm, 
even within the world of the Bible. But many of its most 
famous stories, about the tension between Sarah and 
Hagar, or Leah and Rachel and their children, or David 
and Bathsheba, or Solomon’s many wives, are all critiques 
that point the way to monogamy.
And there is a deep connection between 
monotheism and monogamy, just as there is, in the 
opposite direction, between idolatry and adultery. 
Monotheism and monogamy are about the all-embracing 
relationship between I and Thou, myself and one other, 
be it a human or the divine ‘Other’.
What makes the emergence of monogamy unusual 
is that it is normally the case that the values of a society are 
those imposed on it by the ruling class. And the ruling class 
in any hierarchical society stands to gain from promiscuity 
and polygamy, both of which multiply the chances of my 
genes being handed on to the next generation. From 
monogamy the rich and powerful lose and the poor and 
powerless gain. So the return of monogamy goes against 
the normal grain of social change and was a real triumph 
for the equal dignity of all. Every bride and every groom 
are royalty; every home a palace when furnished with love.
The fourth remarkable development was the way 
this transformed the moral life. We’ve all become familiar 
with the work of evolutionary biologists using computer 
simulations and the iterated prisoners’ dilemma to explain 
why reciprocal altruism exists among all social animals. 
We behave to others as we would wish them to behave 
to us, and we respond to them as they respond to us. As 
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C.S. Lewis pointed out in his book The Abolition of Man, 
reciprocity is the Golden Rule shared by all the great 
civilizations.
What was new and remarkable in the Hebrew 
Bible was the idea that love, not just fairness, is the 
driving principle of the moral life. Three loves. “Love the 
Lord your God with all your heart, all your soul and all 
your might.” “Love your neighbour as yourself.” And, 
repeated no less than 36 times in the Mosaic books, 
“Love the stranger because you know what it feels like 
to be a stranger.” Or to put it another way:  Just as God 
created the natural world in love and forgiveness, so we 
are charged with creating the social world in love and 
forgiveness. And that love is a flame lit in marriage and 
the family. Morality is the love between husband and wife, 
parent and child, extended outward to the world.
The fifth development shaped the entire structure 
of Jewish experience. In ancient Israel an originally 
secular form of agreement, called a covenant, was taken 
and transformed into a new way of thinking about the 
relationship between God and humanity, in the case 
of Noah, and between God and a people in the case 
of Abraham and later the Israelites at Mount Sinai. A 
covenant is like a marriage. It is a mutual pledge of loyalty 
and trust between two or more people, each respecting 
the dignity and integrity of the other, to work together 
to achieve together what neither can achieve alone. And 
there is one thing even God cannot achieve alone, which 
is to live within the human heart. That needs us.
So the Hebrew word emunah—wrongly translated 
as ‘faith’—really means faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, 
steadfastness, not walking away even when the going gets 
tough, trusting the other and honouring the other’s trust 
in us. What covenant did, and we see this in almost all the 
prophets, was to understand the relationship between us 
and God in terms of the relationship between bride and 
groom, wife and husband. Love thus became not only the 
basis of morality but also of theology. In Judaism faith is 
a marriage. Rarely was this more beautifully stated than by 
Hosea when he said in the name of God:  “I will betroth 
you to me forever; I will betroth you in righteousness 
and justice, love and compassion. I will betroth you in 
faithfulness, and you will know the Lord.” Jewish men say 
those words every weekday morning as we wind the strap 
of our tefillin around our finger like a wedding ring. Each 
morning we renew our marriage with God.
This led to a sixth and quite subtle idea that truth, 
beauty, goodness, and life itself, do not exist in any one 
person or entity but in the “between”, what Martin 
Buber called Das Zwischenmenschliche, the interpersonal, 
the counterpoint of speaking and listening, giving and 
receiving. Throughout the Hebrew Bible and the rabbinic 
literature, the vehicle of truth is conversation. In revelation 
God speaks and asks us to listen. In prayer we speak and 
ask God to listen. There is never only one voice. In the 
Bible the prophets argue with God. In the Talmud rabbis 
argue with one another. In fact, I sometimes think the 
reason God chose the Jewish people was because He 
loves a good argument. Judaism is a conversation scored 
for many voices, never more passionately than in the Song 
of Songs, a duet between a woman and a man, the beloved 
and her lover, that Rabbi Akiva called the holy of holies of 
religious literature.
The prophet Malachi calls the male priest the 
guardian of the law of truth. The book of Proverbs says 
of the woman of worth that “the law of loving kindness 
is on her tongue”. It is that conversation between male 
and female voices—between truth and love, justice and 
mercy, law and forgiveness—that frames the spiritual life. 
In biblical times each Jew had to give a half shekel to the 
Temple to remind us that we are only half. There are some 
cultures that teach that we are nothing. There are others 
“The Wedding of  Samson” by Rembrandt (1606-1669), a 1560 painting located in the Gemäldegalerie Alte Meister (Old Masters 
Gallery) in Dresden.
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that teach that we are everything. The Jewish view is that 
we are half and we need to open ourselves to another if 
we are to become whole.
All this led to the seventh outcome, that in Judaism 
the home and the family became the central setting of 
the life of faith. In the only verse in the Hebrew Bible 
to explain why God chose Abraham, He says:  “I have 
known him so that he will instruct his children and his 
household after him to keep the way of the Lord by 
doing what is right and just.” Abraham was chosen not 
to rule an empire, command an army, perform miracles 
or deliver prophecies, but simply to be a parent. In one 
of the most famous lines in Judaism, which we say every 
day and night, Moses commands, “You shall teach these 
things repeatedly to your children, speaking of them when 
you sit in your house or when you walk on the way, when 
you lie down and when you rise up.” Parents are to be 
educators, education is the conversation between the 
generations, and the first school is the home.
So Jews became an intensely family oriented 
people, and it was this that saved us from tragedy. After 
the destruction of the Second Temple in the year 70, 
Jews were scattered throughout the world, everywhere a 
minority, everywhere without rights, suffering some of 
the worst persecutions ever known by a people and yet 
Jews survived because they never lost three things:  their 
sense of family, their sense of community and their faith.
And they were renewed every week especially on 
Shabbat, the day of rest when we give our marriages and 
families what they most need and are most starved of in 
the contemporary world, namely time. I once produced 
a television documentary for the BBC on the state of 
family life in Britain, and I took the person who was then 
Britain’s leading expert on child care, Penelope Leach, to 
a Jewish primary school on a Friday morning.
There she saw the children enacting in advance 
what they would see that evening around the family table. 
There were the five year old mother and father blessing the 
five year old children with the five year old grandparents 
looking on. She was fascinated by this whole institution, 
and she asked the children what they most enjoyed about 
the Sabbath. One five-year-old boy turned to her and said, 
“It’s the only night of the week when daddy doesn’t have 
to rush off”. As we walked away from the school when the 
filming was over she turned to me and said, “Chief Rabbi, 
that Sabbath of yours is saving their parents’ marriages.”
So that is one way of telling the story, a Jewish way, 
beginning with the birth of sexual reproduction, then the 
unique demands of human parenting, then the eventual 
triumph of monogamy as a fundamental statement of 
human equality, followed by the way marriage shaped our 
vision of the moral and religious life as based on love and 
covenant and faithfulness, even to the point of thinking 
of truth as a conversation between lover and beloved. 
Marriage and the family are where faith finds its home 
and where the Divine Presence lives in the love between 
husband and wife, parent and child. What then has 
changed? Here’s one way of putting it. I wrote a book a 
few years ago about religion and science and I summarised 
the difference between them in two sentences. “Science 
takes things apart to see how they work. Religion puts 
things together to see what they mean.” And that’s a way 
of thinking about culture also. Does it put things together 
or does it take things apart?
What made the traditional family remarkable, a 
work of high religious art, is what it brought together: 
sexual drive, physical desire, friendship, companionship, 
emotional kinship and love, the begetting of children 
and their protection and care, their early education and 
induction into an identity and a history. Seldom has any 
institution woven together so many different drives and 
desires, roles and responsibilities. It made sense of the 
world and gave it a human face, the face of love.
For a whole variety of reasons, some to do 
with medical developments like birth control, in vitro 
fertilisation and other genetic interventions, some to 
do with moral change like the idea that we are free to 
do whatever we like so long as it does not harm others, 
some to do with a transfer of responsibilities from the 
individual to the state, and other and more profound 
changes in the culture of the West, almost everything that 
marriage once brought together has now been split apart. 
Sex has been divorced from love, love from commitment, 
marriage from having children, and having children from 
responsibility for their care.
The result is that in Britain in 2012, 47.5% of 
children were born outside marriage, expected to become 
a majority in 2016. Fewer people are marrying, those 
who are, are marrying later, and 42% of marriages end in 
divorce. Nor is cohabitation a substitute for marriage. The 
average length of cohabitation in Britain and the United 
States is less than two years. The result is a sharp increase 
among young people of eating disorders, drug and alcohol 
abuse, stress related syndromes, depression and actual and 
attempted suicides. The collapse of marriage has created 
a new form of poverty concentrated among single parent 
families, and of these, the main burden is born by women, 
who in 2011 headed 92% of single parent households. In 
Britain today more than a million children will grow up 
with no contact whatsoever with their fathers.
This is creating a divide within societies the like 
of which has not been seen since Disraeli spoke of 
“two nations” a century and a half ago. Those who are 
privileged to grow up in stable loving association with 
the two people who brought them into being will, on 
average, be healthier physically and emotionally. They 
will do better at school and at work. They will have more 
successful relationships, be happier, and live longer. And 
yes, there are many exceptions. But the injustice of it all 
cries out to heaven. It will go down in history as one of 
the tragic instances of what Friedrich Hayek called “the 
fatal conceit” that somehow we know better than the 
wisdom of the ages, and can defy the lessons of biology 
and history. No one surely wants to go back to the narrow 
prejudices of the past.
This week, in Britain, a new film opens, telling 
the story of one of the great minds of the 20th century, 
Alan Turing, the Cambridge mathematician who laid the 
philosophical foundations of computing and artificial 
intelligence, and helped win the war by breaking the 
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German naval code “Enigma”. After the war, Turing was 
arrested and tried for homosexual behaviour, underwent 
chemically induced castration, and died at the age of 41 by 
cyanide poisoning, thought by many to have committed 
suicide. That is a world to which we should never return.
But our compassion for those who choose to live 
differently should not inhibit us from being advocates 
for the single most humanising institution in history. The 
family, man, woman, and child, is not one lifestyle choice 
among many. It is the best means we have yet discovered 
for nurturing future generations and enabling children to 
grow in a matrix of stability and love. It is where we learn 
the delicate choreography of relationship and how to 
handle the inevitable conflicts within any human group. It 
is where we first take the risk of giving and receiving love. 
It is where one generation passes on its values to the next, 
ensuring the continuity of a civilization. For any society, 
the family is the crucible of its future, and for the sake of 
our children’s future, we must be its defenders.
Since this is a religious gathering, let me, if I may, 
end with a piece of biblical exegesis. The story of the first 
family, the first man and woman in the Garden of Eden, 
is not generally regarded as a success. Whether or not we 
believe in original sin, it did not end happily. After many 
years of studying the text I want to suggest a different 
reading. The story ends with three verses that seem to 
have no connection with one another. No sequence. No 
logic. In Genesis 3:19 God says to the man:  “By the sweat 
of your brow you will eat your food until you return to 
the ground, since from it you were taken; for dust you 
are and to dust you will return.” Then in the next verse 
we read:  “The man named his wife Eve, because she was 
the mother of all life.” And in the next, “The Lord God 
made garments of skin for Adam and his wife and clothed 
them.” 
What is the connection here? Why did God telling 
the man that he was mortal lead him to give his wife a 
new name? And why did that act seem to change God’s 
attitude to both of them, so that He performed an act of 
tenderness, by making them clothes, almost as if He had 
partially forgiven them? Let me also add that the Hebrew 
word for “skin” is almost indistinguishable from the 
Hebrew word for “light”, so that Rabbi Meir, the great 
sage of the early 2nd century, read the text as saying that 
God made for them “garments of light”. What did he 
mean?
If we read the text carefully, we see that until now 
the first man had given his wife a purely generic name. 
He called her ishah, woman. Recall what he said when he 
first saw her:  “This is now bone of my bones and flesh 
of my flesh; she shall be called woman for she was taken 
from man.” For him she was a type, not a person. He gave 
her a noun, not a name. What is more he defines her as a 
derivative of himself:  something taken from man. She is 
not yet for him someone other, a person in her own right. 
She is merely a kind of reflection of himself.
As long as the man thought he was immortal, he 
ultimately needed no one else. But now he knew he was 
mortal. He would one day die and return to dust. There 
was only one way in which something of him would live 
on after his death. That would be if he had a child. But 
he could not have a child on his own. For that he needed 
his wife. She alone could give birth. She alone could 
mitigate his mortality. And not because she was like him 
but precisely because she was unlike him. At that moment 
she ceased to be, for him, a type, and became a person 
in her own right. And a person has a proper name. That 
is what he gave her:  the name Chavah, “Eve”, meaning, 
“giver of life”.
At that moment, as they were about to leave Eden 
and face the world as we know it, a place of darkness, 
Adam gave his wife the first gift of love, a personal name. 
And at that moment, God responded to them both in 
love, and made them garments to clothe their nakedness, 
or as Rabbi Meir put it, “garments of light”.
And so it has been ever since, that when a man 
and woman turn to one another in a bond of faithfulness, 
God robes them in garments of light, and we come as 
close as we will ever get to God himself, bringing new life 
into being, turning the prose of biology into the poetry of 
the human spirit, redeeming the darkness of the world by 
the radiance of love.  
Sir Jonathan Sacks was formerly the Chief Rabbi of the British 
Commonwealth. This article is based on a speech he gave to the 
international colloquium “Humanum”, convened by Pope Francis 
on the topic of ‘The Complementarity of Man and Woman”, 
held November 17-19, 2014, in Vatican City. It has been 
reprinted with the kind permission of the Office of the Chief 
Rabbi. Additional information about Rabbi Sacks’ work and 
instructions on how to join his mailing list can be found on the 
website:  www.rabbisacks.org
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There have been endless disputes about the 
origins of  Dubrovnik and about its relationship with 
Cavtat, or (as it was known) Ragusa Vecchia, further 
down the coast. Both were settled in early times. Cavtat 
was from the 1st century a Roman colony, called 
Epidaurum. Dubrovnik, we know from archaeological 
evidence, was a fortified Roman settlement from at 
least the 6th century.
According to the chroniclers, notably 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Epidaurum fell in the 
early 7th century to Slavic invaders and the late Roman 
inhabitants made their way to Dubrovnik and founded 
a settlement. The place got its name, 
allegedly, from a deformation of  the 
Greek root lau, meaning cliff, thus Rausa 
and so Ragusa. This is all obviously an 
oversimplification. But I don’t follow 
some scholars in dismissing the story 
of  the collapse of  Epidaurum and its 
connection with Dubrovnik entirely. 
The tradition is too strong. 
Whatever their exact motive and 
numbers, the inhabitants of  Epidaurum 
brought a strong sense of  civic identity, 
and almost certainly a bishopric, with 
them to Dubrovnik. In this sense, the 
foundation myth probably does reflect 
part of  the reality.
The settlement of  Dubrovnik 
proper was essentially Romano-
Greek. But from an early date there 
was another contiguous settlement 
of  Slavs and Vlachs on the slopes of  
Mount Srđ. Srđ was then known in 
Latin as Vergatum, itself  derived from 
the word Virgetum meaning a grove of  
saplings. The villages of  Brgat Donji and Brgat Gornji 
reflect this fact. The “grove” in question was of  
holm oaks—in Croatian dub, hence dubrava, hence of  
course Dubrovnik. The first known use of  the word 
Dubrovčani is in a charter of  1189 from Ban Kulin the 
ruler of  Bosnia. The first known use of  Dubrovnik is 
from a charter of  1215 from King Stefan Nemanja of  
Serbia. 
These are interesting pointers to the future. But 
the fact remains that the population of  Dubrovnik, or 
Ragusa, was culturally Latin not Slavic until probably 
the last part of  the 13th century. And its ruling class 
became only Slavicised in manners and language later 
still. Moreover, the community grew up very much in 
the shadow of  the Byzantine Empire.
Rule by Venice
But Byzantium was distant and, by the end 
of  the 12th century, increasingly weak. So it was 
that on their return from the sack and occupation 
of  Constantinople in the course of  the Fourth 
Crusade, in 1205, the Venetians stopped at Dubrovnik 
and promptly demanded, and received, the city’s 
submission. With occasional intervals as a result of  
Ragusan rebelliousness, Venice would rule Dubrovnik 
for the next century and a half.
Subsequent Ragusan and still later Yugoslav 
historians would have little good to say about this 
period. The fact is, however, that without Venetian 
rule it is highly improbable that Dubrovnik could have 
developed so far—politically, economically, socially, or 
culturally. 
True, Venetian rule was in some respects an 
encumbrance. In particular, it closely 
controlled trade in the Adriatic, the 
so-called “Venetian Gulf ”, seeking to 
ensure that all commerce went via the 
Venice staple market of  Rialto. In three 
ways, however, Venetian rule bestowed 
substantial benefits. In the first place, 
Venice provided an ultimate guarantor 
of  Dubrovnik’s security in the long 
struggle with the Nemanjić rulers of  
Serbia which now began and lasted 
throughout most of  the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries. 
The second advantage of  Venetian 
rule was, paradoxically, economic. 
This though was despite not thanks 
to Venetian intentions. Venice wanted 
exclusive control in the Adriatic. But it 
had little interest in or aptitude for trade 
with the difficult, dangerous Slavs of  the 
Balkan hinterland. 
Dubrovnik shrewdly exploited this 
fact. In 1232, the Serenissima formally 
established that while Dubrovnik could 
send only four ships a year to Venice, and had to pay 
substantial dues on the rest of  its maritime commerce, 
it could trade without any customs dues at all with 
the Slavs. The Ragusan merchants used this provision 
to gain a grip on Balkan trade, including the silver 
mines of  Serbia and Bosnia. The contacts and skills 
they acquired also uniquely prepared them for the 
more fraught, but still more productive, relationship 
they would establish with the region’s future Ottoman 
rulers.
The third benefit of  Venetian rule was 
institutional. The Ragusans hated Venice. But they 
accepted the Venetian institutional legacy with few 
alterations. Above all, perhaps, they absorbed the ethos 
that made those institutions function so effectively. 
Venice was unusual among the Italian city states in 
maintaining a high degree of  stability. Schisms were 
frowned about. Personal ambitions were subordinated 
to, or at least concealed by, an austere civic virtue. 
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Coat of  arms of  the Republic 
of  Ragusa and the city of  
Dubrovnik.
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This became still more the case in the state of  
Dubrovnik, whose major preoccupation throughout 
its existence was to ensure that no individual or clique 
became too powerful. 
This is one reason, incidentally, why the 
picture we have of  so many Ragusans is rather grey. 
Conformity, uniformity, and equality—at least among 
the noble patricians who ran the state’s affairs—were 
emphasised. Decisions were collective wherever 
possible. The only Ragusan citizen to have a statue 
erected in his honour—in this case a rather uninspiring 
bust in the courtyard of  the Rector’s Palace—was 
Miho Pracat. He was a commoner, a hugely wealthy 
merchant from Lopud, and great civic philanthropist. 
And even then the Ragusan Senate wrangled for years 
before it agreed to commission the work. This attitude 
was part of  the Venetian legacy.
Hungary
The final stage of  Dubrovnik’s political 
development towards an autonomy, which can 
reasonably be described as independence, was made 
under Hungarian allegiance. Having been routed in 
their war with Hungary, the Venetians left Dubrovnik 
for good in 1358. 
The Dubrovnik patriciate now managed, by an 
extraordinarily skilful use of  diplomacy and influence, 
to secure terms of  submission to the Hungarian King 
which were unique in Dalmatia. Dubrovnik could 
choose its own Rector (as the Count began now to be 
called) from among its own citizens. It conducted its 
own foreign policy. It minted its own coinage. 
True, it flew the Hungarian flag and employed 
Hungarian guards—called barabanti—to guard its 
fortresses. It also paid a modest tribute, undertook 
to assist the Hungarians in certain circumstances, and 
honoured the Hungarian King with laudes chanted in 
the cathedral. But for all practical purposes Dubrovnik 
was its own master. The city then acquired its splendid 
coat of  arms.
Dubrovnik also undertook further territorial 
expansion. In later years, Dubrovnik made much of  
its peaceful instincts, its preference for diplomacy over 
war, its interest in commerce not aggrandisement. But 
these were really typical Ragusan attempts to make a 
virtue of  necessity once the arrival of  the Ottoman 
Empire transformed the military situation in the 
Balkans. Whenever they could, the Ragusans grabbed 
quite shamelessly, and quite successfully too.
The Ottomans
The Turkish-Ragusan relationship is surely one 
of  the most remarkable symbioses to be found in 
European history. Dubrovnik began tentative dealings 
with the Ottoman invaders from the late 14th century, 
but it strenuously sought to avoid paying tribute to the 
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Sultan. Circumstances in the end, however, left it little 
option and in 1442 the historic decision was made 
to begin to pay the tribute, called harač. There were 
real dangers involved. Payment of  the harač implied in 
Ottoman eyes recognition of  the Sultan’s sovereignty, 
and how he interpreted that sovereignty was entirely 
in his hands. 
The Turks, as an Islamic superpower, had little 
reason to look favourably on Catholic Dubrovnik. 
They began by trying to extract as much as they could 
from it. The harač thus rose sharply in the last part 
of  the 15th century. In exchange, Dubrovnik received 
privileged treatment within the Empire, but these 
privileges were fragile and the cost was high—not 
least in the bribery and bullying of  Ottoman officials 
and soldiers. Only under Suleyman the Magnificent 
in 1521 was the commercial relationship between the 
Empire and its precocious little tributary confirmed 
on highly favourable terms. 
Dubrovnik now gained in effect a new monopoly 
of  the Balkan trade. It paid a fixed sum, raised by its 
own people from its own merchants, to the Sultan. And 
because of  a suspiciously fortunate miscalculation of  
exchange rates by a doubtless venal Turkish financial 
official, while the real value of  Dubrovnik’s trade 
assessed in Venetian ducats rose, its payments in 
Turkish aspers did not. 
Rather than follow the intricate struggles between 
the Counter-Reformation West and the Ottoman East 
during the 16th and early 17th centuries, I shall just 
point out two ways in which they affected Dubrovnik. 
First, Dubrovnik was well placed to appeal to both 
sides. Its most persistent foe was Venice, to whom it 
was both a rival and a reproach. But against Venice it 
had a distinctly odd couple of  protectors. On the one 
hand, there was the Pope, with support from Spain, 
who regarded Dubrovnik as the last toe-hold for 
Catholicism in the region.
Equally powerful a friend, albeit a somewhat 
unpredictable one, was the [Sublime] Porte itself. 
The Turks needed Dubrovnik as an entrepot for 
trade with the West, and they infinitely preferred 
Ragusan merchants, whom they could dominate, to 
the arrogant Venetians whom they feared. Meanwhile, 
Dubrovnik juggled and spied on and lied to the two 
sides to survive. Hence the jibes:
A Frenchman—it had to be a Frenchman—
who visited Dubrovnik in January 1658 noted that the 
inhabitants were known as “the Ragusans of  the sette 
bandiere (the seven flags)” because they (allegedly) paid 
tribute to seven foreign rulers. He continued:  “The 
Turks they fear, the Venetians they hate; the Spanish 
they love because they are useful; the French they 
suffer because of  their fame; and foreigners they spy 
on very much.” 
It was an unenviable reputation. But to these 
sneers the Ragusans could have given a decisive and 
irrefutable answer—these tactics allowed them to 
survive.
The second benefit of  Ottoman rule, which 
I’ve already mentioned, was economic. The Ragusans 
by now were not just merchants but tax gathers and 
entrepreneurs throughout the Ottoman Balkan and 
other territories. They had regularised their relations 
with Constantinople through a web of  bribery, 
diplomacy and indeed ceremony—represented above 
all by the annual mission of  the Republic’s ambassadors. 
These poklisari would depart in procession 
through the Ploče Gate—together with the dragoman 
or interpreter, their priest, their barber-surgeon, their 
servants and their Ottoman guards. They would pass 
slowly through the Balkan lands from Ragusan colony 
to Ragusan colony, resolving outstanding issues in a 
quasi-judicial capacity. Finally, they would take up their 
lodgings in the Pera district of  Constantinople. Here 
they would obtain confirmation of  privileges, present 
the tribute, distribute sweeteners and defuse tensions. 
Sometimes it was a dangerous business, involving 
imprisonment and even death. But it usually worked.
When the Ottoman Empire was at war, the profits 
of  Dubrovnik generally rose, because it benefited as 
the only neutral commercial go-between – and could 
raise its port dues accordingly. But in later years this 
advantage was lessened, as growing disorder led to a 
contraction of  the volume of  trade. Dubrovnik, as a 
tributary of  the Porte, was also regarded as fair game 
both by the uskoks—the piratical zealots of  Senj—and 
the hajduks, a catch-all term for other rebels against 
Ottoman rule. 
A serious blow to Dubrovnik’s fortunes was 
delivered by the opening of  Venetian Split as an 
alternative entrepot in 1590. Only in 1645, with 
the outbreak of  a new war between Venice and the 
Empire, did Split’s closure allow Dubrovnik to reassert 
its quasi-monopoly. But by then wider regional 
economic problems were reducing opportunities. And 
soon Dubrovnik would be facing the greatest crisis of  
its existence.
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The flag bearing the slogan “Libertas”, flown by 
Dubrovnik’s merchant fleet.
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The construction of  Dubrovnik
By now, the mid-17th century, Dubrovnik had 
already reached its full urban development. Dubrovnik 
is often portrayed as a city of  peace, of  culture, of  
international values. And in recent times of  course it 
has been. But, as the Senate insisted in 1430, when 
facing the threat of  attack by Dubrovnik’s arch-enemy 
and neighbour, Radoslav Pavlović, the work on the city 
walls was to be carried out “non tanto per la belleza, 
quanto la forteza”:  that is, these fortifications weren’t 
romantic props—they were for real.
In the 14th century, the defences were erected 
against the Venetians. In the 15th century, especially 
after the fall of  Constantinople, it was mainly against 
the Turks. This is the era of  the construction first by 
Michelozzo Michelozzi and then by the great Juraj 
Dalmatinac of  the MinčetaTower. 
In the 16th century, when Venice sought to 
use the wars of  the Holy League as an excuse to 
seize Dubrovnik, the Revelin (at the Ploče gate) 
and the fortress of  St. John were built and rebuilt. 
The fortification of  the harbour is according to the 
conception of  Dubrovnik’s great, long-serving and 
faithful city engineer, Paskoje Miličević. Miličević also 
designed and built my own favourite civic building—
the Sponza Palace—and so well that it withstood the 
Great Earthquake, more than a century later.
The Great Earthquake
At eight o’clock in the morning on the 
Wednesday of  Holy Week, the 6th April 1667, the 
Great Earthquake began. Within a few seconds a large 
part of  the city’s buildings had collapsed. The great 
Gothic cathedral was among them. Boulders poured 
down from Mount Srđ. Panic and disorder broke out. 
About 2,000 people, a third of  the city’s 
population, probably died; and perhaps another 
thousand or so were killed in the rest of  the Republic. 
These are small figures to us, perhaps, but a true 
catastrophe for a city of  6,000 and a state of  fewer 
than 30,000 souls.
The Dubrovnik patriciate’s struggle to maintain 
the city’s independence, threatened by Venetians and 
Turks externally and by civil disorder within, is I think 
a truly inspiring one. But rather than pursue the course 
of  the city’s reconstruction, I want to look at what had 
been taking place within Ragusan society and culture. 
Society
I was gently criticised in one historian’s review 
of  my book for succumbing to the myth propagated 
by Dubrovnik about itself. I don’t plead guilty:  the 
myth reflected, as myths do, an important reality. But 
it’s certainly true that the Ragusan myth is seductive. 
Notably, Dubrovnik claimed to enjoy something 
called LIBERTAS—the slogan embossed on the 
flag of  its merchant fleet. A famous passage in Ivan 
Gundulić’s poem, Dubravka, eloquently sums up the 
conviction. Gundulić, writing in 1627, contrasts the 
order, harmony, prosperity and above all freedom 
enjoyed by the inhabitants of  the enchanted grove—
Dubrovnik—with the conditions endured elsewhere 
in Dalmatia under Venetian rule.
The triumphal chorus runs:  O ljepa, o draga, 
o slatka slobodo, / Dar u kom sva blaga višnji nam bog je 
do, / Uzroče istini od naše sve slava, / Uresu jedini od ove 
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An old printed map showing the ancient Republic of  Ragusa 
and inbound merchant ships.
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A panoramic view of  Dubrovnik taken from atop the old city walls.
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Dubrave (Oh beautiful, dear sweet Freedom, / The gift 
in which the God above has given us all blessings, / 
Oh true cause of  all our glory, / Only adornment of  
this Grove.)
To all of  which the cynic could answer that this 
is all very well, but that Dubrovnik was in no sense a 
democracy. And that’s true. Only adult male patricians 
could hold political power and significant office. Their 
sovereignty was exercised through the Great Council. 
Moreover, from the 15th century till the end of  the 
Republic it was the increasingly oligarchic Senate, and 
the families represented there, who largely controlled 
the Government—the Rector, elected for just a month, 
held a purely honorary role. 
On the other hand, Dubrovnik was indeed free 
in other senses. It was from the late 13th century at 
least firmly founded upon a rule of  law. Within the 
governing elite there was a large measure of  equality. 
Ingenious measures, combining use of  elections and 
selection by lot, and involving strict prohibitions on 
cabals and campaigning, were implemented to prevent 
concentrations of  power.
Although the nobility exercised political control 
it did not behave oppressively. Above all, it did not 
stand in the way of  a large body of  very wealthy 
merchants from the citizen class—also known as the 
popolo grosso—from achieving high social status. 
We don’t know much about how the lower 
classes in Dubrovnik lived for most of  the Republic’s 
history, except that, as elsewhere, it will have been 
harshly. But again there were mitigating circumstances. 
For example, serfdom of  a fully developed kind was 
unknown on the Republic’s territory. 
While it is true that peasants in some areas were in 
practice tied to the land, this never involved subjection 
to the lord’s justice:  all of  Dubrovnik’s citizens enjoyed 
direct recourse to the Republic’s courts. Moreover, 
those who lived in or near Dubrovnik itself  enjoyed 
the benefit of  a remarkable proto-welfare state and 
National Health Service.
Dubrovnik was proud of  its healthy climate and 
life-style. The 15th century Tuscan Philip de Diversis, 
who served as the city’s school master, claimed to have 
met rosy-faced, fighting-fit Ragusans of  90 or 100 
years old—which also perhaps testifies to the Ragusan 
sense of  humour. 
Anyway, Dubrovnik showed from an early date 
a strong and enlightened interest in public health. 
From the 13th century Dubrovnik had a succession 
of  doctors—Jews, Greeks, Spaniards, Germans and 
Italians, rather than Ragusans—who were employed 
by the town and required to provide free treatment to 
those who needed it. There were also surgeon-barbers 
and pharmacists. 
Commercial considerations as well as public 
health ones required that special measures were taken 
to cope with the risk of  imported disease. Dubrovnik 
was ahead of  the other states of  its day, even Venice, 
in instituting quarantine regulations and providing 
quarantine stations, called Lazzaretti. The first Ragusan 
quarantine law is dated 1377. The quarantine station 
moved from one site to another, finishing up in today’s 
Lazzaretti on Ploče in the 17th century.
Dubrovnik founded a hospice for the destitute, 
known as the Magnum Hospitale, in the mid-14th 
century, near the convent of  St. Clare at Pile. In the 
16th century it was transformed into a hospital in the 
modern sense. 
Dubrovnik had a more enlightened attitude 
towards children born out of  wedlock than did any 
of  its neighbours. Illegitimate children were, as often 
as not, recognized, and grew up in the father’s family 
and even inherited property. But some of  course did 
not—particularly those born to the poor. 
Dubrovnik’s orphanage, set up in 1429 to look 
after foundlings, was one of  the first in Europe. It 
was situated opposite the Mala Braća. Two specially 
designed, wheel-like devices, one on each side of  the 
orphanage, were used to draw in a baby anonymously 
from its mother. 
The impulse is clear from the statute which 
declared it an “abomination and inhumanity to cast 
out little human beings who, because of  poverty or for 
some other reason, are thrown out around the city like 
brute beasts without knowledge of  their parents, for 
which reason they often die without the sacrament of  
baptism, or come to some other ill”. 
The orphanage was founded for this and—the 
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statute added—“for reverence for Jesus”. In short, the 
motive was Christian charity.
Religion
It’s odd, indeed, that so many historians, of  
quite different ideological inclinations, are inclined to 
under-play the importance of  religion in the history 
of  Dubrovnik—and I would even add—in the history 
of  Croatia. 
I suppose Leftists don’t generally like the subject, 
while many Rightists as nationalists are anxious to 
emphasis secular elements, like language or political 
institutions, as defining identity.
For the Ragusan Republic, at least, there can be 
no doubt:  it was first and foremost a Catholic state, 
and remaining one was at the top of  that state’s political 
agenda throughout its existence. For example, until 
the very end of  the Republic Dubrovnik struggled to 
ensure that no Orthodox priest was allowed to reside 
overnight in the city. 
Dubrovnik’s Catholicism, was, however, of  
the Erastian kind. The patriciate did not intend to 
be told what to do by any cleric, except perhaps the 
Pope. The Ragusan nobility kept a firm grip on the 
religious orders and religious houses. They ensured till 
the 18th century that the archbishop was a foreigner, 
so that he could not pose a threat to the government’s 
authority. They quarrelled with the Jesuits because of  
their dangerous Counter-Reformation zeal, for fear of  
offending the Porte.
As everyone knows, the patron of  Dubrovnik 
was and is St. Blaise (Sveti Vlaho). The saint fulfilled a 
parallel role to that of  St. Mark in Venice—or indeed 
St. Tryphon (Sveti Tripun) in Kotor, St. Domnius (Sveti 
Dujam) in Split and so on. The Feast of  St. Blaise, 3rd 
February, was celebrated in a style both noisy and 
devout. 
During the franchise, or immunity, of  St. 
Blaise—three days before and after the Feast—
debtors and criminals could come to the city without 
fear of  pursuit to deal with their creditors or the 
authorities. Wherever Dubrovnik established its rule 
and its customs it also established the cult of  St. Blaise. 
There were ten churches dedicated to him in the 15th 
century—including one at Ston on Pelješac and one at 
Pridvorje in Konavle, thus at each vulnerable extremity 
of  the Republic. 
Decline & fall
The period after the Great Earthquake has 
sometimes been regarded as a rather dreary one in 
Dubrovnik’s history, but unfairly. Eighteenth century 
Dubrovnik was certainly less important than it had 
been in European terms. The incursion into the 
Mediterranean world of  the British, the French and 
finally the Russians, and the decline of  the Ottoman 
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Empire, changed the balance of  power, as well as the 
balance of  prosperity, to Dubrovnik’s loss. 
But Ragusan society was, for all that, remarkably 
polished:  it produced a great scientist in the shape of  
Rudjer Bošković, a fine composer in the form of  Luko 
Sorkočević and a range of  lesser polymaths, all strongly 
imbued with local pride and patriotism. 
By the end of  the 18th century the Ragusan 
maritime trade had recovered:  and Ragusan ships were 
now bringing corn from the Black Sea through the 
Dardanelles to Western Europe.
The political order of  Dubrovnik had, though, 
become sclerotic. The nobles had more or less overcome 
past schisms, based on blood, that divided the families 
of  the so-called sorbonezi and salamankezi. But there were 
simply not enough of  them to fill all the offices:  such is 
the effect of  caste on demography. Moreover, a limited 
section of  the nobility itself  had become imbued with 
reformist ideas derived from the French Revolutionary 
upheavals.
In truth, there was no way in which the Ragusan 
Republic could survive in the turbulent years of  the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars without a powerful 
patron—and for once in its long history that patron 
was lacking. In 1806, despite the Senate’s desperate 
attempts to avert it, French troops entered Dubrovnik. 
This, in turn, prompted a ferocious attack by hordes 
of  Montenegrins, supported by the Russian fleet. The 
aggressors’ tactics, and indeed motivation, differed little 
from that of  their offspring in the early 1990s. 
By the time that the siege was lifted, Dubrovnik’s 
wealth, above all its merchant fleet, had been largely lost. 
Finally, on the afternoon of  January 31, 1808, Marshal 
Marmont, exasperated at the Dubrovnik Senate’s refusal 
to follow Venice’s example of  polite political suicide, 
gave the order for the abolition of  the Republic. It was 
read out in an insulting speech by a jumped-up French 
Colonel. The Senators were ordered to disperse. The 
doors of  the Rector’s Palace, and of  all the offices within, 
were locked fast and sealed.  A few weeks later Marmont 
was rewarded by Napoleon with the title duc de Raguse.
The Ragusans
So how shall I sum the Ragusans? They were, by 
and large, talented, brave, patriotic and pious—as long 
as piety didn’t get in the way of  profit. Their diplomacy 
was in equal degrees admired for its subtlety and reviled 
for its deviousness. They were resilient in the jaws of  
adversity and opportunist in the face of  fortune. They 
were unswervingly consistent in strategy, while infinitely 
flexible in tactics. They were compassionate towards the 
needy; tolerant towards those to whom tolerance paid; 
remorseless in resisting any threat. They were diligent in 
business and skilled in seamanship. 
And they were endowed with the talent for 
pleasure—as their tales of  fishing trips and picnics, 
parties and gardens confirm. They built for themselves 
and their friends a chain of  beautiful villas, sadly now 
often in ruins, along the coast and on the islands. This, 
Petar Sorkočević’s house on Lapad, is now home to the 
Historical Institute. In the end, I admire the Ragusans 
because they knew the most important thing there is to 
know—they knew how to live.  
Robin Harris served as an Adviser at the UK Treasury and Home 
Office, Director of  the Conservative Party Research Department, 
and was as a member of  Prime Minister Thatcher’s Downing 
Street Policy Unit. He is the author of  Dubrovnik:  A History 
(2003), and other books. This article is based on a private lecture 
given to the Croatian Students and Young Professionals Network 
in 2004. It is published here with his kind permission. 
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The cover of  the first edition of  Harris’s 500-page 
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On the 1st of  June 2005, the Dutch people were 
asked in a referendum about their opinion on the new 
Constitution of  the European Union. The Dutch 
voted against this Constitution. But within two years, 
their will was ignored and the text was simply passed as 
the ‘Treaty of  Lisbon’. The public was never consulted 
again and, since then, the process of  European 
integration has continued inexorably, encouraged by 
financial crises and other ‘threats’. 
Exactly ten years after the Dutch referendum, 
in June of  this year, the Civil EU Committee in the 
Netherlands presented a Manifesto to the People of  the 
Netherlands at a conference held in the press room 
of  The Hague’s parliament. Despite invitations to 
attend the launch, not a single member of  parliament 
attended. (They did, however, receive a copy of  the 
Manifesto in their mailboxes.) This was neglect on their 
part as public officials.
The EU has continued to reduce the Netherlands 
to merely a province of  a new supranational state—
one in which we have less sovereignty and a rapidly 
diminishing grip on power. Ten years after the 2005 
referendum, the Netherlands as a sovereign state has 
almost vanished. Although the country may seem 
to exist, its power has shifted from The Hague to 
Brussels, away from ordinary people. In ten short 
years, the Netherlands has became a country that 
has abolished its right to self-determination—one in 
which its own citizens cannot rule themselves. In fact, 
the Netherlands isn’t even a democracy anymore.
The Manifesto to the People of  the Netherlands 
analyses in detail what has happened, and uncovers all 
the hidden mechanisms through which authority and 
sovereignty are undermined. It blames the weakening 
of  Dutch democracy squarely on the European Union 
and calls for a Constitutional restoration. 
But the Manifesto doesn’t just analyse the ongoing 
delegation of  authority to Brussels; it also refutes the 
main arguments used by the ‘Europhiles’ to defend 
the EU—such as the ‘inevitability’ of  history, and 
the claim that the EU has brought peace, wealth, 
and stability to all of  its member states. By reviewing 
Dutch government documents, and other institutional 
and legal texts, the authors—Arjan van Dixhoorn of  
Utrecht University and Pepijn van Houwelingen of  
the Netherlands Institute for Social Research—reveal 
that the only justification offered for the shift in power 
from the Netherlands to the EU is the claim that it 
improves the so-called manageability of  the EU. 
And so, in short, crisis after crisis has been 
used to increase the power of  the EU’s institutions 
in Brussels, as well as that of  the European Central 
Bank, while at the same time diminishing the power of  
national level institutions in each member state. 
The argument of  ‘manageability’ seems to merely 
A New European Referendum
Tom Zwitser
be the ‘garment’ of  the new European ‘emperor’—
one for whom (the bureaucrats argue) it is worth 
sacrificing democratic institutions, the last traces of  
sovereignty, and any remaining possibility of  national 
self-determination. The Manifesto to the People of  the 
Netherlands demonstrates how absurd this argument 
really is. 
Last year, the Civil EU Committee gathered 
65,000 signatures in the Netherlands in a petititon 
submitted to the Dutch parliament calling for a new 
referendum. As a result, members of  the Committee 
were given the right to present their arguments formally 
to members of  parliament. The parliament then had 
a debate about the EU and discussed the possibility 
of  holding another referendum—though in the end it 
voted against it.
This hasn’t stopped the organizers of  the Civil 
EU Committee. The publication of  the Manifesto 
is only the first in a series of  events that have taken 
Manifest 
aan het volk van Nederlands
Arjan van Dixhoorn & 
Pepijn van Houwelingen
Groningen:  Uitgeverij De Blauwe Tijger, 2015
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place following the ten-year anniversary of  the 
2005 referendum in an effort to  bring about a new 
referendum. 
This past July, a new law came into force in 
the Netherlands, which creates the possibility of  an 
‘advisory’ referendum that can be demanded directly 
by the public. But 300,000 signatures are required. The 
Committee has thus begun working on gathering the 
necessary signatures (and so far has gathered more 
than 150,000). 
Meanwhile, debates will continue be organized 
across the Netherlands to raise awareness about the 
undemocratic and legally questionable way in which all 
national authority has been systematically transferred 
to an unelected elite in Brussels. 
This book, which includes an Introduction by 
Thierry Baudet, makes it clear that a referendum is 
necessary. Only the people of  the Netherlands can—
and must—determine their future. And for this to 
occur, the sovereignty of  the Netherlands must be 
restored—otherwise it will continue to become part 
of  the new, autocratic super-state whose throne is in 
Brussels.  
Tom Zwitser is the publisher of  De Blauwe Tijger.
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In 2005, the European Constitution failed in two EU member states due to overwhelming negative votes in the Netherlands 
and France. The image shows some of  the posters put up in Burgundy by opposing sides during the French referendum.
Results of  the 2005 referendum 
on the European Constitution held in 
the Netherlands
Despite overwhelming results against ratification of  the 
European Constitution, EU officials in Brussels have 
ignored the will of  European citizens.
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Briefly Noted
La tradizione e il sacro
Roger Scruton
Milano:  Vita e Pensiero, 2015
La tradizione e il sacro (Tradition and the Sacred), published 
this year by Vita e Pensiero of  Milan, the label of  the 
Catholic University of  the Sacred Heart in Milan, collects 
six previously published essays by Roger Scruton. Scruton’s 
point is really the question of  the day:  “What keeps us 
together?” The answer, he suggests, is found in the 
question itself—where ‘us’ stands for Christian Western 
Civilization, and what remains of  it that is still Christian 
and still Western—despite the contemporary narrative of  
triumphant irreligion.   (M. Respinti)
Admirable Evasions: 
How Psychology Undermines Morality
Theodore Dalrymple 
New York:  Encounter Books,  2015 
One of  the greatest living essayists in the English language, 
Dalrymple turns his attention in this short book to the field 
of  psychology. A former prison doctor, he inveighs against 
the field of  psychology today, which he sees as ‘getting 
in the way’ of  people’s duties and obligations. Too often, 
he writes, medical diagnoses are overused, and societal 
problems are reduced to behavioral problems stemming 
from neurochemical disorders. This contributes to a culture 
in which people are no longer responsible for their actions—
and leads to “intellectual and moral dishonesty”.  
Le traité transatlantique et autres menaces
Alain de Benoist
Paris:  Éditions Pierre-Guillaume de Roux, 2015
In The Transatlantic Treaty and Other Menaces, the controversial 
French academic—and founder of  the Nouvelle Droite (of  
which we are often critical)—here explains his opposition to 
the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the EU and the US. Seeing it as nothing more than a 
mechanism that would facilitate the ‘take-over’ of  Europe by 
multinational corporations, Benoist considers it one of  several 
threats to national sovereignty. In the face of  such threats, he 
argues, the only response is to rebel.   (P. Pigny)
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Estudios de filosofía moderna y contemporánea
(Obras Completas de Leonardo Polo, Vol. XXIV)
Leonardo Polo
Navarra:  Eunsa, 2015
Polo, who died in 2013, remains widely unknown outside 
of  Spanish-speaking academic circles. An influential and 
beloved philosophy professor at the University of  Navarra, 
he influenced generations of  students and made significant 
contributions to the fields of  ethics, epistemology, and 
ontology. His complete works—including extensive 
unpublished manuscripts and class notes—are now being 
published in critical editions. A deep, challenging, and 
complex thinker who never lost sight of  the divine, this 
volume, titled Studies of  Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, 
gathers some of  his most penetrating analyses of  modern 
and contemporary philosophy.   (N. Landa)
The Great Debate:  Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, 
and the Birth of  Right and Left
Yuval Levin
New York:  Basic Books, 2013
Widely reviewed when it was first published in 2013, this 
book is one of  the most engaging introductions to the ideas 
and legacy of  Edmund Burke, using Thomas Paine as a 
foil. Despite their differences, and set in the context of  the 
Anglo-American political tradition, Levin argues that Burke 
and Paine really had much more in common than people 
realize. A bright thinker and clear writer, Levin further 
argues that the consequences of  their ideas can be seen in 
the US today in the political divide between right and left. 
Nicolás Gómez Dávila e la crisi dell’Occidente
Edited by Fabrizio Meroi & Silvano Zucal
Pisa:  Edizione ETS, 2015
The Colombian Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913-1994) remains 
one of  the most interesting—and least known—conservative 
writers in the world. Writing almost exclusively in aphorisms, 
only some of  his work is available in other languages. A lyrical 
writer and trenchant critic of  modernity, he was faithful to 
conservative—and oftentimes reactionary—principles and 
ideas. This book brings together the proceedings of  an 
international conference held in Trent in May 2014 on the 
centenary of  his birth, focusing on the political and religious 
aspects of  his writings.  
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Rarely has a book caused so much controversy 
and upset among Germany’s well-to-do and progressive 
elites as Thilo Sarrazin’s Deutschland schafft sich ab—a 
title that translates into Germany Abolishes Itself. First 
published in 2010, the book has sold over 1.5 million 
copies, making it one of the most successful books on 
contemporary politics in post-war Germany. 
The book might well have gone unnoticed had it 
not been for the prominence of its author. Sarrazin is 
an economist who at one time was a senior manager of 
Deutsche Bahn (Germany’s federal railway), as well as 
serving as the Finance Senator of Berlin. He was also 
an executive board member of Europe’s most powerful 
central bank, the German Bundesbank. 
A quick glance at the book’s index could lead 
the unsuspecting reader into believing that the book 
is merely another historical analysis of Germany, the 
German people, and Europe in general. To be sure, 
Sarrazin spends the first two (of nine) chapters setting 
the scene, providing the background for the rest of the 
book by giving historical accounts of the development of 
German society and the German state, and building the 
basis for the arguments that he makes in the following 
chapters. Interestingly, his concluding ninth chapter can 
almost be read as a work of satire, independent from 
the rest of the book, as Sarrazin describes two possible 
scenarios—“a dream and a nightmare”—of the future of 
Germany a hundred years from now.
Sarrazin makes his key arguments based on the 
social and economic problems caused by immigration, 
and the decline of the German birth-rate. He focuses 
especially on the uncontrolled immigration of largely 
uneducated peoples from the Muslim world. He claims 
that Muslim workers are disproportionally less integrated 
into the job market, hold fewer skills, and have a tendency 
of building sub-cultures that not only act independently 
but are, in fact, hostile to German culture as a whole.
Many of his arguments and examples are drawn 
from his experiences as a professional and politician 
living in Berlin, but he supplements these with statistics 
and other resources. And throughout the book, Sarrazin 
repeats the urgent message of the book’s title, arguing 
that unless restrictions to immigration are implemented 
immediately—combined with reforms in schooling and 
education—Germany will abolish itself.
When it was first published in 2010, the book 
was one of the first to openly criticize the country’s 
endemic political correctness and the immigration of 
unqualified immigrant workers into Germany. (Sarrazin 
is a proponent of the immigration of well-qualified 
individuals.) The book attacked the systematic denial by 
government elites that immigration has placed a burden 
on German culture and society.
By talking about culture and ethnicity as driving 
forces in society, Sarrazin broke the post-war taboo in 
Deutschland schafft sich ab:  
Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen
Thilo Sarrazin
Munich:  Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010
The End of Germany?
Thomas Spannring
Germany that forbade anyone from arguing that some 
people’s values might be irreconcilable with Western 
values. The Left in particular was ready to condemn 
Sarrazin as a ‘racist’. Protest rallies were organized 
wherever Sarrazin appeared, and anytime he tried to 
speak about his book he was received by angry mobs.
Sarrazin’s critics, however, have missed the point 
he was trying to make. In fact, he merely dared to put 
down on paper what many Germans were already thinking 
but did not dare to say:  that immigrant communities 
have created parallel societies within Germany that in 
many ways are hostile to native German and Western 
values—and especially to democracy. In addition, these 
communities are seen as draining resources away from 
the state in the form of social welfare programmes.
For the discerning American reader, this book may 
seem like much ado about nothing, as it merely seems to 
capture the status quo of a Europe in decline, a common 
topic in the American press. But for Europeans—
and Germans in particular—Sarrazin’s book sounds 
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a powerful alarm, and offers a beacon of hope that 
Europeans might once more begin to acknowledge their 
Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage. Perhaps in 
doing so, they might also begin to stand up for themselves 
against the dominance of the left-wing mainstream and 
liberal elites that continue to seek the destruction of the 
values that have given Europe its unique identity.
The Left in Germany continues to fight Sarrazin 
and his book. The greatest insult to them, however, may 
be the fact that Sarrazin was—and remains—a member 
of good standing of Germany’s Social Democratic Party. 
His is a courageous, respectable voice among so many 
cowardly ones. And his book is a must-read.  
Thomas Spannring studied political science and holds an M.A. in 
European political and economic integration from the University of 
Durham in the UK. He is currently the President of a chemical 
company, and is based in Vienna and St. Louis. A previous 
version of this review appeared in The University Bookman. It 
appears with permission.
Borders & Political Order
Philippe Marlou
The French translation of Thierry Baudet’s The 
Significance of  Borders (2012), Indispensables frontières is 
timely. National borders have been under symbolic and 
legal attack for several decades, both within countries 
through multiculturalism and across countries via 
supranationalism. 
But resisting mainstream dogmas on these topics 
is usually the privilege of a few intellectual ‘aristocrats’ 
who are not afraid of being marginalized or attacked 
with slurs. In spite of a very explicit subtitle “Why 
supranationalism and multiculturalism undermine 
democracy”, Baudet’s book has been gaining surprisingly 
good traction in the French media. 
Indispensables frontières is an important opus, 
valuable for the subtle originality of its argument, the 
large number of authors it discusses, and the number 
of examples it provides. Baudet does not primarily 
write to describe or reiterate some of the undesirable 
consequences of the dilution of national borders. 
Instead, his mission is much more ambitious:  to show 
that undermining national borders threatens some of 
the very goals that proponents of multiculturalism or 
supranationalism usually espouse. 
An example may prove useful. For a governmental 
or a legal decision to be seen as legitimate and accepted 
as such, it has to be taken in the name of a particular 
group of people with a certain cultural identity, with 
centuries of particular history. 
Any decision involving a society as a whole (e.g. 
a law or a court order) will not necessarily be seen as 
legitimate—thus may not produce a peaceful and well-
functioning political order—if it reflects one culture 
out of many, with all of them being treated identically. 
Thus, there is no political representation (one aspect 
being democracy) without borders because borders 
make it possible for a “we”—for a res publica—to exist. 
Both multiculturalism and supranationalism 
work towards the dissolution of consistent and 
peaceful political orders, as they undermine political 
representation, which relies on the distinction between 
“we” and “them”. 
Baudet alternates between explications of political 
Indispensables frontières
Thierry Baudet
Paris:  Editions du Toucan, 2015
or legal theory and applying such theories to examples, 
such as legal cases. Chapters on the International 
Criminal Court and on European Court of Human 
Rights are especially illuminating in that respect. This 
book—which is also available in Dutch as De Aanval op 
de Natiestaat—is highly recommended.  
Philippe Marlou is an economist and writer based in Paris.
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Although Michel Houellebecq’s Soumission has 
drawn the ire of politically correct elites for allegedly 
being anti-Muslim and anti-feminist, such criticisms 
miss the point. In fact, a careful reading of the novel 
reveals that it is a subtle though important critique of the 
breakdown of the traditional family and the dominant 
nihilistic sexual amorality in today’s West. 
Michel Houellebecq’s latest novel has generated 
so much commentary since its publication on the day of 
the Charlie Hebdo murders that most readers will already 
know the basic outline of the plot:  Seven years from 
now, a Muslim party comes to power in France and a 
quiet process of Islamisation begins. 
Politicians and journalists who know only the 
outline of the book have assumed that Houellebecq’s 
story is Islamophobic. But careful readers have all 
agreed, along with with Houellebecq, that this is not the 
case at all. If anyone should be offended by his book, 
Houellebecq argues, it should be feminists. 
The place of women in society is indeed one 
of the main themes of Soumission. The narrator and 
protagonist of the story, François, begins by describing 
his growing disillusionment with the secular feminism of 
the contemporary West and ends by accepting a version 
of Islamic patriarchy. However, before accepting Islam 
he is briefly drawn toward Catholicism, whose attitude 
toward women is only indirectly hinted at. His ultimate 
rejection of Catholicism seems to stem from the 
character that secular hedonism has given him.
François is a professor of literature and since his 
student days he has had about one girlfriend a year. The 
book opens as he undergoes a growing realisation that 
these relationships have not remedied his basic loneliness 
and discontent, and also, and perhaps more importantly, 
that the current promiscuous ideal of sexual relations 
has rendered the women he knows lonely and miserable. 
When he meets some of his girlfriends from past years, 
he sees that their implicit plan of “trying out” exclusive 
relationships with a series of boyfriends, before settling 
down with one final boyfriend and starting a family, has 
not worked. 
One of them, Aurélie, was so emotionally and 
physically drained by her series of boyfriends that when 
she finally attempted to start a family she failed. This 
has left her a bitter misandrist, whose only topic of 
conversation is the failings of her male colleagues and her 
(unfulfilling) job. Another one, Sandra, similarly failed 
to start a family but has chosen to become a “cougar” 
who distracts herself from her inner emptiness by 
flirting with younger men. But the most miserable of all 
his female acquaintances seems to be the only one of his 
generation for whom the current model of relationships 
has gone pretty much as planned:  Annelise, the wife of 
an old friend from his student days. 
Annelise wakes up and adorns herself with 
Soumission
Michel Houellebecq
Paris:  Flammarion, 2015
The Future of France?
Pr. Edmund Waldstein
expensive clothes and make-up for her high-stress job, 
in which an elegant and stylish appearance is a sign of 
status. But when she returns home at the end of the 
day, physically and mentally exhausted, she dresses in 
comfortable and ugly clothes, too tired to enjoy the 
company of her husband and children or to try to 
beautify their lives. Under these circumstances, her 
marriage seems to have become a mockery. In one of 
the most poignant passages of the novel, François is at 
Annelise’s house for a barbecue, which is descending 
into chaos. Filled with pity he stays at her side, trying to 
express solidarity with her:  “a vain solidarity”.
The (somewhat fanciful) version of Islam to which 
François eventually submits is portrayed as the opposite 
of the failed sexual egalitarianism he has rejected. 
Muslim women are portrayed as dressing in shapeless 
robes and veils when they go outside but dressing up 
for their husbands. Polygamy allows for stable homes 
for women without sexual discipline on the part of men. 
Sealed off in the privacy of the home, Muslim women 
are absolved from the stresses of commercial and public 
life. They remain in an idyllic world of childhood:
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“In the Islamic regime, women (at least those 
pretty enough to attract well-to-do husbands) could 
remain children for practically their whole lives. Soon 
after they ceased being children themselves they 
became mothers, and plunged again into the world of 
children. As soon as their children grew up they became 
grandmothers .… There were only a few years in which 
they bought sexy lingerie and exchanged children’s 
games for sex games .… Of course they lost their 
autonomy, but f**k autonomy”. This is certainly an 
anti-feminist attitude, but is it a misogynistic one? 
It might be useful in this connection to recall 
David Graeber’s claim in Debt:  The First 5,000 Years 
that patriarchy in the classic, Old Testament sense first 
arose in rebellion against the decadence and sexual 
depravity of Mesopotamian cities; the veiling and 
secluding of women was partly a protest against their 
degradation in temple prostitution. This is certainly the 
way François chooses to see it. But it is 
hard to resist the impression that such 
infantilisation of women implies some 
degree of contempt.
Moreover, in the novel, for 
the new Muslim president of France, 
Mohammed Ben Abbes, the restoration 
of patriarchy is motivated not by pity 
for women but by a desire for power. 
His ultimate goal is to re-create the 
Roman Empire. He is scheming to 
admit the North African nations to the 
EU and then re-model the EU as an 
authoritarian super-state with himself as 
president. But he realises that a strong 
civilisation needs to have more children 
than those being generated in secular 
France, and thus the restoration of 
patriarchy is key to his project. 
He thinks the ultimate foundation 
of patriarchy is religion, and thus his 
first priority is to give French children 
an Islamic education. But he also sees 
that economic changes will have to be made if France 
is really going to become a patriarchal society. He 
begins by giving women financial incentives to leave 
the workforce. But he goes on to attempt a complete 
re-structuring of economic life—abolishing both 
capitalism and the welfare system, with its atomizing 
and egalitarian influences, and building a new economic 
system meant to strengthen families and family 
networks. 
Oddly enough, he turns to non-Islamic sources 
for inspiration here—the Catholic distributists G.K. 
Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. Distributism, the 
astonished public learns, “wanted to take a ‘third 
way’ between capitalism and communism (which it 
understood as state capitalism). Its basic idea was the 
overcoming of the division between capital and labour. 
The normal form of economic life was to be the family 
business. If certain branches of production required 
large scale organization, then everything was to be done 
to ensure that the workers were co-owners of their 
company, and co-responsible for its management”.
A Christian distributist could argue that 
overcoming the separation between work and family 
could allow for equality between the sexes without 
giving women Annelise’s problems. But for François, 
such questions are a bit beside the point. He is not 
much interested in economic theory. He is attracted to 
Islam because it is in power and because it seems better 
than secular nihilism. He does, however, go through a 
phase in which he is attracted to Christianity.
François is an expert on the decadent 19th century 
French novelist J.K. Huysmans. He had converted to 
Catholicism and for a long time François plays with the 
idea of following in his footsteps. He seems to almost 
have an epiphany at a medieval Marian pilgrimage 
shrine, but the moment quickly passes. 
Later, he visits a Benedictine monastery. There 
are, of course, no women there. But 
the Christianity that François sees 
there implies quite a different view 
of women from Islam:  “The voices 
of the monks in the icy air were pure, 
humble, and mild; they were full of 
sweetness, hope, and expectation. The 
Lord Jesus was returning, He would 
return soon, and the warmth of His 
presence already filled their souls with 
joy. That was basically the only theme 
of their chants, songs of harmonious 
and sweet expectation. Nietzsche was 
quite right, in that bitchy way of his, 
that Christianity is at heart a feminine 
religion”.
Unlike Nietzsche, however, 
François does not at first see 
Christianity’s feminine character as a 
reason to reject it. But then he returns 
to his room, and a comical scene ensues 
in which he tries to read a devotional 
book but becomes exasperated because 
he is not allowed to smoke. “You are here”, the book 
tells him, “to journey to that source where the force of 
desire can be expressed”. He becomes enraged. And 
unable to live without smoking he breaks off his visit 
early and returns to Paris. 
Later, the new head of his old university 
introduces him to a form of Islam that will permit 
not only cigarettes but also a full harem—and even, 
surprisingly, fine wine. He converts. 
In the end, it seems that the real problem with the 
“effeminate” religion of Christianity was that it would 
have required him to discipline his passions.  
Pater Edmund Waldstein is a Cistercian priest at Stift 
Heiligenkreuz in Lower Austria. He received his undergraduate 
education at Thomas Aquinas College in California. He blogs 
at sancrucensis.wordpress.com. This article, which was previously 
published in Ethika Politika, has been slightly modified. It is 
published with permission.
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Image taken from page 88 of  Songs 
of  a Savoyard published by George 
Routledge & Sons, London, 1890. 
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Few of  us have the patience—or the discipline—
to engage in the kind of  rigorous philosophical analysis 
needed to understand the roots of  the modern crisis. Rare 
indeed is the individual who can penetrate into ‘deeper 
truths’, and reveal the underlying assumptions and 
conceptual distortions that obscure our view of  social 
and political reality. The Italian philosopher Augusto Del 
Noce (1910-89) was such an individual. 
Considered one of  the most important political 
thinkers of  post-war Italy, his works have escaped the 
attention of  most non-Italian-speaking scholars. But in 
The Crisis of  Modernity, Carlo Lancellotti, a mathematics 
professor at City University of  New York, has carefully 
selected and translated 12 essays and lectures by Del Noce. 
For those interested in rigorous conservative critiques of  
modernity, this collection offers something new. 
Lancellotti has organized selections from Del 
Noce’s varied writings into three thematic sections: 
modernity, revolution, and secularization (Part One); the 
emergence of  the “technocratic society” (Part Two); and 
the predicament of  the West today (Part Three). Also 
included is an appendix comprised of  a 1984 interview 
with Del Noce conducted by 30 Giorni magazine. The 
overall effect is dizzying, with different intellectual 
currents and political movements meticulously examined 
by the late Italian thinker. 
Born in Pistoia, in the region of  Tuscany, into an 
aristocratic family and raised in the city of  Turin, Del Noce 
was from his earliest years a brilliant student. Although two 
thinkers dominated the 1920s intellectual milieu in which 
he grew up—the idealist philosopher Benedetto Croce 
and the so-called “philosopher of  fascism”, Giovanni 
Gentile—Del Noce charted his own course. 
As a private student at the Sorbonne he became 
acquainted with French scholars such as Étienne Gilson, 
Jacques Maritain, Jean Laporte, and Henri Gouhier. As 
Lancellotti explains in his excellent introduction:  “For 
Del Noce, Maritain was, more than anything else, an 
example of  a philosopher fully engaged with history 
who had developed a deep and original non-reactionary 
interpretation of  the trajectory of  the modern world in 
the light of  the classical and Christian tradition.” 
Profoundly influenced by Maritain and Gilson, Del 
Noce adhered to a traditional Catholic perspective, even 
when he became involved with Italy’s largely left-wing anti-
fascist movement. “Almost all my anti-Fascist university 
classmates ... shared [a] liberal-socialist orientation”, he 
notes in the 1984 interview in the appendix. But Del Noce 
forged his own approach to contemporary problems. 
Although he never stopped doing research, Del 
Noce was first and foremost an educator. He taught at a 
high school, worked at various think tanks, and eventually 
made his way through the “byzantine mechanism” of  
Italy’s university system. He landed a permanent academic 
post at the University of  Trieste teaching the history of  
The Crisis of  Modernity
Augusto Del Noce
Montreal:  McGill-Queen’s UP, 2015
A Critique of Modernity
Alvino-Mario Fantini
modern philosophy. Years later he transferred to the 
prestigious University of  Rome “La Sapienza”, where he 
taught political philosophy and the history of  political 
ideas. He would spend the rest of  his life there—with 
one term spent in the Italian senate as a member of  the 
Christian Democratic Party,. 
A natural teacher, he attracted many students. He 
became a mentor and a friend to future eminences like 
historian Roberto de Mattei, president of  the conservative 
Lepanto Foundation and editor of  Radici Cristiane, and 
philosopher-turned-politician Rocco Buttiglione. Both 
served as his assistants. In 1991 Buttiglione published 
a biography in Italian about Del Noce, admitting in the 
beginning that “[i]t is difficult to write a book about a 
master and friend with whom one has shared an intellectual 
friendship for more than twenty years”. Nearly a quarter-
century later, Buttiglione still says, “To be with him was to 
take part in an unending learning process that coincided 
with life itself.” 
Del Noce’s dedication to constant learning not only 
made him an ideal teacher, it also makes him one of  the 
most fascinating—and challenging—thinkers to read. He 
worked across disciplines—philosophy, history, sociology, 
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religion—and read various languages. Buttiglione tells 
me that Del Noce “was a man of  enormous erudition 
and he sometimes presupposes in his reader a level of  
knowledge—especially of  the history of  philosophy—
that goes far beyond that of  an ordinary scholar”. Del 
Noce can quickly take the reader from Machiavelli, Kant, 
and Kierkegaard to Hobbes, Hegel, and Heidegger and 
then to Maistre, Maurras, and Péguy. Along the way, 
he might refer to Marsilius of  Padua, Johan Huizinga, 
Thomas Muenzer, Karl Löwith, and Manuel García Pelayo. 
It’s daunting, to be sure. “Nevertheless”, Buttiglione 
assures me, “the reading is worth the while if  you want to 
understand the world we live in.” 
Lancellotti has helpfully provided extensive and 
detailed explanatory notes. But even in the original Italian, 
Del Noce expects a lot from the reader, expressing complex 
ideas in a highly compressed style. As Lancellotti explains, 
part of  this is due to Del Noce’s lifelong determination 
to “reconstruct intellectual genealogies” by systematically 
exposing the “deep metaphysical premises of  social and 
political movements”. 
In his youth, Del Noce began with a study of  Marx, 
which marked a turning point in his thinking. He realized 
that “all of  Marx’s thought is a consistent development 
of  the radical metaphysical principle that freedom requires self-
creation, and thus the rejection of  all possible forms of  
dependence, especially dependence on God”. In Marxism, 
Del Noce saw that atheism was “not the conclusion but 
rather the precondition of  the whole system”. And it laid 
the groundwork for the permissive, secularized, and 
technocratic society of  today. 
Del Noce’s other early scholarship focused on 
the roots of  fascist thought and its relationship to other 
ideologies. He methodically revealed the revolutionary 
spirit behind fascism, described its close relationship to 
violence, and saw it as one of  several stages in the long 
process of  Western secularization. This—combined with 
the permissiveness, eroticism, and what Del Noce calls 
the “libertine philosophy” of  the sexual revolution—has 
brought the West to ruin. “The question of  eroticism 
is first of  all metaphysical”, he argues. And it arises in 
the context of  a de-sacralized West, “which today has 
manifested itself  as never before”.
Tracing the origins of  eroticism, Del Noce says the 
ideas of  sexual freedom had already been fully formulated 
between 1920 and 1930, beginning with the anti-
rationalist Surrealist writers and then further developed 
by Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957). Reich died in an American 
prison, “almost completely forgotten”, Del Noce notes, 
“after having been condemned by the still moral United 
States”. But the “various beat and hippie movements then 
rediscovered him”. 
Del Noce thus sees the countercultural revolution 
of  the 1960s as the apotheosis of  various long-dormant 
revolutionary strains. He elaborates: “The French ‘May 
Revolution’ was marked ... by the hybridization of  Marxian 
themes with Freudian themes and themes inspired by de 
Sade.” But he also faults the global entertainment industry 
and the arts, as well as the media and other powerful elites, 
for having participated in an aggressive “campaign of  de-
Christianization through eroticism”.
For the revolution against the transcendent to 
triumph, explains Lancellotti, “every meta-empirical order 
of  truth” had to be abolished. Recreational sex replaced 
the truth of  conjugal love. And the ideas of  procreative sex 
and indissoluble monogamous marriage were destroyed 
since they presupposed, Del Noce says, “the idea of  an 
objective order of  unchangeable and permanent truths”. 
Del Noce was clearly a highly astute observer 
of  societal trends. But he also sought to understand 
“philosophical history”—since the West had been 
profoundly affected by the philosophies of  earlier 
centuries. Atheism, empiricism, historicism, materialism, 
rationalism, scientism, etc. had all led to the “elimination 
of  the supernatural” and a “rejection of  meta-historical 
truths”. 
But he was also a staunch critic of  the modern 
West’s affluence, commercialism, and opulence. The loss 
of  belief  in the transcendent, he said, had produced a 
rootless society in which there was nothing to support 
beliefs in anything other than science and technology, 
entertainment and the erotic. And behind everything lay 
nihilism—and a rejection of  the Incarnation itself. Thus, 
the crisis of  modernity is really a crisis of  spirituality. 
Del Noce applied this understanding to his analysis 
of  political phenomena like fascism and communism 
and to more recent trends like consumerism and 
commercialism. He provides the “conceptual tools to 
see the world you live in [from] a completely different 
perspective”, Buttiglione tells me. “The only kindred spirit 
I can think of  in recent American culture is Russell Kirk.” 
There can be no more powerful exhortation to read Kirk’s 
works today than to have Buttiglione compare him to his 
own mentor. 
Thanks to Lancellotti, we can also now read 
Del Noce. It’s true that at times the translation seems 
a bit awkward. It’s difficult to say how much is due to 
the difficulty of  the original text or to an overly literal 
approach to translation. It’s almost as if  the English 
rendition deliberately preserved the same elliptical 
sentence construction and parenthetical expressions that 
appear in the original Italian. Still, we must be grateful. 
This book is not for dilettantes or neophytes. But for 
those who are sufficiently motivated and whose interest is 
piqued by questions about the nature of  modernity, it may 
be quite rewarding. Del Noce’s thinking is so advanced 
and his analysis so sophisticated that it will be years until 
he is properly appreciated by scholars. 
In his biography of  Del Noce, Buttiglione writes 
that “the thought of  Del Noce is a common patrimony 
of  Italian culture”. I would suggest a slight revision to 
this statement: with the material that Carlo Lancellotti has 
made available to the English-speaking world, Del Noce 
is now—finally—part of  the common patrimony of  the 
West.  
Alvino-Mario Fantini is the editor in chief  of  The European 
Conservative. This review previously appeared in the September/
October edition of  The American Conservative. It appears 
here by permission.
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Roger Scruton, who celebrated his 70th birthday 
last year, is a philosopher, farmer, and a gentleman. He 
resides on his farm near the town of Malmesbury in the 
southwest of England. This fact has inspired some to 
refer to him as “the philosopher from Malmesbury”—
which should remind us that there once was another 
well-known philosopher in the same town (but of very 
different views):  Thomas Hobbes.
Originally a professor of aesthetics, Scruton 
has authored forty books dealing with vastly different 
subjects—ranging from the aesthetics of architecture, 
music, wine, and environmentalism, to modern 
philosophy, the New Left, sexual desire, God, and fox 
hunting. He has also composed two operas, developed 
a TV series for the BBC (on the idea of beauty), and 
has written several novels (including The Disappeared, 
which appeared earlier this year).
His acclaimed 200-page novel, Notes from 
Underground, was published last year. It deals with 
many interrelated topics:  love, nostalgia, life under 
totalitarian rule in Prague during the 1980s, the lives 
of dissidents, the sacred, human dignity, striving for 
meaningful existence, faith, betrayal, disappointment, 
and the unfulfilled promises of the changes that 
occurred in November 1989. 
The book is about the love that Scruton has 
for the city of Prague and the Czech language. It is 
also incredibly lyrical, with purposefully ambivalent 
language and formulations, leaving much—including 
the climax—open to the reader’s imagination.
Scruton is a fitting person for the job of writing 
a book about life in Prague thirty years ago, since 
between 1979 and 1989 he actively assisted Czech 
dissidents, helping to smuggle censored books into 
the country and recruiting Western lecturers for illegal 
seminars of an “underground university”. (These were 
typically held in private apartments.) Between 1979 
and 1985, he visited the country frequently—until his 
arrest by Communist State Security officials and his 
subsequent—and, at the time, irrevocable—expulsion 
from the country.
He returned only after the fall of Communism 
in 1990 and held his first public lecture (in the town 
of Brno) in which he called for authorities to ban the 
Communist Party. For his contributions to the cause of 
freedom in the Czech Republic, Scruton was awarded 
a Medal of Merit of the 1st Class, by the late Czech 
president, Václav Havel.
Notes from Underground is inspired by many of these 
experiences. It is written in the form of a retrospective 
from the point of view of the main character, Jan 
Reichl, who, while sitting at his university office in 
Washington, D.C., reminisces about the life he led as a 
former political dissident.
Jan was not allowed to attend university. His 
Notes from Underground
Roger Scruton
New York:  Beaufort Books, 2014
A Literary Love
Roman Joch
father had been put in prison in the 1970s and he had 
died there, too. His only crime had been running an 
informal reading club, discussing authors like Kafka, 
Dostoyevsky, and Camus with a few close friends.
After his father’s death, Jan stays with his 
mother in Prague, works as a cleaner, and spends most 
of his time “underground”—riding the city’s metro 
lines. There he likes to read books belonging to his 
father:  Czech classics and authors from the period 
of late Austro-Hungarian Empire, people like Franz 
Kafka, Joseph Roth, and Stephan Zweig. He also 
reads Dostoyevsky, whose Notes from the Underground 
he carries around with him all the time. Inspired by 
his literary heroes, Jan soon decides to pen several 
short stories under the title Rumors and signs them as 
“Comrade Androš”, the name derived from the Czech 
term for “underground”—that is, a comrade from 
under the ground.
His mother, who types copies of dissident 
literature on a typewriter for others, then makes several 
copies of Jan’s Rumors—until she eventually gets 
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arrested. Then, one day, Jan meets Betka. He follows 
her from the metro, onto a bus, and then to the park 
of Divoka Sarka, where he loses track of her. After the 
arrest of his mother, Betka mysteriously appears at his 
door to return books by several dissidents that had 
been copied by his mother. Among them, is a copy of 
Jan’s Rumors, too.
He is intrigued by Betka. She seems wiser than 
her years. She knows about things that he is ignorant 
of. She is beautiful in a way that he cannot express. 
Soon, she and Jan are discussing how to organize a 
campaign for his mother’s release from prison—and 
they decide that such a campaign has to be organized 
in the West, with the help of the international media.
The rest of the book is the story of how Jan 
becomes deeply involved with other dissidents—
and, eventually, Betka. He learns of the trials and 
tribulations of other dissidents, and develops contacts 
with underground circles and foreign allies.
Along the way, always accompanied by Betka, 
Jan discovers and learns to appreciate the beauty of 
his city, Prague. And through Betka—whose passions 
are Renaissance and baroque music, and, above all, the 
composer Leoš Janáček—Jan also develops a love for 
philosophy, literature, and music. He learns to love 
beauty and learns to love her.
The story, which encompasses the romantic 
and the political, the historical and the literary, is 
fundamentally a fascinating depiction of love and the 
search for the sacred. The richness of its language and 
the story’s tender language make it a novel of pivotal 
importance. Who would have thought that such a 
romantic and lyrical rendering of the lives of dissidents 
would be written by a philosopher like Scruton? On 
the other hand, why not? He certainly possesses the 
talent, the memories, and the insight.
One finished this book with many thoughts—
and with one overpowering feeling of love ... for 
Betka. How is it possible to fall in love with a literary 
character? To be sure, Betka is charming, strong, and 
fragile all at the same time. She is, in contrast to Jan, 
far more mature. She is wise in the ways of the world. 
At the same time, as Jan discovers she is not altogether 
open or honest with him.
With all this said, I found myself asking at 
the very end:  Would I fall in love with Betka? Yes, 
absolutely, I would.  
Roman Joch is the Executive Director of the Civic Institute in 
Prague. He obtained his M.D. degree from Charles University 
and was previously the Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Civic 
Democratic Party (1994-1996).
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The Necessity of the Good
Rémi Brague
We are all disciples of Aristotle. Whether or not 
we realize it, whenever we are talking about the Good 
we are working with ideas that are Aristotelian in origin. 
We speak of good food and good company, good 
behaviour and good outcomes. These modes of the 
Good share a basic assumption:  The good is not the 
Good, but instead a quality or attribute of something 
else. This is well and good. The Aristotelian way of 
thinking has a proper role. But we’re losing our sense 
of wonder and enjoyment. We do not see the Good in 
which all these good things participate and from which 
they draw their lustre. It is time, therefore, to put aside 
Aristotle and rehabilitate Plato. For without him we are 
in danger of losing our reason to want to continue as a 
species.
Aristotle criticized his master Plato and observed 
that, for practical purposes, the Idea of the Good is 
useless for ethics. More useful is the prakton agathon, the 
good that can be done. Plato’s Ideas are ideals, perhaps 
idols, but in any case they are idle. Concrete things act 
upon each other. To quote the ever-recurring example, 
“a human being begets a human being”. Meanwhile, the 
Platonic Ideas stay in their heavens and twiddle their 
thumbs. In contradistinction to Plato’s flights of fancy, 
Kant said that the philosophy of Aristotle is work. The 
great Macedonian sage was a business manager of sorts. 
He put the ideas in the things, expecting them to roll up 
their sleeves and produce something.
The secondary character of the Good?
From this active point of view, one can consider 
the Good as superfluous, as something merely 
decorative, as something that makes life more beautiful, 
to be sure, but that one can perhaps take or leave. In 
entertaining the good as a possibility that we might 
do without, we are following Aristotle’s distinction 
between life (zēn) and the good life (eu zēn). Aristotle 
says the political community comes into being for the 
sake of securing “the bare needs of life”. But it goes 
on existing for the sake of the good life. To put it in 
Marxist terms:  Life, in the sense of being alive (zōē) or 
leading a life (bios), is the infrastructure; the Good is 
hardly more than a superstructure, something that sets 
a crown on life. The Good is there as an adjective or an 
adverb rather than a noun.
Given the clear priority of life, the Good is 
certainly a good thing—nobody gainsays that—but it 
is not necessary. Two cheers for the Good, but it is not 
the most urgent task. What is most important is being 
alive rather than not.
The secondary character of the Good is 
expressed in the old popular wisdom of the Greek 
people, upon which Aristotle and before him Plato 
drew. The Milesian poet Phocylides, in the early 6th 
century before Christ, gives us a saying:  “We should 
look for a living, then for virtue, but only after one has 
got a living”. Plato explicitly alludes to this aphorism 
in the Republic when discussing the proper education 
of the Guardians. The same view is expressed in other 
proverbs, for example, primum vivere, deinde … philosophari 
(first live, then philosophize). Machiavelli puts the same 
sentiment into the mouth of a leader of the Ciompi, 
who revolted in Florence:  “We have no business to 
think about conscience; for when, like us, men have to 
fear hunger, and imprisonment, or death, the fear of 
hell neither can nor ought to have any influence upon 
them.” One can find everywhere stronger and more-
cynical versions of the same. In Bertolt Brecht’s The 
Threepenny Opera, the line “First comes the grub, then 
morals” is in all mouths.
In all this we find the same basic assumption: The 
good is something that we do. As a consequence, we 
can do the good or fail to do it. From time to time, 
we have to let it go provisionally, postponing it to the 
fu¬ture. As the object of activity, it belongs to the 
realm of practical philosophy, especially to the branch 
that deals with the actions of people—which is to say, 
morals. Little wonder that we have taken our moral 
bearings from Aristotle’s ethics.
Being & freedom
But what if the Good is a condition of life rather 
than one of its modes? And what if it is an absolutely 
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necessary condition? There is a classic way to ground 
the necessity of the Good. It involves tying Goodness 
to existence. This is the approach we find in Boethius, 
who bequeathed it to the whole Latin Middle Ages. He 
presupposes that the Good and Being wax and wane 
together, that they run parallel to each other. There’s no 
difficulty in recognizing in this foundational assumption 
the scholastic doctrine of the convertibility of the 
transcendental properties, especially of Being (Ens) and 
the Good (Bonum):  ens et bonum convertuntur.
If every being, as such, is good, then the presence 
of the Good is necessary wherever there is something, 
which is to say, everywhere. The Good may even 
stretch farther than Being, as Dionysius Areopagita 
suggests. But turning to his mystical theology would 
lead us too far. I agree with his doctrine, up to a point. 
But it is recondite and far from our present-day ways of 
thinking. Better, therefore, to proceed indirectly and in 
more-familiar terms.
Let us begin with something very much of 
concern in the modern era:  human freedom. It is 
something that ethics presupposes and fosters. Kant’s 
account of the foundation of morals shows this with 
great clarity. Ethical life is genuinely ethical if and only 
if it holds in check the influence of external agents. To 
be governed by something external to oneself leads to 
what Kant calls “heteronomy”. When we are governed 
by others, we are not responsible for our actions. We 
may do moral acts at the command of others, but to 
be a moral agent in the full sense requires us to obey 
our own laws. We need to attain the condition of 
“autonomy”, the condition of life in which our doing is 
a direct consequence of our will. The truly good person 
is thus the person who does good deeds at his own 
command.
Yet in this we presuppose something. The good 
deeds come from a subject that is already there. There 
must be a self who is the seat of self-command. This is 
not something we should take for granted. What kind 
of subject is the source of free action? Whence comes 
this moral subject?
We can begin by stipulating that this subject is 
a rational being. It must be rational to be able to act. 
As Aristotle points out, simple motion is not action. A 
stone that rolls down a steep slope doesn’t act. Neither 
does the plant that grows, pushes its roots deep in the 
earth, and unfolds its boughs. Nor does an animal act, 
properly speaking, for acting means implementing a 
course of action that one has planned and chosen, in 
freedom.
This should not lead us to assume that human 
beings are the only moral subjects that exist. Kant 
explicitly states that the subjects that abide by the moral 
law are not necessarily human beings, but rational 
beings in general. In the Critique of Practical Reason, 
he insists that the moral vocation “is declared by the 
reason to be a law for all rational beings in so far as 
they have a will, that is, a power to determine their 
causality by the conception of rules”. This moral calling 
stipulates that the law we establish for ourselves must 
be a universal law. “It is, therefore, not limited to men 
only, but applies to all finite beings that possess reason 
and will; nay, it even includes the Infinite Being as the 
supreme intelligence”.
Schopenhauer poked fun at the idea and wrote 
with contempt that Kant probably thought of the nice 
little angels. He was right, even more than he knew. For 
Kant appeals to the angelic mode of rational existence 
as a way to dramatize what he sees as the all-conquering 
power of reason. In “Perpetual Peace,” his meditation 
on the triumph of righteousness and the end of history, 
he seeks to show that the problem of building an 
enduring political constitution is in principle soluble 
even if the citizens are devils, provided the devils are 
rational. If they listen to their calculating reason, these 
utterly bad creatures can understand that it is in their 
interest to live in peace with each other. 
In his belief that reason can govern even devils, 
Kant exaggerates the paradox that David Hume 
expressed one generation earlier:  that politicians should 
take their bearings from the assumption that “every 
man must be supposed a knave”. Modern thinkers have 
generalized the insight. The trick is to design a political 
system in which everyone has a self-interested reason 
to play by the rules. Human society is a pack of wolves 
domesticated by rational self-interest.
Now, one may ask whether this makes things 
too easy. Did Kant not make his task too light? Did 
he in fact choose the simpler case, while giving the 
impression of choosing to scrutinize the more difficult 
one? Because devils are so utterly bad, you can’t expect 
the shadow of a good intention when they set up their 
pandemonium. This would seem a terrible impediment 
to any enduring political arrangements. But this is only 
one side of the coin. The flip side is that, by choosing 
devilish beings, one avoids the question of the temporal 
and bodily existence of rational beings.
As do angelic beings, the devils float in what 
Greeks called aiōn, and the Romans aevum, a time of 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART 
Detail of  “The Triumph over Evil” (c. 1550/1580) by 
Anonymous showing many infants, playing instruments and 
carrying weapons, while demons are dragged, hanged, and 
pierced with arrows.
The European ConservativeSummer/Fall  2015 41
indefinitely long duration. As such, they soar above 
physical and biological existence. Among other things, 
this means they have no need to reproduce in order to 
exist as a species.
Men & angels
These considerations on pure spirits may sound 
arbitrary, and even otiose. Yet pondering the angels and 
devils sheds light on our present predicament, which 
is best summed up as a fatal separation of what makes 
life good from what makes life life. In his book on the 
leading minds of the modern era, Three Reformers, Jacques 
Maritain observed that Descartes lifted the human 
intellect up to a place that classical metaphysics reserved 
for the angelic intellect. In the case of Descartes, I doubt 
this holds true. Nevertheless, Maritain is right about the 
general trend of modern thought. Its categories seem 
tailored for angels rather than for human beings.
The proud self-image of modern thought puts 
freedom at the centre of all that is worth striving for. 
As Hegel put it, “The right of the subject’s particularity, 
his right to be satisfied, or in other words the right 
of subjective freedom, is the pivot and centre of the 
difference between antiquity and modern times”. Hegel 
thought no further stage necessary; modern times are 
the End Times. Whether or not Hegel was right about 
that, he was surely correct to identify freedom as the 
defining commitment of our times. Thus our problem 
today. And if we press freedom’s demands to their 
logical conclusion, we reach the point where totally 
free beings should call themselves into being. Radical 
autonomy entails the power and right of self-creation. 
Existence itself needs to become a human project, 
something we can do.
Here we meet again our friends the angelic beings. 
According to traditional theology, devils are fallen 
angels. As pure, bodiless spirits, the angelic hosts were 
brought into being by God. But they had to decide, 
right after their creation, whether they would thankfully 
turn toward God or dream of an independence over 
and against their Creator. In short, a devil becomes 
what he is—a fallen angel—through an act of freedom. 
He exercises the “right of the subject’s particularity”. In 
the same way, good angels distinguish themselves from 
the apostates when they freely accept God’s creative 
love. Thomas Aquinas reasons that this happened in a 
decision of freedom that took place in an instant, but 
made them forever what they are. The Devil is not self-
begotten, contrary to Satan’s boast in Milton’s Paradise 
Lost. Every angel is God’s creature, but each makes 
itself what it is—devil or good angel—through an act 
of free will.
Up to a certain point, human beings can choose 
the properties that we want to give ourselves and in that 
sense exercise the right to our own particularity. We 
can choose our job, our partner in marriage, and our 
“lifestyle,” as people now put it. But there are limits. 
As Kierkegaard said, we don’t create ourselves, we 
only choose ourselves. Today, however, we play footsy 
with the wish for a total self-determination that would 
make us quasi-angels. We toy with the idea of weighing 
the anchors, especially and perhaps not surprisingly in 
matters concerning sex and reproduction, where the 
biological basis of life can be turned into a lifestyle in 
the former case and a project in the latter.
This ambition is quite real and already well 
advanced. But the question is still there. Where does the 
human being with the capacity for acting in freedom 
come from? Whence comes the life that can be good?
The concrete subjects with whom we interact, 
indeed, who we ourselves are, were born in some place 
and at some point in time. Now, birth is an event not 
determined by its subject. He or she does not exist 
before conception. This foundational fact represents 
an extreme case of heteronomy, since it doesn’t affect 
only what a being is but the very fact that it is. Why do I 
exist? That’s what other people decided for me.
Furthermore, our birth as individuals of the 
species Homo sapiens is simply a recent event in the series 
that goes back to the very beginning of life in the “warm 
little pond”, as Darwin put it. The series even reaches as 
far as the so-called Big Bang, since physicists tell us that 
the atoms of which our body consists were made only 
moments after the beginning. Why do I exist? That’s 
something that depends on the great contingency of 
things being the way they are.
Birth & death
Hannah Arendt put forward the concept of 
“natality” as a counterpoint to our grim obsession 
with mortality. She thinks that birth underscores the 
possibility of making a new beginning in action. This 
obscures a deeper truth about birth, which is the aspect 
of pure passivity. Being-born is not something we do. It 
happens to us. In this respect natality is akin to mortality. 
But not entirely so.
If you will permit me the hackneyed lines of Rilke: 
“O Lord, give each of us our own death: / a dying that 
is born of each life, / our own desire, our purpose, love, 
dearth.”
It is a strange petition:  Whose death should we 
die, if not our own? But perhaps it’s not so strange. We 
often speak of a “good death”. The old-fashioned notion 
draws attention to how we endure death’s dark arrival. 
We can in a certain sense make our death a project, our 
project. We can use what little freedom we have left to 
accept death in a fitting way. We can make dying into a 
moral act, or at least surround it with moral acts.
This is not true of birth. We cannot make our own 
birth into a moral act. Yet it remains intimate, so much 
so that it is more a part of me than anything I might do, 
because it is the basis for the me that does things. My 
birth is necessarily my own, not the birth of another. 
My “Mine-ness” (Jemeinigkeit), to use Heidegger’s term, 
shows birth’s paradoxical features. The “I” to whom 
this event happens can’t claim any preexistence, but is 
made real or possible by this very event. And although 
my coming to be has no source in me—and in that sense 
has nothing to do with me—what could be more dear to 
me than the fact that there is a me?
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This intertwining in birth of radical “Mine-
ness” and radical heteronomy produces a clash of two 
irreconcilable contraries. Or at least it does for any view 
of human life that makes freedom the sine qua non of 
personhood, which is what happens when “good” is 
only an adjective or adverb and never a noun.
Kant has already shown us the extent to which 
modern man is ashamed of being simply human and 
so dreams of becoming something more. Dostoyevsky 
wrote of this shame as early as 1864, at the end of his 
enigmatic Notes from the Underground:  “We are oppressed 
at being men—men with a real individual body and 
blood, we are ashamed of it, we think it a disgrace and 
try to contrive to be some sort of impossible generalized 
man.” Dostoyevsky was not a philosopher, but his 
observation can be transposed in a philosophical key: 
The shocking thing is individuation, the fact that we 
received our own particular body. We would be glad to 
possess the same universality as the angels, since each 
and every one of them is his own species. 
Günther Anders’s notion of a “promethean 
shame” identifies a similar sense of inadequacy. We are 
ashamed not to be a match for the perfection of our 
own products. The artefacts are perfect because they 
were designed and made according to the blueprint, not 
begotten and born.
The solution is to ascend to perfection. 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is to overcome man and to sail 
in the direction of the Overman. Today, the dreams—
or nightmares—of a post-human endpoint of history 
are deeply rooted in the desire modern man feels to 
escape the passivity of his birth, the moment of natality 
that can’t be turned into a project or enterprise, that 
can’t be made good. Hence the fascination with the so-
called “transhumanist” project of transforming men 
into beings that would be more than men.
If we’re not inclined toward the Overman and 
want to remain loyal to the human condition, then we 
face a fundamental question:  What do we do with this 
radical impossibility of doing anything about our birth?
Procreation
There is a point at which freedom as the 
condition of action and the radical non-freedom of 
birth meet each other, and even clash against each 
other. This point is generation. For the existence of 
mankind depends on the free decision of its members. 
Children are born only because men and women come 
together and conceive them. This is not automatic. 
From the very beginning human freedom has played 
a role in the forward march of the generations. All the 
more so as technology progresses. Instinct may vouch 
for the survival of animal species. In the case of man, 
however, species survival is more and more relayed by 
freedom. Freedom’s dominion over natural impulses is 
a fact that we should wholeheartedly affirm. But, mind 
you, we should affirm this dominion if and only if it 
brings the subject of freedom to self-assertion, not to 
self-destruction. For this we need an external fulcrum.
Plato conceived of the Good not so much as a 
norm that active subjects have to abide by but rather as 
a creative principle. He compares the Idea of the Good 
with the sun. Now, Plato insists that the sun doesn’t 
only shine its light on what already is, a role it plays 
to show us right action, the path to the good life. It 
also and more importantly gives being and life to what 
doesn’t yet exist. It furnishes coming to be (genesis), 
growth (auxē), and food (trophē). This corresponds to 
our everyday experience and was what Aristotle had in 
mind when he made what seems an odd qualification: 
Human being begets human being with the help of 
the sun. He meant this in a literal sense, which is to 
say, material sense. The sun makes plants grow, brings 
again the spring and so forth. Yet we should not limit 
ourselves to the literal. The sun’s indispensable light 
can be interpreted as a metaphor for the necessity of 
the Good for the survival of man.
How can I tolerate not having created myself? My 
answer is:  If and only if I come from some utterly good 
principle. Suppose that I owe my being to chance, to the 
concourse of blind forces. This is now a common view, 
one widely thought to be mandated by modern science. 
If this is so, I have no reason whatsoever to contribute 
to the coming to be of new life. But if I understand 
myself as the creature of a good and generous God, 
who calls me to share his life and love, then I have 
reasons to ensure the continuance of life.
Put bluntly:  If a blind watchmaker threw me into 
life without asking me for my advice, why should I play 
the same trick on other people by bringing them into 
the world? If, on the contrary, I experience myself as 
the creature of a good and generous God who calls me 
to partake of his own loving life, then I have the very 
best of reasons to use my freedom to promote life.  
Rémi Brague is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the Sorbonne 
in Paris and at Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich. He 
is the author of numerous books, including La Loi de Dieu: 
Histoire philosophique d’une alliance (2005) and Le 
Règne de l’homme: Genèse et échec du projet moderne 
(2015). This article is an abridged version of an article that 
appeared in the February edition of First Things. It is printed 
here with permission.
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Augusto Del Noce, Eric Voegelin & Modernity
Bjørn Thomassen & Rosario Forlenza
All was darkness, superstition, and despair—
until the Enlightenment and the revolution ushered in 
modernity as a radical departure from the old, classical, 
and Christian civilization. That, at least, is how many 
in the modern West understand their history—and, 
therefore, their identity. 
Conservatives thinkers, of course, have often 
challenged this view. One of the most profound 
attempts to correct this narrative and its destructive 
side effects was made by the Italian thinker Augusto 
Del Noce (1910-1989), especially after his encounter 
with the works of his Austrian contemporary, Eric 
Voegelin (1901-1985). Del Noce sought to re-
conceptualize the modern call to freedom from 
within the Christian Catholic tradition. And his 
trenchant critique of ‘gnostic modernity’, a legacy of 
the Enlightenment was accompanied by an attempt 
to develop an alternative ‘Catholic modernity’ instead. 
Del Noce’s thought remains crucial to post-war 
Europe. Even the Marxist intellectual Lucio Magri, 
has asserted:  “Augusto Del Noce, one of the finest 
minds among the Left’s adversaries … said that the 
Communists have both lost and won. They have lost 
disastrously in their Promethean quest to reverse 
the course of history, promising men freedom and 
fraternity even in the absence of God, and in the 
knowledge that they are mortal. But they have won 
as a necessary factor in accelerating the globalization 
of capitalist modernity and its values:  materialism, 
hedonism, individualism, ethical relativism. An 
intransigent Catholic conservative, Del Noce believed 
he had foreseen this extraordinary heterogenesis of 
ends, though he would have had little reason to be 
pleased by it”. 
Both Del Noce and Voegelin tried to formulate 
a critique of modernity that exposed the tendencies 
that could be detected within both communism 
and fascism but which could not be reduced to 
those ideologies. And both came to argue that in 
the modern world, something ‘new’ had taken the 
place of utopian ideologies—what Del Noce called 
the “opulent society”, the kind of society in which 
we live today, driven by consumerism, globalization, 
materialism, technocracy, the triumph of finance over 
politics, and characterized by a generalized loss of 
ethical foundations.
A new Christian Democratic politics
Del Noce grew up and studied in Turin, where 
he graduated in philosophy with a dissertation on 
Malebranche in 1932. Having been profoundly 
marked by the rise of fascism and the horrors of the 
Second World War, he saw a need to find ways in 
which Catholics could forge an accommodation with 
democracy and modern, secular politics. And greatly 
inspired by Jacques Maritain, he sought to think 
through the possible links between Catholicism and 
liberalism. 
For Del Noce, this was not merely a scholarly 
enterprise:  From the 1950s onwards he was strongly 
committed to the Christian Democratic project as 
formulated by Alcide De Gasperi. However, he was 
deeply frustrated with the weaknesses that plagued 
Christian Democratic politics. 
According to Del Noce, Christian Democrats 
needed to provide their own interpretation of history 
if they were to avoid being subjugated by the narratives 
of other political ideologies. Catholics, he believed, 
could be fully modern and democratic, building on 
their own ideological and religious roots, without the 
need to rely on inspirations and sources alien to their 
own traditions. Otherwise, he thought, they would be 
unable to counter the claims of the Communist Party, 
which had gained tremendous momentum during the 
1960s and 1970s. 
At the same time, Christian Democrats needed 
to articulate an alternative vision to another enemy 
more insidious than communism and fascism:  what 
Del Noce called the “opulent society”, or Western 
irreligion. Just like communism and fascism, this was 
the product—not the culmination—of the modern 
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project. It was against this third ‘enemy’ that a re-
discovery of Catholic tradition as a way of interpreting 
the present would stand its real test.  
The question of modernity
How should modernity be “re-conceptualized”? 
According to Del Noce, philosophers and historians 
had taken three different theoretical positions vis-à-
vis modernity:  
(1) the “anti-modern” attitude (the 
“restoration”), also defined as the “archaeological 
utopia” of the past (for example:  Joseph de Maistre); 
(2) the “ultramodern” attitude (the “utopia of 
the future”), which eagerly embraces any modernist 
developments, including secularization; 
(3) the “compromising” attitude, which seeks 
a middle ground but thereby “de-ideologizes the 
political” and reduces politics to mere “pragmatic 
choices”. Del Noce placed Christian Democracy in 
this latter third category. As such, Christian Democrats 
were losing the “Christian” aspect, the religious élan.
All three positions were unacceptable for Del 
Noce because all three were based on a “spiritual 
separation between Faith and Reason, Faith and 
History, Nature and Grace”. The “central problem 
of contemporary Catholic thought”, wrote Del Noce, 
is precisely this “Cartesian separatism”. According to 
him, the rationalistic philosophy that grew from this 
had as an objective the ‘erasure’ of any transcendental 
perspectives from history. 
Del Noce tried to trace back and reconstruct 
a dual development in the history of Western 
thought. This meant elaborating an elaborate 
intellectual genealogy that went from Descartes to 
Nietzsche and passed through Hobbes, Spinoza, 
Feuerbach, and Marx, on the one hand, while also 
developing a trajectory from Descartes to Rosmini 
via Pascal, Malebranche, and Vico. This second line 
of thought—“the line of ontologism”—was the basis 
for Del Noce’s claim of an “alternative tradition” of 
modern thought—one that retained a transcendental 
perspective of history.
The encounter with Voegelin
Eric Voegelin lived through both World Wars. 
His was an age where the “ordering structures” of 
society were collapsing. And his work was an attempt 
to understand both wars, as well as the related political 
ideologies and mass movements. 
Voegelin diagnosed the modern world essentially 
as “gnostic”:  a worldview driven by the idea that there 
is no order in nature, and that humans therefore are 
forced to “artificially” create order out of the disorder 
of the world through their own devices. This all 
stemmed from a sense of alienation or ‘homelessness’. 
To Voegelin, this amounted to intellectual hubris that 
was deeply nihilistic and which hopelessly emptied 
the world of meaning. He recognized this tendency 
as underpinning both modern science and modern 
politics.
Some of Voegelin’s early writings were about 
the roots of Nazism; however, for him, the problem 
turned out to be much broader. Like Del Noce, 
he also identified a “gnostic tendency” in modern 
political movements. He provocatively categorised a 
host of other ‘-isms’ under the term ‘gnosticism’—
such as scientism, Marxism, or positivism writ large. 
In other words, for Voegelin it was somehow the 
very modern worldview and its search for “inner-
worldly fulfilment” which was deeply pathological. 
Consequently, the end of Nazism was not the end of 
“the problem”.
Del Noce encountered Voegelin’s writings in the 
late 1960s, after the former had already published such 
books as Il problema dell’ateismo (The Problem of Atheism) 
in 1964. He went on to write the introductory essay 
to the 1968 Italian edition of Voegelin’s 1952 classic, 
The New Science of Politics. Titled “Eric Voegelin and the 
Critique to the Idea of Modernity”, Del Noce’s essay 
explicitly reflected on modernity and secularization 
as a ‘new Gnosis’ (or knowledge). His subsequent 
works—on Marxism, atheism, and secularization, and 
on revolution and tradition, permissivism, and the 
opulent society—all reflect Voegelin’s influence.
According to Del Noce, the philosophical 
proposals elaborated after the Second World War had 
failed in their attempts to liberate themselves from 
“fear”. Rather, he thought, “the anti-Platonic new 
world constitutes itself in the name of force and fear”. 
It is Voegelin, he wrote, who had first identified the 
emergence of a new phenomenon:  the “prohibition 
to ask questions”, a kind of epistemological ‘closure’ 
that in the name of “science” or revolutionary thought 
erects a self-sustaining ideological edifice, declaring 
“irrelevant” anything that might serve to question the 
very premises set up. 
In addition, both Voegelin and Del Noce saw 
atheism fundamentally as a spiritual “revolt against 
God”. Thus, because the question of truth had been 
eliminated, the ideology of atheistic secularism had 
ended up constructing “another reality” in its stead—
as a sort of secular projection of a fundamentally 
religious dimension. 
This, however, was a dangerous construction, a 
kind of “horizontal transcendence” which in practice 
turns man into God, and which substitutes the 
spiritual dimension with a secular notion of fulfilment 
and perfection, in which man seeks to be liberated 
from any dependency on external forces. This is the 
ultimate expression of hubris.
The ‘modern’ theory of secularization is an 
integral part of that particular narrative of modernity. 
The term ‘secularization’, Del Noce wrote in the 1980s, 
“is always to be found in a judgment on contemporary 
history typically favourable to the Marxist revolution, 
or to the idea of progress; as a consequence, through 
the modern age, the mundane character of the world 
has triumphed”.
Del Noce relied on the concept of secularization 
in his discussion of the opulent—or affluent—society 
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(what others have called the ‘technological society’). 
This is the society that comes after revolutionary 
Marxism and which Del Noce considered the last 
stage in the process of the loss of the sacred and the 
race towards atheism—an atheism that was much 
worse than Marxist atheism. According to Del Noce, 
secularization means the “de-sacralization” of the 
world. Modernity can thus be understood as the 
secularization of Gnosis—and not as the secularization 
of Christianity. 
He wrote:  “Having encountered the concept 
of Gnosis, we now encounter the concept of 
secularization, and perhaps we are then on the right 
track trying to pin down its exact meaning. I propose 
that this term, so diffused today, is meaningful when 
linked to Gnosis, and not to Christianity”.
The essential aspect shared by the various 
philosophies of history is not a ‘residual transcendence’ 
that they retain; rather, it has to do with a trend that 
dates back to Joachim of Fiore, a force that animated 
English Puritanism and which later fully materialized 
during the Enlightenment. It was a Gnostic revolt that 
entrusted man with the task of redemption and which 
appealed to the masses because of its subversion of 
traditional order. 
As Del Noce wrote in his introductory 1968 
essay, “[t]he spirit of modernity, as the foundation 
of evaluations and of modern political movements, 
is thus the immanentization of the Christian 
eschaton; and the factor that furthers this evolution 
is, in [Voegelin’s] view, gnosticism, and therefore the 
evolution of the spirit of modernity coincides with 
the evolution of Gnosticism”. Del Noce agreed with 
Voegelin that modernity enacts an immanentization 
of the Christian eschaton—which means that the 
human being, through the discovery and unveiling of 
the law of history (such as Marx and Engels’s diamat), 
can redeem himself in the world. 
Del Noce also endorsed Voegelin’s view of 
totalitarianism as a modern expression of Gnosis—a 
political project that proposed a human self-
redemption and salvation that was entirely historical 
and intramundane. Thus, all forms of totalitarianism 
are expressions of “political perfectionism” that is 
substantially anti-Christian, as it denies that Evil is 
constitutive of the human being. Evil is thus reduced 
to merely a “consequence of society”. 
Gnosis produces a sort of theology of self-
liberation—without the sacramental mediation of 
grace. This results in, for example, the Third Reich as 
willed by Nazism or the communist realm of freedom 
and social justice after the withering away of the State. 
In this way, both Nazism and Marxism can be seen as 
the most significant types of contemporary Gnosis. At 
the same time, Gnosis has Christianity under check: 
Redemption through the grace of God is replaced by 
‘self-redemption’ through the denial of original sin. 
To Voegelin, this idea of the ‘superman’—a 
man who, so full of hubris, claims to save himself 
and forces others to save themselves—was already 
present in Ludwig Feuerbach’s humanism and in 
Marx’s scientific socialism. It was also embedded in 
every manifestation of socialism, which, along with 
earlier medieval heresies, elicited their own historical 
origins and produced their own symbolism. 
In the context of this current of thought, God 
is only a projection of the human spirit. Del Noce 
wrote:  “God would not exist because His existence 
is the product of human demands. This argument 
implies that God could exist only if Man would not 
need Him”.
It is an untenable argument, yet unquestionable 
within the categories of neo-Gnostic thought. To 
assign the creation of God to man, as well as the task 
of building the ‘Ideal City on Earth’—that which 
Christianity placed in Heaven—means to divinize 
man. The concept of sin is turned upside down, too: 
It is not God who redeems and liberates man but man 
who redeems himself from the sin of having created 
God.
Yet—and this is probably the only criticism 
Del Noce has of Voegelin—the indiscriminate 
use of the term ‘Gnosticism’ is confusing. It is 
important to distinguish between an old or ‘ancient’ 
Gnosis and a new, or ‘post-Christian’ Gnosis. This 
can lead to, Del Noce says, “an extremely serious 
misunderstanding”—that is, “the idea of the unity 
of pre-Christian and post-Christian Gnosticism”. 
He further writes:  “Ancient Gnosticism atheizes the 
The philosopher of  history Eric Voegelin (1901-
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world (by denying its creation by God) on behalf of 
divine transcendence; the post-Christian sort atheizes 
it on behalf of a radical immanentism”.
Hegelian Gnosticism—which emerges at the 
culmination of a process in which religion is reduced 
to philosophy—is a new Gnosticism, a ‘post-Christian’ 
one, which sees history as the fulfilment of man who, 
in overcoming the alienated world, attains a god-like 
nature in Promethean fashion. 
Following Hegel, what Marxism is fighting is 
the ancient form of Gnosticism that abandons the 
world by declaring it inherently unfair and evil, and 
impossible to correct. “Within the new Gnosticism”, 
Del Noce writes, “the activist and revolutionary form 
is bound to prevail over the contemplative form”. To 
define the process generating the “myth of modernity 
and Revolution”—or the “historical watershed that 
opens the way to the new man”—nothing is better 
than the term “new Gnosis”. “New”, Del Noce 
explains, means “post-Christian”, “fallen”, or even 
“degenerate”, a term that “Voegelin could perhaps 
accept”.
The old Gnosticism continued to survive 
in certain pessimistic strands of modern thought. 
Thinkers such as Simone Weil and the Italian Pietro 
Martinetti, says Del Noce, both of whom exhibited a 
rationalistically configured pessimism, struggled with 
Christianity. But in the new Gnosticism, such religious 
anxiety is denied, as the evil and pain of the world are 
not a “gaping wound” but just necessary obstacles to 
the achievement of ‘progress’. Ancient gnosis is about 
cosmic pessimism and the radical dualism between 
God and the world; the new gnosis turns this around 
so that the negative becomes a positive.
The spiritual attitude that underlies modern 
pessimism has analogies with the pessimism of 
ancient Gnosticism. The legitimization of violence 
that forms part of modern-day activism was also part 
of a modern version of Gnosticism. 
The theme of violence forms part of Gnosticism 
every time. Modern violence—the sort that became 
rife in the 20th century—is not ‘natural’ violence. 
It is the outcome of the post-Christian context in 
which, for the first time, it has been justified as 
‘creative’ violence—the necessary birth pains of the 
new world that has to be produced. “Violence and 
the Secularization of Gnosticism”, the title of a 
1980 Del Noce essay, linked the two aspects of the 
problem:  violence and the process that gave rise to it, 
secularization. 
In the end, the encounter with Voegelin 
allowed Del Noce to arrive at a deeper theoretical 
understanding of the new form of violence that had 
arisen in the 20th century—and which increasingly 
has characterized the 21st century.
After gnostic modernity 
Del Noce recognized that materialism lives 
on in contemporary scientism. Materialism ignores 
concerns over morality and transcendence, and 
justifies and ‘grounds’ the primacy of economy and 
finance. In other words, the technocratic, opulent 
society is connected to a neo-positivistic scientism 
that eliminates the impulse—the motivation—of 
the dialectic of revolution and brings alienation to a 
maximum. 
The opulent society is the highest form of man’s 
‘self-estrangement’. It occurs with the reciprocal de-
humanization of the relationship of ‘otherness’ (the 
relationship of the self with the self and with other 
human beings). Everyone perceives other human 
beings as ‘aliens’, strangers, persons not united in a 
common devotion towards the same shared values. The 
‘other’ thus becomes  either an obstacle to overcome 
or an instrument for our own self-empowerment. 
This is the evil now corroding Western society. 
In the post-Marxist, ‘profane’ period of 
secularization—which is marked by the advent of the 
irreligious, technocratic, ‘opulent society’—democracy 
has become simply another form of relativism. The 
relativism of Western thought has divorced freedom 
from truth, and has opened the way for a totalitarianism 
more powerful than communism:  a Marxism without 
any promise of a future revolution—in short, the 
suicide of democracy.
Del Noce here followed Voegelin precisely 
as he tried to propose a unitary and comprehensive 
interpretation of contemporary history, which aimed 
at demonstrating that the ‘theological’ problem was 
still open—or could be re-opened. Yet the triumph of 
the opulent society took the wind out of any possible 
spiritual renewal based on a Christian philosophy, and 
on a conception of nature and human beings open to 
the transcendent. 
These were conflicting dynamics that Del Noce 
could not resolve. And in this, perhaps, he was also 
brother-in-arms with Voegelin. 
Solutions to the deep crisis of modernity with 
which we now live are hard to find. But whatever they 
may be, they must ultimately stem from a diagnostic 
attempt that goes back to the very roots of the crisis. 
In this regard, the intense reflections sparked by the 
encounter between Del Noce and Voegelin, remains 
of vital importance today—perhaps more than ever 
before.  
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Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing (1927-2009) 
was a leading German conservative in the period 
after World War II. Between the 1960s and 1990s, 
he founded the widely-read conservative magazine 
Criticón, set up the Foundation for Conservative 
Education and Research, and published a number 
of thought-provoking books. And in 2006, he was 
a decisive voice supporting the establishment of the 
conservative European association, the Vanenburg 
Society.
His most prominent book is Charakterwäsche 
(Character-Washing), which appeared in 1965. It 
contained an excellent analysis of the ways Germans 
had been ‘re-educated’ after World War II. In it he 
explained that Allied forces saw three possibilities to 
deal with Germany after the war: 
“The first possibility referred to the so-called 
‘Morgenthau plan’ which saw Germany as the great 
and perpetual source of disturbances in world history, 
and recommended the permanent isolation of the 
country from its neighbours, as well as the systematic 
weakening of its economic and political power. 
[Germany] should be re-modelled as an agrarian 
state.”
“The second option distinguished between 
two kinds of Germany. On the one side, there was 
the (bad) Germany of the Prussian squires, the rich 
industrialists, the influential generals, the Romantic 
philosophers, and the legal positivists; but on the 
other (good) side, there were the passionate pacifists, 
the trade unionists, the idealistic socialists, and the 
enlightened philosophers. The obvious solution … 
was to foster the good party at the expense of the bad 
one. 
“The third option was provided by ‘character 
reformers’. They rejected the Morgenthau plan and 
dismissed the thesis of the two different Germanys. 
Instead, they maintained that certain qualities—such 
as, for instance, aggressiveness or racism—are in no 
way hereditary but simply the outcome of a certain 
‘misdirected’ culture.”
According to Schrenck-Notzing, the solution 
offered by the “character reformers” was to “alter the 
general culture in Germany by introducing a new style 
of leadership”, which they expected would eventually 
lead to a new way of life in Germany. In the end, the 
Allied Powers adopted this approach. 
But in order to change the German character, 
democracy first had to be established. Setting up 
a democracy not only meant creating political 
institutions on the basis of regular elections and offices 
with term limits; it also required a deep transformation 
of the whole political culture. Democracy had to be 
publicly praised and it had to be practiced so that it 
would eventually become the natural inclination of all 
Germans. 
In order to realize this goal, various things had 
to happen:  The German school system had to be 
changed, faculties of political science at universities 
needed to be founded, the content of television 
programmes had to be adjusted, and the old party 
system had to be completely re-modelled. Schrenck-
Notzing offered a fundamental critique of this 
“character-washing”. He argued that the influence 
of the Allied Powers on Germany went far beyond 
the political and military realm, and that they ended 
up imposing an ideology—using methods not unlike 
those used by prior political regimes.
In this respect, Schrenck-Notzing observed 
that none of the institutions like schools, universities, 
the press, etc. were ever ‘free’ in the sense that a 
true democracy is supposed to be free. Rather, such 
institutions were first studied systematically and then 
afterwards supervised closely. Schrenck-Notzing 
called this kind of a democracy an “educational 
democracy”—one that does not give power to 
people but, on the contrary, only to a select group of 
individuals who direct, control, and manipulate public 
opinion. 
In his Foreword to Charakterwäsche, Schrenck-
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Notzing wrote:  “People say that Germany in 1945 
was a tabula rasa on which things never heard could 
be written. Nothing is further from the truth. In 1945 
Germany was not a blank slate but a heavily inscribed 
one. The inscriptions, however, were not written in 
German but in English, Russian, and French.” Since 
then, he continued, the historical roots of Germany’s 
present were to be found less in Germany and more in 
Russia and the US. “Washington and Lenin are much 
more prominent figures in contemporary Germany 
than Bismarck or Frederick the Great”, he wrote. 
One might be tempted to think that Schrenck-
Notzing’s rejection of the democratic reforms imposed 
by the Allied Powers and his apparent rejection of the 
ideal of democracy may have been fuelled by a certain 
affinity for authoritarianism. But this would be a hasty 
conclusion and grievous mistake. For an adequate 
judgment of Schrenck-Notzing’s political orientation, 
it is best to look at his autobiography. Writing in the 
third person, he noted: 
“Schrenck-Notzing was born in 1927, and was 
18 years old when the Second World War ended. He 
was a son in the oldest aristocratic family in Munich, 
dating back to 1214 and whose members oftentimes 
in history had held high offices. He was educated 
during the war, but contrary to the then ruling ideas, 
he was instructed in the liberal-pacifist and anti-
centrist ideology of the famous Munich professor of 
philosophy, Frederick Foerster.”
“After studying history and sociology at the 
universities of Fribourg, Munich, and Cologne, he 
spent three winters in India. The outcome of this stay 
was his first book, 100 Years of India. In it he analysed 
the impact of European rule on India. In 1961, he 
returned to Munich and found a completely different 
cultural atmosphere than when he left. This made him 
investigate the effects of the Allied Powers’ policy on 
Germany. And just as he had analysed the impact 
of British rule on India, he now turned his attention 
to the presence and strategy of the United States, in 
particular, on Germany.” 
It’s clear that Schrenck-Notzing was no 
nationalist defending a past regime. On the contrary, 
he was a ‘classical conservative’ who was shocked by 
the changes he saw in Germany. His stay in India had 
sharpened his eyes and mind. He was simultaneously 
surprised and repelled by the influence of foreign 
powers on Germany, and by the wholesale re-
arrangement of his country’s institutions and ‘cultural 
framework’. This is what he criticized in his first book.
Three years later, during the high point of the 
student rebellion of 1968, he published another book 
titled Zukunftsmacher (Future-Makers), in which he 
detailed the various manifestations of the left—and 
lamented its widespread influence in Germany and 
abroad. Two years later, he founded the conservative 
periodical, Criticón. 
Schrenck-Notzing’s great hope during the 
1970s was that a conservative Tendenzwende (reversal 
of the trend)—and along with it, a “reconstruction of 
conservatism” (the title of one of his articles)—would 
succeed. But things did not work out that way. Nor 
did the party politics of the Christlich Demokratische 
Union (Christian Democratic Union or CDU) under 
the leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-
1998) meet any of his expectations. He saw there that 
conservative principles were used by politicians merely 
to accumulate votes and advance particular ‘power 
interests’. Too often, tactical manoeuvres displaced 
genuine principles. And given that political milieu, 
Schrenck-Notzing distanced himself increasingly 
from political activity. 
In order to promote a ‘true conservatism’, 
Schrenck-Notzing chose to dedicate himself to the 
establishment of ‘Library of Conservatism’. He 
collected thousands of books about the history of 
German conservatism since the late 18th century, and 
also gathered the most important works of American, 
French, Italian, Russian, and Spanish conservatism. In 
addition, he amassed a huge collection of periodicals 
from different countries. 
Separately, he also founded a conservative 
institute which, in 2000, was transformed into a 
foundation called the Förderstiftung Konservative Bildung 
und Forschung (Foundation for Conservative Education 
and Research or FKBF). In addition to organizing 
lectures and roundtable discussions, it produced 
many publications—books, periodicals, and even 
the detailed Lexikon der Konservatismus, which was 
published in 1996.
In 2004-5, when I began to cooperate with 
Schrenck-Notzing, he was—understandably—
concerned about the future of the FKBF. On his 
80th birthday, he hoped to leave the running of the 
foundation to someone else. At the time, no one at 
the foundation had any experience with independent 
fund-raising; their resources were just enough to cover 
the office rent and finance a few smaller projects. So 
Schrenck-Notzing began looking for partners who 
might be interested in taking over the foundation or 
cooperating with it. 
The first trip I undertook in the name of the 
FKBF was in 2004 to the annual meeting of the 
conservative association known as the Philadelphia 
Society, that year meeting in Miami, Florida. There 
I met, among others, the chief academic officer of 
the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI). Despite 
Schrenck-Notzing’s critique of the influence of the 
Allied Powers in post-war Germany and their attempt 
to re-educate Germans, Schrenck-Notzing admired 
the American talent for organization. Conservatism—
and this was his firm conviction—could only survive 
as long as its exponents were well-organized. He saw 
that too often conservatives acted as individualists. 
He thought that they would harm the ‘conservative 
cause’ if they did not properly organize themselves—
something which they should do both nationally and 
internationally. And the best organizers he thought 
were the Americans. 
This deeply held conviction was also the 
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reason why for decades he paid close attention to 
the American conservative movement, and stayed in 
close contact with some of its best representatives—
people such as Russell Kirk, Henry Regnery, and Claes 
Ryn. For many years Schrenck-Notzing was also a 
regular attendee of the Philadelphia Society’s annual 
meetings. Sometimes when he and I talked about 
American conservatism, he would indicate proudly 
that he was not only one of that Society’s longest-
serving members but probably its only European—
and especially the only German—one. 
My 2004 trip to the US did not provide 
any solutions to the foundation’s problems. But 
it did yield new European contacts—particularly 
several people who had an interest in setting up an 
organization in Europe to promote conservative 
ideas. As a result, in 2005 Schrenck-Notzing and I 
travelled to the Netherlands and met with officials of 
the Edmund Burke Stichting to discuss the possibility 
of collaborating. Although the outcome was not one 
we had sought, the meeting laid the foundation for 
what eventually became the Vanenburg Society—and, 
later, the Center for European Renewal (CER). 
What happened to Criticón, the FKBF, and the 
Library of Conservatism? By 1997, at the age of 70, 
Schrenck-Notzing had already handed over control of 
the magazine to a former contributor, Gunnar Sohn. 
Unfortunately, instead of building on the successful 
tradition that had for three decades made Criticón the 
most important German periodical of intellectual 
conservatism, Sohn changed its focus to economic 
and financial issues; and instead of maintaining the 
periodical’s conservative values, he replaced them 
with the liberal values of the German middle class. 
This was a huge disappointment to Schrenck-
Notzing, and many former readers cancelled their 
subscriptions. In response, a new bi-monthly 
magazine, Secession, was set up in 2000 by the Institut 
für Staatspolitik (Institute of State Politics) in Saxony-
Anhalt, an organization run by a younger generation 
of conservatives. Secession intends to perpetuate 
the legacy of Criticón—though its focus, as well as its 
writers, readers, and editorial positions differ slightly. 
Secession recently published its 66th issue, and it has 
access to a wide range of intelligent authors. Thus 
Schrenck-Notzing’s idea of having a “medium of 
communication” among German conservatives has 
been kept alive. 
With regard to the management of the FKBF, 
Schrenck-Notzing in 2006 turned to the editor of 
the leading conservative weekly, Junge Freiheit (Young 
Freedom), Dieter Stein. After some discussions, Stein 
took over both the foundation and the library, which 
are now located in Berlin. And since 2008 members 
of its staff have been managing its growing collection 
of materials. In the very beginning, it had merely been 
Schrenck-Notzing’s personal library; but after some 
years, it absorbed the library of his good friend, the 
philosopher Günter Rohrmoser. Today the FKBF 
has the biggest collection of conservative materials 
in Germany, with more than 20,000 books in various 
languages. The library allows students, scientists, 
journalists, and politicians to conduct research there, 
and occasionally it organizes lectures and seminars on 
various topics of interest. 
The FKBF also has an active publications 
programme, producing books and monographs of 
special interest. One of the foundation’s most recent 
publications, Konservative Publizistik:  Texte aus den Jahren 
1961 bis 2008 (Conservative Journalism:  Texts from the 
Years 1961 to 2008), is a tribute to Schrenck-Notzing. 
It brings together some of his most important articles 
from a period of nearly 50 years—and thus ensures 
that his important work on behalf of conservatism 
will not be forgotten. 
The FKBF and library today are thriving. 
Hopefully, the Vanenburg Society, which Schrenck-
Notzing also helped found, will thrive as well. In both 
cases, the seeds of Schrenck-Notzing’s work certainly 
seem to have been planted on fertile ground.  
Harald Bergbauer is Assistant Professor of Political Theory 
at the Bavarian School of Public Policy and the University 
of Armed Forces, both in Munich. From 2004 to 2008, he 
worked at the Foundation of Conservative Education and 
Research with Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing.
FKBF
The posthumously published collection of  articles and 
essays by Schrenck-Notzing.
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Defining Right & Left
Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
There’s a great deal of semantic rubble in the 
vocabulary commonly used in the Western World. But 
we come to a very necessary, not universally accepted 
definition—the definition of the terms “right” and 
“left”. 
If a workable definition existed, our task would 
be superfluous. This would also be the case if we could 
dispense altogether with these two magic words. They 
can, however, be put to very good use and often—as 
handy labels—truly simplify matters. 
Right and left have been used in Western 
civilization from times immemorial with certain 
meanings; right (German:  rechts) had a positive, left 
a negative connotation. In all European languages 
(including the Slavic idioms and Hungarian) right 
is connected with “right” (ius), rightly, rightful, in 
German gerecht (just), the Russian pravo (law), pravda 
(truth), whereas in French gauche also means “awkward, 
clumsy”, (in Bulgar:  levitsharstvo). The Italian sinistro 
can mean left, unfortunate, or calamitous. The English 
sinister can mean left or dark. The Hungarian word 
for “right” is jobb which also means “better”, while bal 
(left) is used in composite nouns in a negative sense: 
balsors is misfortune.
In Biblical language the just on the Day of 
Judgment are to be on the right and the damned on 
the left. Christ sits ad dexteram Patris (on the right hand 
of the Father) as the Nicene Creed asserts. In Britain it 
became the custom to allocate seats to the supporters 
of the government on the right and to the opposition 
on the left side. And when a vote is taken in the House 
of Commons the “ayes” pass into the right lobby 
behind the Speaker’s chair while the “noes” go to the 
left lobby. They are counted by four members who 
then inform the Speaker of the outcome. Thus in the 
Mother of Parliaments right and left imply affirmation 
or negation.
On the Continent, beginning in France, where 
most parliaments have a horseshoe shape (and not rows 
of benches facing each other) the most conservative 
parties have been seated to the right, usually flanked 
by liberals; then came the parties of the center (who 
frequently held key positions in the formation of 
government coalitions); then the “radicals” and finally 
the Socialists, Independent Socialists, and Communists. 
In Germany after World War I, unfortunately, 
the National Socialists were seated on the extreme right 
because to simple-minded people nationalists were 
rightists, if not conservatives—a grotesque idea when 
one remembers how anti-nationalistic Metternich, the 
monarchical families, and Europe’s ultraconservatives 
had been in the past. Nationalism, indeed, has been 
a by-product of the French Revolution (no less so 
than militarism). After all, nationalism (as the term 
is understood in Europe, though not in America) is 
identitarian, whereas patriotism is not. 
In Central Europe nationalism has a purely 
ethnic connotation and implies an exaggerated 
enthusiasm about culture, language, folklore, ways of 
life. Patriotism, on the other hand, puts emphasis on 
the country. A patriot will be happy if there are many 
nationalities living in his Fatherland, whose keynote 
ought to be variety, not uniformity. The nationalist is 
hostile toward all those who do not ethnically conform. 
Thus nationalism (as understood on the Continent) is 
the blood brother of racialism.
The misplacing of the Nazis in the Reichstag 
has thus hardened a confusion in semantics and 
logical thinking that had started some time earlier. 
The Communists, the Socialists, and the Anarchists 
were identified with the left, and the Fascists and the 
National Socialists with the right. At the same time 
one discovered a number of similarities between the 
Nazis on the one side and the Communists on the 
other. Thus the famous and perfectly idiotic formula 
arose:  “We are opposed to all extremism, be it from 
the left or the right. And, anyhow, Red and Brown are 
practically the same:  extremes always meet”.
All this is the result of very sloppy thinking, 
because extremes never meet. Extreme cold and 
extreme heat, extreme distance and extreme nearness, 
extreme strength and extreme weakness, extreme speed 
and extreme slowness, none of them ever “meet”. They 
do not become identical or even alike. 
The moment one counterattacks and inquires 
from the good man who just pontificated about the 
meeting of extremes what precisely he understands by 
right and left, he proves unable to give any coherent 
analysis of these terms. Lamely he will hint that on the 
extreme are the reactionaries—the Fascists, for instance. 
Asked whether Mussolini’s Repubblica Sociale Italiana 
was a reactionary or a leftist establishment, he will again 
mumble something about those paradoxical extremes. 
Certainly the left is collectivist and progressive; the 
Communists are “extreme progressivists”. If he sticks 
to this piece of nonsense, one should point out to him 
that certain primitive African societies with a tribal 
collectivism are not really so “extremely progressive”. 
This is usually the moment when the conversation 
expires.
The first fault with this loose reasoning lies in 
the aforementioned belief that “extremes meet”; the 
second in the almost total absence of clear definitions 
of left and right. In other words, there is a deficiency 
of logic as well as an absence of semantic clarity. Logic 
stands independent of our whims, but we can provide 
clear definitions.
Let us then agree that right is what is truly right 
for man, above all his freedom. Because man has a 
personality, because he is a riddle, a “puzzle”, a piece 
of a puzzle which never completely fits into any pre-
established social or political picture, he needs “elbow-
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room”. He needs a certain Lebensraum in which he 
can develop, expand, in which he has a tiny personal 
kingdom. “L’enfer, c’est les autres” (Hell, that’s the others), 
has been said by Sartre, a pagan existentialist, towards 
the end of his play Huis Clos. 
The Great Menace is all around us. It is vertical 
because it comes from above, but it is also horizontal 
because it attacks us from all sides. In a state-insured, 
government-prescribed, and—to make matters 
worse—socially endorsed collectivism, our liberty, 
our “Western” personality, our spiritual growth, our 
true happiness is at stake. And all the great dynamic 
isms of the last 200 years have been mass movements 
attacking—even when they had the word “freedom” on 
their lips—the liberty, the independence of the person. 
Programmatically this was done in the name of all sorts 
of high and even low-sounding ideals:  nationality, race, 
better living standards, “social justice”, “security”, 
ideological conviction, restoration of ancient rights, 
struggle for a happier world for us all. But in reality 
the driving motor of these movements was always the 
mad ambition of oratorically or at least literarily gifted 
intellectuals and the successful mobilization of masses 
filled with envy and a thirst for “revenge”.
The right has to be identified with personal 
freedom, with the absence of utopian visions whose 
realization—even if it were possible—would need 
tremendous collective efforts; it stands for free, 
organically grown forms of life. And this in turn implies 
a respect for tradition. The right is truly progressive, 
whereas there is no real advance in utopianism which 
almost always demands—as in the “Internationale”—
to “make a clean sweep” of the past, du passe faisons table 
rase:  dyelayem gladkuyu dosku iz proshlago! If we return to 
point zero, we are again at the bottom of the ladder, we 
have to start from scratch again. 
Bernard of Chartres said that generations were 
“like dwarfs seated on the shoulders of giants, thereby 
capable of seeing more things than their forebears 
and in a greater distance”.  As a matter of fact, almost 
all utopias, though “futuristic” in temperament, have 
always preached a return to an assumed Golden Age, 
glowing in the most attractive colours of a falsely 
romanticized version. The true rightist is not a man 
who wants to go back to this or that institution for 
the sake of a return; he wants first to find out what is 
eternally true, eternally valid, and then either to restore 
or reinstall it, regardless of whether it seems obsolete, 
whether it is ancient, contemporary, or even without 
precedent, brand new, “ultra-modern”. Old truths can 
be re-discovered, entirely new ones found. The ‘Man of 
the Right’ does not have a time-bound but a sovereign 
mind. In case he is a Christian he is, in the words of the 
Apostle Peter, the steward of a Basíleion Hierateuma, a 
Royal Priesthood.
The right stands for liberty, a free, unprejudiced 
form of thinking, a readiness to preserve traditional 
values (provided they are true values), a balanced view 
of the nature of man, seeing in him neither beast nor 
angel, insisting also on the uniqueness of human beings 
who cannot be transformed into or treated as mere 
numbers or ciphers; but the left is the advocate of the 
opposite principles. It is the enemy of diversity and the 
fanatical promoter of identity. Uniformity is stressed 
in all leftist utopias, a paradise in which everybody 
should be the “same”, where envy is dead, where the 
“enemy” either no longer exists, lives outside the gates, 
or is utterly humiliated. Leftism loathes differences, 
deviation, stratifications. Any hierarchy it accepts 
is only “functional”. The term “one” is the keynote: 
There should be only one language, one race, one class, 
one ideology, one religion, one type of school, one law 
for everybody, one flag, one coat of arms and one 
centralized world state.
Left and right tendencies can be observed not 
only in the political domain but in many areas of human 
interest and endeavour. Let us take the structure of 
the state, for instance. The leftists believe in strong 
centralization. The rightists are “federalists” (in the 
European sense), “states’ righters” since they believe in 
local rights and privileges, they stand for the principle 
of subsidiarity. Decisions, in other words, should be 
made and carried out on the lowest level—by the 
person, the family, the village, the borough, the city, 
the county, the federated state, and only finally at the 
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top, by the government in the nation’s capital. 
The breakup of the glorious old French provinces 
with their local parlements and their replacement with 
small departements, named after some geographic feature 
and totally dependent upon the Paris government, was 
a typically leftist “reform”. Or let us look at education. 
The leftist is always a statist. He has all sorts of 
grievances and animosities against personal initiative 
and private enterprise. The notion of the state doing 
everything (until, finally, it replaces all private existence) 
is the Great Leftist Dream. Thus it is a leftist tendency 
to have city or state schools—or to have a ministry 
of education controlling all aspects of education. For 
example, there is the famous story of the French 
Minister of Education who pulls out his watch and, 
glancing at its face, says to his visitor, “At this moment 
in 5,431 public elementary schools they are writing an 
essay on the joys of winter”. Church schools, parochial 
schools, private schools, or personal tutors are not at 
all in keeping with leftist sentiments. 
The reasons for this attitude are manifold. 
Here not only is the delight in statism involved, but 
the idea of uniformity and equality is also decisive; 
i.e., the notion that social differences in education 
should be eliminated and all pupils should be given a 
chance to acquire the same knowledge, the same type 
of information in the same fashion and to the same 
degree. This should help them to think in identical or at 
least in similar ways. It is only natural that this should 
be especially true of countries where “democratism” as 
an ‘-ism’ is being pushed. There efforts will be made to 
ignore the differences in IQs and in personal efforts. 
Sometimes marks and report cards will be eliminated 
and promotion from one grade to the next be made 
automatic. It is obvious that from a scholastic viewpoint 
this has disastrous results, but to a true ideologist this 
hardly matters. When informed that the facts did not 
tally with his ideas, Hegel once severely replied, “Um so 
schlimmer fur die Tatsachen” (all the worse for the facts).
Leftism does not like religion for a variety of 
causes. Its ideologies, its omnipotent, all-permeating 
state wants undivided allegiance. With religion at least 
one other allegiance (to God), if not also allegiance to a 
Church, is interposed. In dealing with organized religion, 
leftism knows of two widely divergent procedures. 
One is a form of separation of Church and State which 
eliminates religion from the marketplace and tries to 
atrophy it by not permitting it to exist anywhere outside 
the sacred precincts. The other is the transformation of 
the Church into a fully state-controlled establishment. 
Under these circumstances the Church is asphyxiated, 
not starved to death. The Nazis and the Soviets used 
the former method; Czechoslovakia still employs the 
latter.
The anti-religious bias of leftism rests, however, 
not solely on anti-clericalism, anti-ecclesiasticism, and 
the antagonism against the existence of another body, 
another organization within the boundaries of the State: 
It gets its impetus not only from jealousy but, above 
all, from the rejection of the idea of a supernatural, a 
spiritual order. Leftism is basically materialistic.
The Provident State, Hilaire Belloc’s “Servile 
State”, is obviously a creation of the leftist mentality. 
We will not call it the Welfare State because every state 
exists for the welfare of its citizens; here a good name 
has been misused for a bad thing. In the final prophecy 
of Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America the 
possibility, nay, the probability of the democratic 
state’s totalitarian evolution toward the Provident State 
has been foretold with great accuracy. Here again two 
wishes of the leftist find their fulfilment, the extension 
of government and the dependence of the person 
upon the state which controls his destiny from the 
cradle to the grave. Every movement of the citizen, his 
birth and his death, his marriage and his income, his 
illness and his education, his military training and his 
transportation, his real estate and his travels abroad—
everything is to be a matter of knowledge to the state.
One could continue this list ad nauseam. 
Naturally, we must add that in the practical order of 
things there are exceptions to the rule because leftism is 
a disease that does not necessarily spread as a coherent, 
systematic ideology. Here and there an isolated 
manifestation can appear in the “opposite camp”. 
Sometimes, to quote an example, the stamp of rightism 
has been applied to Spain’s present government. 
Yet it is obvious that certain features of the Franco 
government have a leftist character as, for instance, the 
strong centralizing tendencies, the restrictions placed 
on languages other than Castilian, the censorship, the 
monopoly of the state-directed syndicates. As for the 
first two failings—leftist tendencies are failings—one 
has to remember the effects of the immediate historic 
past.
Nationalism (in the European sense) is leftism; 
and Catalonian, Basque, and Gallegan (Galician) 
nationalism naturally assumed a radically leftist 
character opposing “Castilian” centralization. Hence, 
in Madrid, almost all movements promoting local rights 
and privileges, be they political or ethnic, are suspect 
as leftist, as automatically opposed to the present 
regime as well as to the unity of Spain. (Spain is “Una, 
Grande, Libre”!) Oddly enough—but understandable to 
anybody with a real knowledge of Spanish history—the 
extreme right in Spain, represented, naturally, by the 
Carlists and not at all by the Falangists, is federalistic 
(“localistic”, anti-centralistic) in the European sense. 
The Carlists are opposed to the centralizing tendencies 
of Madrid and when late in 1964 the central government 
made an effort to cancel the privileges of Navarra, the 
fueros, the Carlists of Navarra, nearly issued a call to 
rebellion—at which point the government quickly 
declared its own preparatory steps as a “mistake” and 
backed down.
All conservative movements in Europe are 
federalistic and opposed to centralization. Thus 
we encounter in Catalonia, for instance, a desire for 
autonomy and the cultivation of the Catalan language 
among the supporters of the extreme right as well as the 
left. The notorious Catalonian Anarchists always have 
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been supporters of autonomy, but formal anarchism has 
always been a curious mixtum compositum. Its ultimate 
vistas were leftist, socialistic in essence, but its temper 
was rightist. Much of present-day “communism” in 
Italy and Spain is merely “popularly misunderstood 
anarchism”. But, on the other hand, it is also significant 
that in 1937 open war broke out in Barcelona between 
the Communists and the Anarchists. And it was the 
Anarchists who resisted the Communists in Russia 
longer than any other group, until in 1924 they were 
literally exterminated in all Soviet jails and camps. 
Hope of “taming” them had been abandoned.
Or let us take the Metternich regime in Central 
Europe. Basically it had a rightist character, but having 
been born in conscious opposition to the French 
Revolution it had—as so often tragically happens—
learned too much from the enemy. True, it never became 
totalitarian, but it assumed authoritarian features and 
aspects which must be called leftist, as for instance the 
elaborate police system based on espionage, informers, 
censorship, and controls in every direction.
Something similar is true of Maurrasism, which 
was also a curious blend of rightist and leftist notions, 
characterized by deep inner contradictions. Charles 
Maurras was a monarchist and a nationalist at the 
same time. Yet monarchy is a basically supranational 
institution. Usually the monarch’s wife, his mother, 
and the spouses of his children are foreigners. With 
two exceptions (Serbia and Montenegro), all the 
sovereign ruling houses of Europe in the year 1910 
were foreign by origin. Nationalism is “populist” 
by contrast, and the typical republican constitution 
insists that the president be a native of the country. 
Maurras undoubtedly had brilliant insights and many a 
European conservative has borrowed from him. But it 
was by no means accidental that he collaborated when 
the Nazis occupied his country. Nor was he a Christian 
during most of his lifetime. He returned to the Faith, 
however, some time before his death.
If we then identify, in a rough way, the right 
with freedom, personality, and variety, and the left 
with slavery, collectivism, and uniformity, we are 
employing semantics that make sense. Then the stupid 
explanation that communism and Nazism are alike 
because “extremes always meet” need not trouble us 
any longer. In the same camp with socialism, fascism, 
and that particularly vague leftism which in the United 
States is known perversely enough as liberalism, there is 
another phenomenon to be explained elsewhere. This, 
however, is not the case with European liberalism. 
It is significant that the Italian Liberal Party (Partito 
Liberale Italiano or PLI) is seated to the right of the 
Democristiani, next to the monarchists. We will always 
use right and left in the sense we have outlined here, 
and we are convinced that this distinction in semantics 
is indeed a vital one in discussing the political scene of 
our age.  
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The Cultural Roots of Conservatism
Roger Kimball
I’ve been asked to share some thoughts on “the 
cultural roots of conservatism”. That’s a tall order, so 
while I will say something about roots, something more 
about conservatism, I propose to focus mostly on the 
first essential word of my mandate, “cultural”.
After the protracted bout of global warming 
we’ve been through here in the northeast, everyone is 
looking forward to spring. Spring means longer days, 
more sunshine, and, even for many city dwellers, the 
planting and tending of flowers and vegetables.
 Which brings me to the word “cultural”. I 
remember the first time I noticed the legend “cultural 
instructions” on the brochure that accompanied some 
seedlings. “How quaint”, I thought, as I pursued the 
advisory:  this much water and that much sun, certain 
tips about fertilizer, soil, and drainage. Planting one sort 
of flower nearby keeps the bugs away but proximity to 
another sort makes bad things happen. Young shoots 
might need stakes, and watch out for beetles, weeds, 
and unseasonable frosts … 
The more I pondered it, the less quaint, the more 
profound, those cultural instructions seemed. I suppose 
I had once known that the word “culture” comes from 
the capacious Latin verb colo, which means everything 
from “live, dwell, inhabit”, to “observe a religious 
rite”—whence our word “cult”—to “care, tend, 
nurture”, and “promote the growth or advancement 
of”. I never thought much about it. 
I should have. There is a lot of wisdom in 
etymology. The noun cultura (which derives from colo) 
means first of all “the tilling or cultivation of land” 
and “the care or cultivation of plants”. But it, too, has 
ambitious tentacles:  There’s the bit about religious rites 
again and also “well groomed”, and “chic, polished, 
sophisticated”. 
It was Cicero, in a famous passage of the Tusculan 
Disputations, who gave currency to the metaphor of 
culture as a specifically intellectual pursuit. “Just as a 
field, however good the ground, cannot be productive 
without cultivation”, Cicero wrote, “so the soul cannot 
be productive without education”. Philosophy, he said, 
is a sort of “cultura animi”, a cultivation of the mind or 
spirit:  “[I]t pulls out vices by the roots”, he said, “makes 
souls fit for the reception of seed”, and sows in order to 
bring forth “the richest fruit”. But even the best care, 
Cicero warned, does not inevitably bring good results: 
The influence of education, of cultura animi, “cannot be 
the same for all:  Its effect is great when it has secured 
a hold upon a character suited to it”. That is to say, the 
results of cultivation depend not only on the quality of 
the care but also on the inherent nature of the thing 
being cultivated. How much of what Cicero said do we 
still understand? 
In current parlance, “culture” (in addition to its 
use as a biological term) has both a descriptive and 
an evaluative meaning. In its anthropological sense, 
“culture” is neutral. It describes the habits and customs 
of a particular population:  what its members do, not 
what they should do. Its task is to inventory, to docket, 
not to judge. 
But we also speak of “high culture”, meaning not 
just social practices but a world of artistic, intellectual, 
and moral endeavour in which the notion of hierarchy, 
of a rank-ordering of accomplishment, is key. 
Let me pause to introduce one more bit of 
etymology:  “[H]ierarchy” derives from words meaning 
“sacred order”. Egalitarians are opposed to hierarchies 
in principle; what does that tell us about egalitarianism?
Culture in the evaluative sense does not merely 
admit, it requires judgment as a kind of coefficient or 
auxiliary:  Comparison, discrimination, evaluation are 
its lifeblood. “We never really get near a book”, Henry 
James once remarked, “save on the question of its 
being good or bad, of its really treating, that is, or not 
treating, its subject”. It was for the sake of culture in 
this sense that Matthew Arnold extolled criticism as—
you all know the famous phrase—“the disinterested 
endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known 
and thought in the world”.
It is of course culture in the Arnoldian sense 
that we have primarily in view when we ask about 
the cultural roots of conservatism. And it is the fate 
of culture in this sense that I will be chiefly concerned 
with in these remarks. But it would be foolish to draw 
too firm a distinction between the realms of culture. 
There is much confluence and interchange between 
them. Ultimately, they exist symbiotically, nurturing, 
supplementing, contending with each other. The 
manners, habits, rituals, institutions, and patterns of 
behaviour that define culture for the anthropologist 
provide the sediment, the ground out of which culture 
in the Arnoldian sense takes root—or fails to take root. 
Failure or degradation in one area instigates failure 
or degradation in the other. Some people regard the 
astonishing collapse of manners and civility in our 
society as a superficial event. They are wrong. The fate 
of decorum expresses the fate of a culture’s dignity, 
its attitude toward its animating values, which is why 
conservatives have always regarded the degradation of 
manners as presaging other, more sinister degradations. 
Let me say something, too, about the nature of 
metaphors. The problem with metaphors is not that 
they are false but that they do not tell the whole truth. 
The organic image of culture we have inherited from 
Cicero is illuminating. Among other things, it reminds 
us that we do not exist as self-sufficient atoms but have 
our place in a continuum that stretches before and after 
us in time. Like other metaphors, however, it can be 
elevated into an absurdity if it is pushed too far. 
Oswald Spengler’s sprawling, two-volume 
lament, The Decline of the West, is a good illustration of 
what happens when genius is captivated by a metaphor. 
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Spengler’s book, published in the immediate aftermath 
of World War I, epitomized the end-of-everything 
mood of the times and was hailed as the brilliant key 
to understanding—well, just about everything. And 
Spengler really is brilliant. For example, his remarks 
about how the triumph of scepticism breeds a “second 
religiousness” in which “men dispense with proof, 
desire only to believe and not to dissect”, have great 
pertinence to an era, like ours, that is awash in New 
Age spiritual counterfeits. Nevertheless, Spengler’s 
deterministic allegiance to the analogy between 
civilizations and organisms ultimately infuses his 
discussion with an air of unreality. One is reminded, 
reading Spengler, of T. S. Eliot’s definition of a heretic: 
“a person who seizes upon a truth and pushes it to the 
point at which it becomes a falsehood”.
That said, for anyone who is concerned about 
the cultural roots of conservatism, there are some 
important lessons in the armoury of cultural instructions 
accompanying a humble tomato plant. Perhaps the chief 
lesson has to do with time and continuity, the evolving 
permanence that cultura animi no less than agricultural 
cultivation requires if it is to be successful. All those 
tips, habits, prohibitions, and necessities that have been 
accumulated from time out of mind and passed down, 
generation after generation. How much in our society 
militates against such antidotes to anarchy and decay! 
Culture thrives and develops under the aegis of 
permanence.  And yet instantaneity—the enemy of 
permanence—is one of the chief imperatives of our 
time. It renders anything lasting, anything inherited, 
suspicious by definition.  
Our culture wants what is faster, newer, less 
encumbered by the past. If we also cultivate a nostalgia 
for a simpler, slower time, that just shows the extent 
to which we are separated from what, in our efforts 
to decorate our lives, we long for. Nostalgia—the 
Greek word for “homesickness”—is a version of 
sentimentality—a predilection, that is to say, to distort 
rather than acknowledge reality. 
The attack on permanence comes in many 
guises. When trendy literary critics declare that “there 
is no such thing as intrinsic meaning”, they are denying 
permanent values that transcend the prerogatives of 
their lucubrations. When a deconstructionist tells us 
that truth is relative to language, or to power, or to 
certain social arrangements, he seeks to trump the 
unanswerable claims of permanent realities with the 
vacillations of his ingenuity. When the multiculturalist 
celebrates the fundamental equality of all cultures—
excepting, of course, the culture of the West, which 
he reflexively disparages—he substitutes ephemeral 
political passions for the recognition of objective 
cultural achievement. 
But what seems at first to be an effort to establish 
cultural parity turns out to be a campaign for cultural 
reversal. When Sir Elton John is put on the same level 
as Bach, the effect is not cultural equality but cultural 
insurrection. And if it seems farfetched to compare 
Elton John and Bach, recall the literary critic Richard 
Poirier’s remark in 1967, that “sometimes [the Beatles] 
are like Monteverdi and sometimes their songs are even 
better than Schumann’s”.
In the face of such levelling assaults, the most 
basic suppositions and distinctions suddenly crumble, 
like the acidic pages of a poorly made book, eaten away 
from within. Culture degenerates from being a cultura 
animi to a corruptio animi. 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World may be a 
second-rate novel—its characters wooden, its narrative 
overly didactic—but it has turned out to have been 
first-rate prognostication. Published in 1932, it touches 
everywhere on 21st century anxieties and has a lot to 
say, implicitly, about the cultural roots of conservatism. 
Perhaps the aspect of Huxley’s dystopian admonition 
that is most frequently adduced is its vision of a society 
that has perfected what we have come to call genetic 
engineering. Among other things, it is a world in 
which reproduction has been entirely handed over to 
the experts. The word “parents” no longer describes 
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a loving moral commitment but only an attenuated 
biological datum. Babies are not born but designed 
according to exacting specifications and “decanted” at 
sanitary depots like The Central London Hatchery and 
Conditioning Centre with which the book opens. 
As with all efforts to picture future technology, 
Huxley’s description of the equipment and procedures 
employed at the hatchery seems almost charmingly 
antiquated, like a space ship imagined by Jules Verne. 
But Huxley’s portrait of the human toll of human 
ingenuity is very up-to-date. Indeed, we have not—not 
quite, not yet—caught up with the situation he describes. 
We do not—not quite, not yet— inhabit a world in 
which “mother” and “monogamy” are blasphemous 
terms from which people have been conditioned to 
recoil in visceral revulsion. Maybe it will never come 
to that. (Though monogamy, of course, has long been 
high on the social and sexual revolutionary’s list of 
hated institutions.) Still, it is a nice question whether 
developments in reproductive technology will not soon 
make other aspects of Huxley’s fantasy a reality. Thinkers 
as different as Michel Foucault, Francis Fukuyama, 
and Michel Houellebecq have pondered the advent of 
a “post-human” future, eagerly or with dismay, as the 
case may be. Scientists busily manipulating DNA may 
give substance to their speculations. 
It is often suggested that what is most disturbing 
about Brave New World is its portrait of eugenics in 
action:  its vision of humanity deliberately divided into 
genetically ordered castes, a few super-smart Alpha-
pluses down through a multitude of drone-like Epsilons 
who do the heavy lifting. Such deliberately instituted 
inequality offends our democratic sensibilities. 
What is sometimes overlooked or downplayed is 
the possibility that the most disturbing aspect of the 
future Huxley pictured has less to do with eugenics 
than genetics. That is to say, perhaps what is centrally 
repellent about Huxley’s hatcheries is not that they 
codify inequality—nature already does that more 
effectively than our politically correct sensibilities like 
to acknowledge—but that they exist at all. Are they not 
a textbook example of Promethean hubris in action? It 
is worth stepping back to ponder that possibility. 
In the 17th century, René Descartes predicted 
that his scientific method would make man “the master 
and possessor of nature”. Are we not fast closing in on 
the technology that proves him right? And this raises 
another question. Is there a point at which scientific 
development can no longer be described, humanly, 
as progress? We know the benisons of technology. 
Consider only electricity, the automobile, modern 
medicine. They have transformed the world and 
underscored the old observation that art, that techne, 
is man’s nature. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether, 
after two hundred years of breathtaking progress, we 
are about to become more closely acquainted with the 
depredations of technology. It would take a brave man, 
or a rash one, to venture a confident prediction either 
way. For example, if, as in Brave New World, we manage 
to bypass the “inconvenience” of human pregnancy 
altogether, ought we to do it? If—or rather when—that 
is possible (as it certainly will be, and soon), will it also 
be desirable? If not, why not? Why should a woman go 
through the discomfort and danger of pregnancy if a 
foetus could be safely incubated, or cloned, elsewhere? 
Wouldn’t motherhood by proxy be a good thing—the 
ultimate labour-saving device? Most readers, I think, 
will hesitate about saying yes. What does that hesitation 
tell us? Some readers will have no hesitation about 
saying yes; what does that tell us? 
These are some of the questions anyone 
concerned with the cultural roots of conservatism will 
have to conjure with. 
As Huxley saw, a world in which reproduction 
was “rationalized” and emancipated from love was 
also a world in which culture in the Arnoldian sense 
was not only otiose but dangerous, and hence severely 
policed. This suspicion of culture is also a sub-theme 
of that other great dystopian novel, George Orwell’s 
1984, which ends with the work of various writers, such 
as Shakespeare, Milton, Swift, Byron, Dickens, being 
vandalized by being translated into Newspeak. When 
that laborious propaganda effort is finally complete, 
Orwell writes, the “original writings, with all else 
that survived of the literature of the past, would be 
destroyed”. 
The point is that culture has roots. It limns the 
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future through its implications with the past. Moving the 
reader or spectator over the centuries, the monuments 
of culture transcend the local imperatives of the present. 
They escape the obsolescence that fashion demands, the 
predictability that planning requires. They speak of love 
and hatred, honour and shame, beauty and courage and 
cowardice—permanent realities of the human situation 
insofar as it remains human. 
The denizens of Huxley’s brave new world 
are designed and educated—perhaps his word, 
“conditioned”, is more accurate—to be rootless, 
without culture. Ditto the denizens of Orwell’s 
nightmare totalitarian society. 
In Brave New World, when a relic of the old order 
of civilization—a savage who had been born, not 
decanted—is brought from a reservation into the brave 
new world, he is surprised to discover that the literary 
past is forbidden to most of the population. 
When he asks why, the bureaucrat in charge says 
simply:  “[b]ecause it’s old; that’s the chief reason. We 
haven’t any use for old things here”.
“Even when they’re beautiful?” asks the Savage. 
“Particularly when they’re beautiful”, replies the 
bureaucrat. “Beauty’s attractive, and we don’t want 
people to be attracted by old things. We want them to 
like the new ones.” 
Huxley’s brave new world is above all a 
superficial world. People are encouraged to like what 
is new, to live in the moment, because that makes 
them less complicated and more pliable. Emotional 
commitments are even more strictly rationed than 
Shakespeare. (The same, again, is true in 1984.) In the 
place of emotional commitments, sensations—thrilling, 
mind-numbing sensations—are available on demand 
through drugs and motion pictures that neurologically 
stimulate viewers to experience certain emotions and 
feelings. The fact that they are artificially produced is 
not considered a drawback but their very point. Which 
is to say that the brave new world is a virtual world: 
Experience is increasingly vivid but decreasingly real. 
The question of meaning is deliberately short-circuited. 
Huxley’s imagination failed him in one area. He 
understood that in a world in which reproduction was 
emancipated from the body, sexual congress for many 
people would degenerate into a purely recreational 
activity, an amusement not inherently different from 
one’s soma ration or the tactile movies. He pictured 
a world of casual, indeed mandatory, promiscuity. 
But he thought it would develop along completely 
conventional lines. He ought to have known that 
the quest for “agreeable sensations” would issue in a 
pansexual carnival. In this area, anyway, we seem to 
have proceeded a good deal further than the characters 
who inhabit Huxley’s dystopia. 
In part, the attack on permanence is an attack 
on the idea that anything possesses inherent value. 
Absolute fungibility—the substitution of anything for 
anything—is the ideal. In one sense, this is a product 
of what the philosopher Michael Oakeshott criticized 
as “rationalism”. “To the Rationalist”, Oakeshott wrote 
in the late 1940s, “nothing is of value merely because it 
exists (and certainly not because it has existed for many 
generations), familiarity has no worth and nothing is 
to be left standing for want of scrutiny”. The realm of 
sexuality is one area where the effects of such rationalism 
are dramatically evident. It was not so long ago that the 
description from Genesis—“male and female created he 
them”—was taken as a basic existential fact. True, the 
obstinacy of sexual difference has always been a thorn 
in the side of utopian rationalism. But it is only in recent 
decades that the engines of judicial meddlesomeness, 
on the one hand, and surgical know-how, on the other, 
have effectively assaulted that once permanent-seeming 
reality. 
What we are seeing in sexual life is the fulfilment, 
in some segments of society, of the radical emancipatory 
vision enunciated in the 1960s by such gurus as Herbert 
Marcuse and Norman O. Brown. In Eros and Civilization 
Marcuse looked forward to the establishment of what 
he called a “non-repressive reality principle” in which 
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“the body in its entirety would become … an instrument 
of pleasure”. The sexual liberation Marcuse hailed 
was not a fecund liberation. As in Brave New World, 
children do not enter into the equation. The issue is 
pleasure, not progeny. Marcuse speaks glowingly of “a 
resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality” that 
“protests against the repressive order of procreative 
sexuality”. A look at the alarmingly low birth rates of 
most affluent nations today suggests that the protest 
has been effective. 
When Tocqueville warned about the peculiar 
form of despotism that threatened democracy, he noted 
that instead of tyrannizing men, as past despotisms had 
done, it tended to infantilize them, keeping “them fixed 
irrevocably in childhood”. What Tocqueville warned 
about, Marcuse celebrated, extolling the benefits 
of returning to a state of what he called “primary 
narcissism”.  What Marcuse encouraged, in other 
words, is solipsism, not as a philosophical principle but 
as a moral indulgence, a way of life. I note in passing 
that Marcuse was a college professor:  How proud he 
would be of those contemporary universities which 
have, partly under his influence, become factories for 
the maintenance of infantilizing narcissism. 
A couple of concluding observations:  In Notes 
towards a Definition of Culture, T. S. Eliot observed that 
“culture is the one thing that we cannot deliberately 
aim at. It is the product of a variety of more or less 
harmonious activities, each pursued for its own sake”. 
“For its own sake”. That is one simple idea that is 
everywhere imperilled today. When we plant a garden, 
it is bootless to strive directly for camellias. They are 
the natural product of our care, nurture, and time. We 
can manage that when it comes to agriculture. When 
we turn our hands to cultura animi, we seem to be 
considerably less successful. 
Let me end by noting that the opposite of 
“conservative” is not “liberal” but ephemeral. Russell 
Kirk once observed that he was conservative because 
he was liberal, that is, committed to freedom. Kirk’s 
formulation may sound paradoxical, but it touches on a 
great truth. To be conservative:  that means wanting to 
conserve what is worth preserving from the ravages of 
time and ideology, evil and stupidity, so that freedom 
may thrive. In some plump eras the task is so easy we 
can almost forget how necessary it is. At other times, the 
enemies of civilization transform the task of preserving 
of culture into a battle for survival. That, I believe—
and I say regretfully—is where we are today.  
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